








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Royakkers, L. M. M. (1996). Representing Legal Rules in Deontic Logic. [n.n.].
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





Representing Legal Rules in Deontic Logic
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, op gezag van
de rector magnificus, prof. dr. L.F.W. de Klerk,
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van
een door het college van dekanen aangewezen
commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op
maandag 1 april 1996 om 16.15 uur
door
Lambertus Maarten Maria Royakkers
geboren op 4 september 1967 te Heerlen
PROMOTOR : Prof. dr. W.J. Witteveen




Dit onderzoek werd gesteund door de Stichting voor Recht en Openbaar Bestuur (Reob),
projectnummer 415-03-014, welke deel uit maakt van de Nederlandse Organisatie voor
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO).
Acknowledgements
Here, I would like to express my gratitude to those who, in one way or another, have
contributed to it.
First of all I want to thank Frank Dignum íor his continuous support and guidance
over the past two years, and for spoiling my holidays. My thanks to John-Jules Meyer for
his valuable suggestions and comments during the first year of this project, and also to
Andries Sarlemijn who introduced me to deontic logic. I would also like to thank Vincent
Buskens for his comments on earlier versions of parts of this thesis.
Next, I would like to thank Willem Witteveen and the members of the reading com-
mittee: John-Jules Meyer, Corien Prins, Harrie de Swart and Marek Sergot.
I am grateful to my colleagues of Tilburg University for putting up with me while I was
a Ph.D. student; especially to Bart van Klink who has shared an office with me for four
years, for better and for worse. I would like to thank Hildegard Penn for correcting the
English of an earlier version of this thesis. Finally, I also owe thanks to Peter Sol and Ton
de Witte for designing the cover.




1.1 Logic and law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Deontic logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Standard deontic logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2 Ought-to-do and Ought-to-be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 Normative inconsistencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Conflicting speed limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Case ................................... 9
1.3.2 Article 63 and incompatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3 Speed limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.4 Undesirable consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.5 An alternative proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.6 Emergency service vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 The structure of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 Propositional deontic logic 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 The syntax of actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 The semantics of action expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2.3 S-sequence semantics of action expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.4 Positive and negative action expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.5 Actions and worlds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Deontic assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Paradoxes and semantics of the deontic operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Simple PDeL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
v
vi CONTENTS
3 Relativised deontic modalities in SDL 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Formalisations of relativised deontic modalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2.1 O(p) as the general or unspecific obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.2 The combined approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.3 Herrestad and Krogh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 The collective obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.1 The semantics of the collective obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.2 The interpretation of OX(p) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3.3 The strong and weak obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 The notions of obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5 The directed obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4 Relativised deontic modalities in PDeL 75
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 The extension of PDeL with actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.1 The semantics of individual event expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.2 PDeL(Evt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.3 The general and unspecific obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2.4 The relations between the notions of obligation and permission ... 89
4.2.5 The directed obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3 The extension of PDeL with groups of actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3.1 The semantics of collective event expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3.2 PDeL(Evt') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4 The strong and weak obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.4.1 The relations between group and individual norms .......... 102
4.5 When does a group satisfy a norm? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.6 Evaluation and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5 Deontic systems and authorities 113
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2 Authorities in SDLX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2.1 The relation between SDLX and SDLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.3 Normative inconsistencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.4 The system DÁ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.4.1 Conflicting norms or normative agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4.2 Some properties of DÁ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.5 Authorities in PDeL(Evt') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
CONTENTS vii
5.6 Normative systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6 Deontic inconsistency and universality 133
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.2 Authority hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.3 The promulgation and derogation of norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.3.1 Promulgation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.3.2 Derogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.3.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.4 Universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.4.1 Postulated universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
7 Defeasible reasoning with legal rules 157
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.2 Legal rules: rules and conditional norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.3 Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.4 Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.4.1 Defeasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.4.2 Violation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
7.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8 Conclusion 183
8.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.2 The Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990 revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185









1.1 Logic and law
Research on the application of computer science to law (legal informatics) is intimately
connected with jurimetrícs, formal logic, legal theory and the study of positive law (cf.
Sartor, 1992). Formal logic comprises the methodology of computer science in general and
is also an indispensable instrument of analysis of the interpretation of legal texts and the
assessment of the validity of legal reasoning (cf. De Wild, 1979). The close connection of
legal informatics and (deontic) logic is most pronounced in the study of expert systems'
and knowledge based systems2 in law.3 The nature of such systems is in part determined
by logical formalism used for the representation of the legal rules involved. In practice,
it turns out, however, that the results from modern deontic logic concerning the logical
structure of legal rules and of legal reasoning are not (explicitly) taken into account in the
construction of, e.g., knowledge based systems. Classical two-valued propositional calculus
is generally considered strong enough and is supposed to be adequate to cope with the
1 Expert systems are able to reason with complex rules as well as simple facts and several systems are
available which can understand subjects of natural language (cf. Frost, 1986, p. 1).
2A knowledge based system is a set of resources - hardware, software and possibly human - whose
collective responsibilities include storing the knowledge base, maintaining security and integrity, and pro-
viding users with the required input~output routines, including deductive retrieval facilities, so that the
knowledge base can be accessed as required. Unfottunately, at present, there is no widely accepted defi-
nition of `knowledge base' and this term is used by different people to mean different things. We define a
knowledge base as a collection of simple facts, such as `John drives on the motorway' together with general
rules, such as `it is forbidden to drive Íastet than 120 km~h on motorways' (cf. Frost, 1986, p. 3).
3Knowledge based systems are distinct from expert systems which are most often designed for specific
tasks such as mineral prospecting, medical diagnosis, fault-findíng and proving mathematical theorems.
Knowledge based systems might be used as components in expert systems. However, their use is not
limited to this. They can be used as general purpose sophisticated database systems or as components of
`special function' systems such as pattern recognition systems ( cf. Frost, 1986, p. 6).
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problem of the representation of legal rules and legal reasoning (see Koers, Kracht, Smith,
Smits and Weusten, 1989). This presupposition, however, can be seriously questioned. At
first glance, theory formation in legal informatics is not in line with the state of the art in
the field of deontic logic. The question can be asked whether or not there is a correlation
between this observation on the one hand and the rather limited usefulness and limited
sophistication of most existing expert systems in law on the other hand (cf. Susskind,
1987).
This research starts from the hypothesis that there is a connection between the relative
lack of interest in deontic logic (and in legal theory in general) of the builders of knowledge
based systems in law on the one hand, and the relative lack of usefulness for legal practice
of most expert systems and knowledge based systems as presented in the literature on the
other hand. This inquiry intends to improve the usefulness of knowledge based systems
in law by taking into account deontic logic in representing legal rules." The scientific
interest of this thesis is therefore given, since it tries to apply results from a science of a
highly theoretical and abstract nature (such as deontic logic) to an applied science as legal
informatics.
In modern logical theory it is generally acknowledged that legal rules and legal reasoning
cannot adequately be formalised and assessed in propositional or predicate calculus, and
that the system of deontic logic with specific deontic operators is required (see Brouwer,
Soeteman and De Wild, 1982). The state of the art in this field is described in hand-
books dating already from the seventies (cf. Alchourrón and Bulygin, 1971; F~llesdal and
Hilpinen, 1971; Von Kutschera, 1973; Reisinger, 1977). For more recent publications see
Martino and Socci Natali, 1986, especíally part two; Soeteman, 1989; Brouwer, 1990. A
formalisation of deontic notions is required in the cases, when violations must be accounted
for (cf. Jones, 1990). To express violations consistently, one has to distinguish what ought
to be done and what is the case. If this distinction cannot be made, the concurrent occur-
rence of a rule and the violation (which then is represented as the negation) of that rule
would render the system inconsistent.
In summary, we can say that the role of deontic logic with respect to knowledge based
systems in law is both necessary and important. We pose that no appropriate deontic logic
is available for legal expert systems and knowledge based systems in law, and that such
a logic should be constructed. Our aim is not to construct such an appropriate logic -
this would be aiming too high - but to develop a deontic system which will improve the
representation of legal texts and of legal knowledge in general, and to formalise adequately
legal reasoning by investigating deontic defeasibles reasoning and reasoning with normative
inconsistent information, such that legal expert systems, or knowledge based systems in
4Fot a discussion of the use of deontic logics in representing legal knowledge, see Herrestad (1991).
SLegal rules are taken to be inherently subject to exceptions, i.e., they are defeasible.
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law, can be improved.
The theory that is developed in this thesis is based on two standard deontic logics, one
for Ought-to-be statements, which we call `standard deontic logic' (see subsection 1.2.1),
and one for Ought-to-do statements, which we call `propositional deontic logic' (see chapter
2). The difference between Ought-to-be and Ought-to-do is discussed in subsection 1.2.2.
In this thesis, we will extend these standard deontic logics with some new concepts. These
concepts are:
~(groups of) actors (chapters 3 and 4);
~ authorities (chapter 5);
~ authority hierarchy (chapter 6);
~ defaults (chapter 7).
The latter two concepts relate to the notion of normative inconsistency (see section 1.2.3.).
In this thesis, we will not make a formal comparison between Ought-to-be and Ought-to-
do. Both approaches have their own merits. Neither do we aim to construct a combination
of the two approaches in this thesis.s This would lead us too far away from the main goal
of the thesis and, therefore, we leave it for further research.
In the following two sections, we introduce the two main pillars of this thesis. In the next
section (standard) deontic logic is introduced, together with some of its main problems.
In section 1.3, we present an in-depth discussion of a case of conflicting speed limits on
the basis of a judgement by the High Court. This case is a good example of the type of
problems that are encountered in representing legal rules. It serves the motivation for the
research into new concepts in deontic logic which is pursued in this thesis. In chapter 8,
we will analyse and formalise these problems on the basis of the concepts discussed in the
other chapters.
1.2 Deontic logic
Deontic logic7 is a branch of philosophical logic concerning reasoning about norms, or in
other words, about normative versus non-normative behaviour. It is the logic of obligations,
prohibitions and permissions. As such, it is relevant for the foundations of ethics and law.
Deontic logic has been used to analyse the structure of normative law and normative
6Fot a formal approach of the relation between the Ought-to-do and Ought-to-be we refer to d'Altan,
Meyer and Wieringa (1993).
~The adjective deontic is derived from the Greek word `áeovr~c', which means `as it ahould be'.
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reasoning in law.s In this thesis, we will use deontic logic as a tool for representing legal
rules.
Not much is certain in deontic logic, in contrast to, for example, propositional and
predicate calculus. There are not many principles, in whatever deontic system, which
are undisputed; i.e., which cannot be accepted as rational reconstructions of normative
reasoning. There is, nevertheless, a formal system on which several other systems are
based, although it has been disputed as a whole as well as with regard to its theorems.
Most other systems can be regarded as extensions of standard deontic logic. One may,
therefore, to a certain extent rightly speak of a`standard system of deontic logic'. This
is even more justified by the fact that alternative systems have often been developed as a
reaction to this system. Every deontic logician has to determine, in one way or another,
his attitude towards this standard system. In the following section, we briefly discuss this
standard system.
1.2.1 Standard deontic logic
In standard deontic logic (SDL), three deontic operators are used: `O' (obligatory), `F'
(forbidden) and `P' (permitted). By connecting propositions to these operators as argu-
ments, well-formed formulas of the system originate from which, by interpretation of the
propositions, normative judgements can be formed. E.g., O(p) means `it is obligatory that
p'. The deontic operators can be defined in terms of one another. If we take `O' as a
primitive, then the other operators can be defined as follows:
. F(p) -de~ O(~p);
. P(p) -def ~O(~P)-
Thus, `it is forbidden that p' is defined as `it is obligatory that not-p', and `it is permitted
that p' is defined as `it is not obligatory that not-p'.
By standard deontic logic, a modal (Kripke-style) version of the now so-called `Old
System' of Von Wright (1951), we mean the system D`9 based on propositional logic and
axiomatised by the rule of inference:
(ROM) P~9
~~P)~~~41'
`~However, as so many subjects in philosophical logic and philosophy in general, the subject was aLso
picked up by computer scientists and AI (artificial intelligence) reseazchers. Deontic logic proved to be
relevant as well for such prosaic mattets as authorisation mechanisms, decision support systems, database
secutity tules, fault-tolerant software and database integrity constraints; thus, outside the area of legal
analysis and legal automation. A survey of applications can be found in Meyer and Wieringa (1991).
9System D' is the smallest notmal Ií D-system of modal logic (cf. Chellas, 1980).
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together with the following axiom schemata:lo
(OC) (O(P) n O(9)) ~ O(P n 4)
(ON) O(p v ,p)
(OD) ,O(p n ,p)
(Df.P) P(P) - ~O(,P)
The semantics of this system can be given using the following model structure ~t~l -
(W,1Z, V) consisting of three elements:
1. the set of possible worlds W-{wr, w2, ...};
2. the accessibility function R E ~Z, which takes a world and returns a subset of W:
R:W-~2W;
3. a valuation function V, which assigns the values `true' or `false' to a proposition at
a world in W.
The intuition behind the function R is that it yields the deontically ideal worlds relative
to a given world. The truth conditions for O and P can now be defined as follows:
~1d,w ~ O(p) iff R(w) C ~[p] (1.1)
and
M, w~ P(P) iff R(w) n Í~P] ~~, (1.2)
with tlre function Q] E L-~ 2W and L the set of well-formed formulas of the propositional
calculus.'r Thus, O(p) holds in w if and only if p is true in all ideal worlds with respect to
w, and P(p) holds in w if and only if there is at least one ideal world with respect to w in
which p is true.
The following constraint
R(w)~0fora1lwE W (1.3)
is added to validate the schema (OD). Tlre truth conditions (1.1) and (1.2) are sufficient
to validate the rule and all other schemata. Thus D' is sound.'~
loAxiom (ON) was rejected by Von Wright (1951, p. I1), since he developed the principle of deontic
coníingency: `A tautologous act ís not necessarily obligatory, and a conttadictory act is not necessazily
forbidden'. We have to commit outselves to this axiom, since otherwise we cannot view deontic logic as a
branch of Kripke-style normal modal logic.
tl[p] -{w~V(w,p) - true}. It is easy to see that the following properties hold: [pV q] -[p]U[q],
[p n q] - [P] n [q] and [~p] - [P].
tZA system is sound iff for all well-formed formulas p it holds that if F- p then k p.
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1.2.2 Ought-to-do and Ought-to-be
The expressions in deontic logic are read as `it is obligatory (forbidden, permitted) that ...'
followed by a descriptive sentence, or are read as `it is obligatory (forbidden, permitted)
to ...' followed by a verb (or verb phrase) for a category or type of action or activity.
The reading of the deontic operators with `that' and `to', respectively, may be said to
answer to two different types of deontic logic. The first type is a logic of that which ought
to, may or must not be, and the second a logic of that which ought to, may or must not
be done. According to Castaíieda (1970, p. 452):
In short, deontic statements divide neatly into: (i) those that involve agents
and actions and support imperatives, and (ii) those that involve states of affairs
and are agentless and have by themselves nothing to do with imperatives. The
former belong to what we used to call the Ought-to-do and the latter to the
Ought-to-be.
The difference between Ought-to-do and Ought-to-be matters greatly. Suppose `p' stands
for the description of the act `to feed the monkeys', then F(p) is read as `it is forbidden
to feed the monkeys'. This rule is broken if someone feeds the monkeys. If `p', on the
other hand, stands for the proposition or the description of the state `the monkeys are fed',
then F(p) is read as `it is forbidden (to accomplish) that the monkeys are fed', which is a
different interpretation. The second prohibition demands more than the first prohibition,
since one does not only break the rule if one feeds the monkeys, but also if one neglects to
act if another person feeds the monkeys. The norms `it is forbidden that the monkeys are
fed' and `it is forbidden to feed the monkeys' are not equivalent. Thus, it depends on the
interpretation of the norm content one uses, and is especially relevant for the analysis of
legal rules, which mostly belong to Ought-to-do and not to Ought-to-be (the `duties of care'
constitute an exception to this). A system expressing Ought-to-do sentences fits better with
the common-sense interpretation of legal rules, especially in criminal 1aw13, since norms
are mostly concerned with behaviour, and are thus essentially related to individuals; they
constitute somebody's obligation, permission or prohibition.
Theoretically, it does not matter which type of logic (Ought-to-do or Ought-to-be) one
uses for a non-relativised deontic logic and that is why authors often leave this problem
out of consideration in their publications. However, in a relativised deontic logic14 the
interpretation of the norm content matters greatly, for example with respect to conflicting
13Criminal law is concerned with behaviour: if an illegal situation is mentioned in the description of
an offence, the question is taised as to who created this situation ( by action or omission) and who is
responsible for continuing the situation. Thus, from the illegal situation a certain type of behaviour is
derived, as it were.
14Relativised deontic modalities are concerned with what is obligatory for or permitted to an actor or
group of actors, as contrasted with what is impersonally obligatory or permitted (see chapters 3 and 4).
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norms.IS Suppose `p' is the description of an act, e.g., `to feed the monkeys', then the
obligations `it is obligatory that the zoo caretaker i feeds the monkeys' and `it is obligatory
that visitor j does not feed the monkeys' are not in conflict. However, if `p' is a proposition
or a description of a state of affairs, e.g., `the monkeys are fed', then the obligations `it
is obligatory that the zoo caretaker i brings about (accomplishes) that the monkeys are
fed' and `it is obligatory that visitor j brings about that the monkeys are not fed' are in
conflict.
Bailhache (1981, p. 76), for example, interprets the norm content as the description of
a state of affairs:
It is advisable to note that this formula [Oy(p) -~ PZ(p)16, Royakkers~ appears
paradoxical only if the normative addressee is unduly identified with the subject
of proposition p. The formula does not say for example that `if y is obliged
to go into that house, then z is also permitted to go in'. The formula only
corresponds to the following: as soon as an addressee is obliged that such a
thing is accomplished, normative coherence makes it necessary that all other
individuals are not obliged that this thing is not accomplished (in other words,
that they are permitted that it is accomplished).
In SDL, we cannot deal with actions; norms are expressed by applying a sentential operator
O to sentence letters p. Now, O(p) cannot be read as `it is obligatory to do p', for then
p would not be a sentential letter. In `it is obligatory to feed the monkeys', `to feed
the monkeys' is not a sentence.l~ Thus, SDL is inadequate for representing Ought-to-do
statements, and thus also inadequate for representing legal rules.
A fairly adequate approach to express Ought-to-do statements is system PDeL (propo-
sitional deontic logic), developed by Meyer (1988, 1989). This system is an extension of
SDL using Anderson's (1967) variant of SDL with propositional dynamic logic. This
system will be discussed in chapter 2.
1.2.3 Normative inconsistencies
As stated above, normative inconsistencies play an important role in legal reasoning. In
this subsection we take a closer look at these inconsistencies. Let us consider the following
1sTwo obligations ate in conflict if and only if it is impossible to fulfil both obligations simultaneously.
1sThis formula is read as `if it is obligatory fot individual y that p, then it is permitted for individual z
that p'.
1TVon Wright (1951) interpreted the norm content as a description of an action (`act-qualifying proper-
ties'), by introducing `performance-values' which ate strictly analogous to the truth values in alethic logic
and thus present the opportunity to compound actions. E.g., action pl~q is performed if and only if action
p is performed and action q is performed. However, then system SDG as a logic of Ought-to-do is still not
satisfactory. The central point of this problem consists of the interpretation of the internal negation. For
an analysis of this problem, we tefer to Brouwer (1990).
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two norms: `it is obligatory to feed the monkeys' and `it is forbidden to feed the monkeys'.
At first glance, we would say that these norms are conflicting since they cannot be fulfilled
simultaneously. This is correct, if we assume that these norms are related to one and the
same individual. If we add actors to these statements, we obtain norms which mostly
do not conflict: `it is obligatory for the zoo caretaker to feed the monkeys' and `it is
forbidden for visitors to feed the monkeys.'18 Thus, by adding actors to a deontic system,
some (normative) inconsistencies can be removed. This will be done in chapters 3 and 4.
However, contradictory or conflicting norms can still be found - and mostly very frequently
- at least in law. Suppose, for example, the norms: `it is permitted for the visitors to feed
the monkeys' and `it is not permitted for the visitors to feed the animals'. These norms
are contradictory. To express this consistently, we can add authorities to the statements
(see chapter 5). For example, `authority a enacted that it is permitted for the visitors to
feed the monkeys' and `authority 6 enacted that it is not permitted for the visitors to feed
the animals'. Now we can consistently express that authorities have enacted contradictory
or conflicting norms. However, we have to determine which of the two contradictory or
conflicting norms should be followed. Many researchers have suggested to treat these norms
by means of defeasible reasoning. In chapter 7, we investigate how to include defeasible
reasoning in a deontic logic. Another possibility is to use the authorities to prioritise the
norms, by means of an authority hierarchy. This is done in chapter 6.
1.3 Conflicting speed limits
In this section, based on Royakkers (1995), we give an extensive description of an example
from the Dutch Traffic Regulation to illustrate the types of problems we try to solve in
this thesís.19
The amendment of the Dutch Trafl"ic Regulation 1966 (in Dutch: `Reglement Verkeers-
regels en Verkeerstekens 1966' - RVV 1966) has led to a great deal of largely justified crit-
icism. The Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990 was supposed to become the political showpiece
of deregulation. Compared to the 1966 Act, the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990 showed that
a simplification and reduction of regulations in the critical field of road traffic was possible.
The aim of the legislature was to increase the credibility of the rules. According to Otte
(1993), however, the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990 turned into a total fiasco as regards
simplicity, accessibility and comprehensibility. Also, in a number of articles for the Dutch
lsIn the logic of Cuppens (1993), norms are conflicting if an actor has two roles, X and X', and is obliged
to do something with respect to X and is forbidden to do the same thing with respect to X'. Cuppens
gave the following example: an agent is a Christian and a soldier. He ought not to kill, because he is a
Christian, but he ought to kill, because he is a soldier (if he is ordered to kill).
19The reason for choosing the Dutch Ttaffic Regulation that this part of Dutch law contains a minimum
of fuzzy concepts. Therefore, it seems to lend itself for formalisation.
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journal Verkeersrecht, Otte and Simmelink (1993) discussed some of the structural flaws in
various rules of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990. In one of their so-called `Kronkels in het
RVV 1990' (Twists in the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990), `De bijzondere snelheidsmaxima
in het RVV 1990' (The special speed limits in the Dutch Trafl'ic Regulation 1990), they
question the effectiveness of the speed limit rules. They discuss this on the basis of a case
such as the following.
1.3.1 Case
On a national route road A28, within the city limits of Zwolle, a lorry from the firm H.I.
drove at a speed of 96 km~h. H.I. was imposed an administrative sanction on the ground
of `a lorry exceeding the speed limit by 15 to 20 km~h'. An appeal was lodged with the
public prosecutor and the subdistrict court judge, because H.I. was of the opinion that, on
the road in question, traffiic signs indicating a speed limit of 100 km~h were in force, and
that, therefore, no sanctionable act had been committed, for traflic signs override traflïc
rules.20
According to Otte and Simmelink, the subdistrict court judge will find it hard to rule
in this case, and they advise the following:
Our advice is twofold. The subdistrict court judge has no choice but to pro-
nounce the appeal by the lorry driver valid and to quash the court order by the
public prosecutor. When the Dutch Traffic Regulation is evaluated - or sooner
- the legislator will have to amend the Dutch TrafTic Regulation. (...) Neither
is it desirable to amend arts. 21 and 22 of the Dutch Traífic Regulation. The
solution should be sought in amending art. 63 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation
1990.
In the proceedings that led to High Court judgment HR 61-93-V,21 the subdistrict court
judge ruled differently. His motivation was the following:
In art. 22 of the Dutch Trafiic Regulation 1990,22 it is laid down that for
lorries the special speed limit of 80 km~h holds. In art. 63 of the Dutch Traffic
Regulation 1990, it is laid down that traffic signs override traffic rules, in as far
as these rules are incompatible with the signs. From the text it appears that
traffic signs only override trafí'ic rules if they are in conflict with the trafiic rules.
ZoArt. 63 of the Dutch T~affic Regulation 1990: Ttaffic signs override trafFic rules in as far as specific
rules aze incompatible with specific signs.
21DD, 99.137.
ZzArt. 22 of the Dutch ~affic Regulation 1990: In as far as no lower speed limits have been set in other
articles, the following special speed limits hold for the follow~ng vehicles: a. for lorries, buses and vehicles
with trailers 80 km~h; (...).
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This is, according to the subdistrict court judge, not the case here. Traflic sign
A1 indeed indicates the speed limit, but as this is not in conflict with the traf~ic
rule as stated in art. 22 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, the latter rule
remains in force. Traf~ic sign A1 is a regulatory sign (a speed limit of 100 km~h
in this case) and does not imply a higher speed limit in force for particular
vehicles such as lorries.
H.I. appealed to the court of cassation of this judgement, but the High Court rejected this
appeal. In his conclusion, Advocate-General Meijers clearly indicated why, in his opinion,
there is no conflict between or incompatibility of trafí'ic sign and traf~ic rule here.
According to art. 63 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, the prohibition of
art. 22 preamble and sub a, Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, would, for a lorry
driver, be lifted by a traf~ic sign if that traffic sign were to imply a compulsory
minimum speed limit of 81 km~h on that particular section of the road. Only
in such a case would there be incompatibility of rule and sign.
1.3.2 Article 63 and incompatibility
In what situations are traffic signs and traffic rules incompatible? To answer this question,
we will first take a close look at the notion of `incompatibility'. Two rules are incompatible
if, and only if, they lead to contrary results or conclusions. Let us consider the following
example. Car driver il is on a major road and approaches a junction, where car driver i2
approaches from the left. According to art. 15 of the Dutch TrafFic Regulation 1990, i2
has to give way to il, who approaches the junction from the right. Also, according to the
right-of-way signs (A6 and A9), i2 has to give way to il. So, it will be clear that there is no
incompatibility between traffic rule and trafí'ic signs in this case. However, we do not know
exactly on the basis of which i2 has to give way. In the case of an offence in such situations,
it does not matter whether the violation of a traffic rule or a traffic sign is held against
the suspect. Now, suppose that i2 approaches the junction from the right. On the basis of
art. 15 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, il has to yield right of way and, according to
the right-of-way signs (A6 and A9), i2 has to yield right of way as well. In a logical sense,
there is no incompatibility between signs and rule here; there is a deadlock, however: both
drivers have to yield right of way. The relevant rules and signs do not lead to contrary
conclusions. However, we may also apply a different interpretation to the situation. On
the basis of the principle of trust, we may assume that the obligation of one means the
right of the other. `Trust' here means that a road user can, in principle, expect the other
road users to observe the rules (cf. Simmelink, 1995). On the grounds of the rule in art.
15 and the principle of trust, iz has right of way, and il does not; on the grounds of the
right-of-way signs and the principle of trust, il has right of way, and i2 does not. In this
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formulation il both has right of way and has not, which is clearly a case of incompatibility.
So, on the basis of art. 63, iz has to yield to il. Strictly speaking (considering the letter of
the law), there is no incompatibility; when considering the underlying aims, there is indeed
incompatibility between signs and rule.
The necessity of the condition `in as far as specific rules are incompatible with specific
signs' in art. 63 lies in the fact that, should this condition be lacking, a traffic rule could
suspend all rules in force at that moment, meaning that no rules are in force as long as
there are traffic signs, which is absurd, to say the least. For example, il drives his car at
the speed of 100 km~h within a built-up area, and is halted by a policeman, because il is
not permitted to drive faster than 50 km~h. il can, however, refer to the fact that there
was a traffic sign (for example a`right-of-way' sign) and that this sign overrides the rule, so
that the rule (speed limit of 50 km~h) is no longer in force. In the case mentioned above,
this would mean that the lorry driver would be in the right, because the sign overrides the
rule, which is thus suspended.
1.3.3 Speed limit
Opinions differ as to the question whether rules and signs pertinent to the speed limit are
incompatible or compatible, as can be seen from the motivation by the district court judge,
which was not in line with Otte and Simmelink's advice. The explanatory memorandum
to the Dutch Traffic R.egulation 1990 indicates that there is incompatibility in this case:23
The systematic structure of art. 63, according to which traffic signs override
traffic rules, implies that a different maximum speed indicated by traffic signs
- such as 30 or 70 km~h inside a built-up area - need not be incorporated into
the rules of this section.
Let us consider the meaning of traffic sign A1, which indicates that a speed limit of 100
km~h holds for that particular part of a motorway.24 This only means that each car doing
over 100 km~h breaks the law. We obey the law if we drive at a speed of 10 or 20 km~h.
But this does not mean that we also observe other possible prohibitions or obligations
concerning speed, for example that drivers must adjust their speed to the traffic situation
or to weather conditions. Taking weather conditions into account may mean that our
maximum speed should be 80 km~h, which implies that, when driving at a speed of 90
km~h, we may observe the former prohibition, but not the latter order. This example
shows that the prohibition to drive faster than 100 km~h can only mean that every speed
under 100 km~h is permitted in as far as one does not have to take other speed orders or
prohibitions into account. The prohibition to drive faster than 100 km~h only means that
23Bu1letin of Acts and Decrees, 1990, 459, Explanatory memorandum, p. 103.
24Hereafter, this traffic sign will be referred to as `A1 (100)'.
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we will, in any case, break the law if we drive at a greater speed than 100 km~h. This
implies that a traffic sign indicating the prohibition of any speed over 100 km~h is not in
conflict with the prohibition in the rule to drive at a greater speed than, for example, 80
km~h. For, if it is not permitted to drive faster than 80 km~h, it is certainly not permitted
to drive faster than 100 km~h.
This can be illustrated with a simple mathematical example. Assume the following
statement to be correct: `x is greater than 0 and x is a natural number'. In a logical
sense, this statement is equivalent with the statement `x is a natural number'. Thus, the
statements `x is greater than 0' and `x is a natural number' are not incompatible. The
statement `x is greater than 0' is only limited; `x is a natural number' implies that x is
greater than 0. x- 4.5 is in agreement with the former, but not with the latter statement.
This means that the two statements are not incompatible, since there are values for x that
do lead to a true statement. Two statements are incompatible if no value can be found for
x that satisfies both statements, such as `x is greater than 0' and `x is smaller than 0'.
The prohibition to exceed the speed limit of 100 km~h clearly does not imply that it
is by definition permitted to drive at a speed of 96 km~h: one has to take other speed
prohibitions and orders into account, such as art. 25 of the Trafflc Act.25 It would be
absurd to stick to this meaning when one considers the following example. There is a
trafflc jam on the motorway, and a car is driving at a speed of 100 km~h. The driver
breaks the law in this situation, and he cannot maintain that it was permitted to drive at
a speed of 100 km~h on this section of the road. The High Court and the Advocate-General
are in agreement on the meaning of the prohibition to exceed the 100 km per hour limit
in the case presented above.
What are the consequences of traffiic sign A1 (100) for car drivers? On motorways
outside built-up areas, a speed limit of 120 km~h is in force. On the approach of the A1
(100) traffiic sign, the maximum speed of 100 km~h holds for car drivers, not, however,
because the trafl~ic rule is incompatible with the traffic sign. The speed limit of 120 km~h
still holds, because cars are still not permitted to drive faster than 120 km per hour. The
prohibition is, however, restricted by another prohibition, namely the prohibition to drive
faster than 100 km per hour. The traffic sign has a speed-reducing effect on the rule. For
lorry drivers traffiic sign A1 (100) has no meaning: for them this sign carries superfluous
information, because they are not permitted to drive faster than 80 km~h, so not faster
than 100 km~h anyway. The result is that art. 63 of the Dutch Trafl'ic Regulation 1990
can never be applicable as regards speed limits, because speed limits do not conflict.2ó
ZSArt. 25 of the Traffic Act: On the road, it is prohibited to act in such a way that the freedom of
ttaffic is hindeted without necessity or that road security is jeopardised or may reasonably be expected to
be jeopardised.
Z67}affic signs and traffic rules can only be incompatible in situations concerning right of way and
changing lanes.
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1.3.4 Undesirable consequences
The motivation by the district court judge, which was supported by the High Court, poses
problems, however. In many cities, so in built-up areas, there are, for example, A1 traffic
signs on circular roads, indicating that it is prohibited to drive faster than 70 km~h. Many
drivers will, and justifiably, take this sign to mean that it is permitted to drive at a speed
of 70 km~h. This is, however, in disagreement with the motivation by the district court
judge and the Advocate-General. Accordíng to art. 20 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation
1990, a speed limit of 50 km per hour holds for motor vehicles inside built-up areas. Traffic
sign A1 (70) does not imply that on that particular section of the road the minumum speed
is 51 km~h. So, there is no conflict here between traffic rules and traffic signs, with the
result that traffic sign A1 (70) is totally superfluous and has no other meaning than that it
is not permitted to drive at a greater speed than 70 km~h. This we already knew, because
it is not permitted to drive faster than 50 km~h anyway. In this case, the district court
judge will reason as follows: `Traffic sign A1 (70) is a regulatory sign (meaning that it is
prohibited to drive faster than 70 km~h) and does not imply that the speed limit in force
for motor vehicles in built-up areas is raised.'
There is a similar problem in the case of national routes and motorways inside built-up
areas. From the above it follows that it is prohibited to drive faster than 50 km~h on
such roads, because they are inside built-up areas. It was, of course, the intention of the
legislator to indicate that the prohibition to drive faster than 50 km~h is no longer in force,
and that on such roads it is prohibited to drive faster than 100 or 120 km~h, respectively.
In the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, however, the legislator did not define the speed limit
on national routes and motorways inside built-up areas.27
1.3.5 An alternative proposal
In art. 22 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, the following, superfluous information is
given: `... in as far as no lower speed limits have been set in other articles'. It would have
been sufficient to state: `For the following motor vehicles the following speed limits hold:
a. for lorries, etc.' The motor vehicles mentioned will also have to observe lower speed
limits, because they belong to the category of motor vehicles.
Section 8 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990 could be amended as follows, which
would solve the problems discussed above. The proposed article will thus replace arts. 20,
21 and 22.
The following speed limits hold:
a. for motor vehicles on motorways 120 km~h, on national routes 100 km~h
and on other roads 80 km per hour;
~~Cf. arts. 20 and 21. The maximum speed limit on motorways has only been set outside built-up areas.
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b. for lorries, buses and motor vehicles with trailers 80 km per hour;
c. for mopeds and motorised wheelchairs inside built-up areas 30 km~h and
outside built-up areas 40 km~h;
d. for tractors and construction vehicles 25 km~h.
The Dutch Traffiic Regulation 1990 distinguishes between driving inside and outside built-
up areas. This aspect is largely lost in the alternative proposal.28 The standard `it is
prohibited to drive faster than 50 km~h' on, for instance, motorways inside built-up areas,
is left out. This alternative has two advantages: first, the rules can be applied consistently,
and second, the legislator's wish is expressed in a clearer way. The legislator's intention is
stated precisely in these rules. In the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, this is definitely not
the case.
Furthermore, traffic signs A1 will have to be given a different meaning. In my proposal
they contain three components:
1. A different speed limit is indicated.
2. A possibly different speed limit is lifted. Traffic sign A1 thus also contains the
meaning of traffic sign A2,29 with respect to a previous, possibly different speed
limit.
3. For as long as no different speed limit is indicated, the present speed limit holds.
These traffiic signs therefore apply to zones.
We have seen that these different speed limits do not conflict with the speed limits according
to the traffic rules in the proposed art. 20. The speed limits, as indicated in art. 20, remain
in force. In the alternative proposal, different speed limits are provided for by traffic signs
A1, and are, by definition, only applicable to those road users for whom this implies a lower
speed limit according to art. 20. For road users for whom a speed limit holds according to
art. 20, a traffic sign A1 indicating a higher speed limit is superfluous, but no contradicting
information.
1.3.6 Emergency service vehicles
There is one case in which art. 63 has a nasty consequence, as Otte and Simmelink
(1993) described in their `Kronkels in het RVV 1990', `The regulation concerning so-called
"emergency service vehicles"', with regard to art. 50 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990.30
ZdOnly for mopeds and motorised wheelchairs, the distinction between inside and outside built-up areas
remains.
~9~affic aign A2 means: `end of speed limit'.
~Art. 50 of the Dutch Tl~affic Regulation 1990: Road users aze obliged to give way to drivers oí
emergency service vehicles.
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They discuss the following situation. A passenger car driving on a major road approaches
a junction, and at the same time a police car with flashing light and sirens approaches from
the right. On the ground of a traffic rule (art. 50 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990),
the driver of the passenger car has to give way to the driver of the police car, but on the
ground of the right-of-way signs, the driver of the police car has to give way to the driver
of the passenger car. As signs and rule are incompatible in this case, the driver of the
passenger car has right of way on the ground of art. 63. Otte and Simmelink, therefore,
conclude that the position of emergency service vehicles is not adequately provided for.
It is clearly the intention of art. 50 that police cars, fire engines and ambulances with
operating signals should always have right of way, but this cannot be concluded from the
systematic structure of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990. This problem can easily be
solved by replacing art. 50 by:
Yielding right of way by road users to drivers of emergency service vehicles
overrides traffic lights and traffic signs and rules that regulate right of way.
This sentence could, systematically, best be incorporated in the section `General provisions'
of chapter 3 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, which also contains art. 63.
1.3.7 Conclusion
We may conclude that rules and signs that provide speed limits can never be in conflict. The
ruling of the district court judge in the case discussed is correct, but leads to undesirable
situations concerning the speed limit inside built-up areas. As a consequence, the letter
of the law with regard to the speed limit is not in agreement with the spirit of the law in
the Dutch Traflïc Regulation 1990. This does not contribute to the credibility of the law.
The reason for this lies in the distinction that is made between driving inside and outside
built-up areas, and the lack of clarity about the notion of incompatibility. By means of
the solution given above and by clarifying the notion of `incompatibility' the problems
concerning speed limits will be solved.
A very undesirable situation also occurs in the applica,tion of arts. 50 and 63 Dutch
TrafHc Regulation 1990, but here too a simple adjustment of art. 50 suffices.
1.4 The structure of this thesis
In this thesis, we will address the problems indicated in the previous section by extending
the two standard deontic logics.
In chapter 2, we discuss system PD~L, which can formalise Ought-to-do statements and
some modifications of this system. In chapters 3 and 4, relativised deontic modalities are
investigated in SDL and PD~L, respectively. We will see that the addition of actors and
16 Introduction
groups of actors gives new expressive power, and the formulas of these relativised deontic
logics acquire new meanings, not expressible in SDL and PDeL. They are, therefore,
subject to new intuitions. The systems developed in chapters 3 and 4 will be extended to
authorities in chapter 5. Authorities are responsible for the establishment of norms and
supervising the enactment of the norms. With the addition of authorities to a deontic
system, we can consistently express conflicting norms enacted by (sets of) authorities.
However, this does not determine which norm should be followed in cases of conflicting
norms: this will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7. In chapter 6, we introduce the term
`authority hierarchy' to overcome this problem. The authorities are used to prioritise the
norms they enacted. Chapter 6 also discusses some related issues such as promulgation,
derogation and universality. Chapter 7 presents a defeasible deontic reasoning formalism
based on preferences, which can deal with conditional norms and inconsistencies between
interpretation rules, in contrast to the theory developed in chapter 6, to treat conflicting
norms. Finally, in chapter 8, we apply the concepts - investigated in chapters 2 up to and
including 7- to some cases related to the case of `conflicting speed limits', discussed in the
present chapter, and some areas for future research are indicated.
Chapter 2
Propositional deontic logic
In this chapter, we will discuss the system PDeL (Propositional Deontic Logic), developed
by Meyer, and some modifications to this system. The system will be extended to include
actors and authorities, in chapters 4 and 5, respectively.
2.1 Introduction
The system PDeL (Propositional Deontic Logic) was developed by Meyer (1988, 1989).
Meyer defined PDeL as a modal logic, following an article by Anderson (1967). The basis
for PDeL is the logic framework of (propositional) dynamic logic. The reduction of deontic
operators to dynamic ones uses Anderson's violation atom V to indicate that an action took
place that violates one of the deontic constraints, i.e., that the performance of a forbidden
action leads to a bad state of affairs. A bad state of affairs can be, e.g., a sanction, a
liability to sanction or trouble. What exactly the consequences are of a bad state of affairs
is another matter, and depends on the philosophy one adheres to. Our interpretation of the
constant V is: the situation is in contravention of the law. Whether it leads to a sanction
will be left aside here.
(Propositional) dynamic logic (e.g., Harel, 1984) consists of the normal propositional
language extended with modal operator [Q] for every action ~3 in the language. Expression
[~3]~ means that ~ holds after ,~ has been performed. The essential reason to describe
deontic logic as a variant of dynamic logic is that now actions and assertions can be
strictly separated, because:
~`an action may change the current situation (world) and an assertion does not'
(Meyer, 1988, p. 109);
~`only assertions can be asserted and actions can be acted or performed. So it is
meaningless to state the obligation O~ of some proposition ~, such as OOa, where
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~ is taken to be the assertion stating that the action n is obligatory' (Meyer, 1988,
p. 109);
~`the fact that actions change situations implies some notion of passing time' (Meyer,
1988, p. 109).'
We can see [Q]~ as a refined version of Q-~ ~ in traditional deontic logic, the difference
being that actions and assertions are strictly separated, and a notion of time-lag is built
in. In this approach, Q is forbidden (F(Q)) is reduced to a dynamic expression as follows:
F(Q) - [Q]~!
It is also easy to express the deontic modalities of `permission' and `obligation' in dynamic
logic, once so-called negated actions (e.g. `~3') have been added to the syntax of actions.
In this chapter, we present a formal introduction to the syntax and semantics of PDeL:
section 2.2 presents the language of actions. The language of PDeL assertions and their
formal semantics, and the formal system PDeL itself are discussed in section 2.3. Section
2.4 discusses the semantics of the deontic assertions starting from some well-known para-
doxes. In section 2.5, we present a simplified version of PDeL used in this thesis. Finally,
we draw some conclusions.
2.2 Actions
Actions are the semantic counterparts of the action expressions used in dynamic logic (and
thus used in PDQL). The semantics of an action expression is a set of sets of actions. We
will come back to this in subsection 2.2.3.
2.2.1 The syntax of actions
We define A as the set of action symbols. An atomic action is denoted by an underlined
action symbol (a). A is the set of atomic actions. Furthermore, we introduce a special
action symbol skip, which is not an element of A~ and a special action symbol 6, which is
neither an element of A, and which models failure. Together, they constitute the set of
semantic elementary actions.
lA deontic system in which time is a central notion is given by Van Eck (1982). The main difference
between the tempotal treatment in Van Eck's system and PDeL is the definition of the accessibility
relation. Van Eck defines this relation between wotlds within one time-slice, and in PDeL the relation is
defined between worlds with different `time-stamps'.
ZThe skip symbol, introduced by Dignum (1989, p. 188), is comparable with the c process in process
algebra.
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The set of all action expressions Act can now be determined by the following BNF for
its elements (Q)
Q ;;- a~Ql U Qz~Qi~~i~Qi;~z~Q~any~fail~skip~change.
The meaning of Ql U Qz is a choice between ~1 and Qz, Qr~Qz stands for the simultaneous
performance of Q~BaQz, Q1;Qz stands for the sequential composition of Ql and ,Qzi and Q
stands for the negation of action expression Q. The any action expression indicates a
universal or `don't care which' action. The change action expression can then be charac-
terised as a`don't care which, but not the skip' action. The skip action expression stands
for the empty action; that is, the action that has no effect (`does nothing'). Finally, the
fail action expression expresses the action that always fails. After this action, the system
stops and nothing can be done any more.
The performance of an atomic action a(e.g., to walk) involves the performance of a
(semantic) elementary action a(to walk), possibly together with other elementary actions
(e.g., to whistle, to look, etc.), and followed by an arbitrary performance of future actions
(e.g., to run, to eat, etc.). Thus, we have to be careful not to confuse an atomic action
(expression) a with the semantic elementary action a. The meaning (denotation) of a only
stipulates (specifies) the performance of a corresponding semantic a, but we are free to
perform any other set of elementary actions simultaneously with a.
2.2.2 The semantics of action expressions
We give the semantics of action expressions by sets of sequences of what are called syn-
chronicáty sets. These sets denote sets of elementary actions that are performed simultane-
ously. The following definitions formally describe the synchronicity sets, the way in which
they can be combined to form sets of sequences of synchronicity sets and the semantic
counterparts of the syntactic operators on action expressions.
Definition 2.2.1
~ Set {6} is a synchronicity set (s-set~.
~ Set {skip} is an s-set.
~ Every non-empty subset of A is an s-set.
We will use S, Sl, Sz, ..., S', ... to denote s-sets. The powerset of s-sets with actions in A
will be denoted by S(the set of non-empty s-sets). In concrete cases, we will write such a
set using brackets. Thus, the s-set consisting of the action skip is written as [skip] and the
s-set consisting of actions al and az is written as
S-láz J ,
20 Propositional deontic logic
and
s - {[at], [as], [as], [
az ] ~ [ as
al
a2
, , a2 },a3
a3
with A- {al,a2ia3}. Note that S does not contain s-set [b] nor s-set [skip].
Definition 2.2.1 prevents the simultaneous performance of the special actions skip and
b with other actions, because they are not in A. This is needed because it is, of course,
not possible to perform an action and at the same time do nothing, or have a deadlock.
To denote the courses of performances of actions, we use sequences of s-sets, which we
shall call synchronicity sequences. These sequences can be finite or infinite, although in
practice they will usually be finite. The definition of a sequence is as follows:
Definition 2.2.2 A synchronicity sequence ~s-sequence~ is a fanite or infinite sequence
SISy...Sn... Of S-SCtS St.
E stands for the empty sequence.
Only the last s-set of an s-sequence may be [b].
We refer to the number of s-sets in an s-sequence t as the length of t, denoted by 1(t).
!(E) - 0. ~It is possible that 1(t) - oo.)
We use t, tl, tz, ...t', ... to denote s-sequences. In a particular case, we can write
a3a
t- 1 aa [ó],a2 as
with 1(t) - 3.
By defining sequences of s-sets, obviously it must be possible to concatenate these
sequences. This is possible by using the `o' operator, which is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.3 Let t- 51...5„ and t' - Si...Sm... be two s-sequences (t' possibly infi-
nite~, then
tot'- ' (
51...SnSi....S~,y... 2f sn ~ lb]l t Zf S~ - [ ]
If t is an infinite s-sequence, then t o t' - t for any s-sequence t'.
t O E- E O t- t,
Note that [ó] o t - [6].
Since the language of action expressions contains a choice operator introducing non-
determinism, we have to consider sets of s-sequences as the semantics of an action expres-
sion. Moreover, non-determinism is introduced by using the open specification of actions,
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as we have seen in the intended semantics of a. That is, a indicates a choice between all
possible actions in which a is at least performed. Each s-sequence in such a set stands for
a possible choice of a sequence of synchronicity sets. We use T, Tl, T2i ..., T', ... to denote
sets of s-sequences.
Domain A of the action model is now given by:
Definition 2.2.4 A is the collection of sets T consisting of s-sequences.
We also define the length and concatenation of sets of s-sequences.
Definition 2.2.5 The length of a set of s-sequences T, denoted by 1(T), is defined as
follows:
1(T) - mT (1(t)).
We use I(T,TI) to denote that 1(T) - 1(Tl) - 1.
Definition 2.2.6 Let T and T' be sets of s-sequences. Then T o T' is defined as the set of
s-sequences {t o t' ~ t E T, t' E T'}.
Note that T o{e} -{e} o T- T and that T o {[b]} - {t o[ó]~t E T} and {(b]} o T-{[6]}.
Example 2.2.7 Let S1iS2,53 be s-sets, V;,~E{i,z,3}ni~~((S~ ~ S~) n(S;,S~ ~[ó])), Tl -
{S1SZS3[b], S1S253S2, SZS2S3} and T2 -{Sl [b], S1S2}, then
1. 1(T,) - 4;
2. 1(T2) - 2;
~i. Tl O Ty -{Sl.s2.sg[tt], S1.SySgSyS1[ó], SiSySgS2S1S2i S2S2`53Sllb]i S2`52S3S1S2}~
4.1(Tl oT2)-6.
To give the denotation for all action expressions in Act, we define operations LJ, fl and "
on domain A, which we will use as semantic counterparts of the syntactic operators U, 8c
and -, respectively, in the language Act. We first present some definitions that will help in
defining these operators. The first definition is of a function pref that gives all the prefixes
of a given s-sequence.
Definition 2.2.8
pref(t) - {t'~t' o t" - t}.
e is an element of the pref of any s-sequence.
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Example 2.2.9
P~.~[ai][as] [ a9 J ) - {E, [ail, [ai][azl, [ai][az] I a4 J }.
The next function defines the longest common prefix of two s-sequences.
Definition 2.2.10 Let t- 51...5„ and t' - Si...Sm... be two s-sequences.
Then maxpref(t, t') is the longest s-sequence t" such that t" E pre,~t) and t" E pref(t').
(Note that if Sl ~ Si, maxpref(t, t') - e.)
Finally, we define an operator on sets of s-sequences which deletes s-sequences ending in [b]
if there is another sequence that is the same but with [b] replaced by another s-sequence.
Definition 2.2.11 Let T be a set of s-sequences. Then
T6-T`{t~t-t'o[s]n~t--ET{t"~tnt'E pre~t")}}.
This operator is closely related to what is called failure removal in De Bakker, Kok, Meyer,
Olderog and Zucker (1986). The idea is that failure is avoided if possible, i.e., if there
is a non-failing alternative. Such an interpretation of non-determinism, where a`good'
alternative is preferred to a`bad' one, is sometimes called
Broy, 1986).
Example 2.2.12 Using example 2.2.7, it holds that
1 Ti - {S1S2S3S2iS2S2S3}~
. T2 - {S,S2};
. (Ti o T2)b - {S1S2S3S2S1S2i 5'ZS2S3S1S'2}.
Now we can define the semantic operators on A.
Definition 2.2.13
. fl on s-sequences is defined by:
For s-sequences tl and t2:
angelic non-determinism (cf.
tl, if maxP~Í(ti, ts) - tz
tl fl t2 - t2i if maxpre,f(t~, t2) - tl
maxpref(tl, t2) o [b], otherwise
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~ n on sets of s-sequences Ji is defined by:
For s-sequences T, and Tz in A,
t n t2 6T, n T2 - ( Us,ET,,tzETs{ 1 }) .
Definition 2.2.14 LJ on sets of s-sequences in .,4 is given by:
For T,, T2 E A, a
T,uT2-(((T,uT2)`(T,nT2)~U(T,nT2)) .
Definition 2.2.15 " is defined as follows:
1. For an s-set S,
S - (S u {(skip]}) `S.
,2. For a non-empty s-sequence t- S, ... S,,, .. .,
t-{S', .. . S„-,S„ ~ S', ... S„-,.S„ E pref(t)}.
~i. For a non-empty set T E A,
T-n{t~tET}.
Note that S - [b].
As was suggested in their notation, n and U resemble ordinary set-theoretical intersec-
tion n and union U. The only difference is that the former two operators account for the
prefixes of the s-sequences involved. Operator n of two argument sets of s-sequences that
are not equal, but one is the prefix of the other, yields the one with the longest sequence,
and if neither of the s-sequences is a prefix of the other, we take their maximal common
prefix, after which we register a conflict between the sequences by putting [b] at the end
of the maximal common prefix, since the rest of the sequences cannot be performed simul-
taneously. Operator L1 of two argument sets of s-sequences, one of which is a proper prefix
of the other, yields only the shortest.
The definition of operator " consists of three clauses. Clause (1) is straightforward: if
we want to indicate that an s-set S~ [b] is not involved, we may express this by considering
all other s-sets in S, and if we want to indicate that one does not fail, any s-set is possible.
Clause (2) expresses that if we want to say that an s-sequence t is not involved, we have
to consider all s-sequences t' with I(t') C I(t), where the performance of s-sets according
to s-sequence t are followed up to some moment and then contain a different s-set in
S U{[skip]}. Clause (3) states that the negation of a set T of s-sequences considers all
negations t of s-sequences t E T and takes the n-intersection of these sets.
To obtain a better understanding of these semantic operators on A, we will give some
examples.
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Example 2.2.16 Let A- {al, az}. Then
1. {[al]} n{[ al J ,[ai] L al 1 }-az az
({[al] n [ al J } u {[a~] n [ai] [ al 1 })6 - {[b], [al] [ alaz az az
{[ai] [ QZ ] },'
J}á-
2. {[al]} U {[al]} - (({[al]} ` {(a~]}) U {[a1]})á - {[al]};
3. {[ai]} U{[ a2 J ,[ai] I a2 1 }-
~~({[a~l, [ a2, , [a~l [ a2, }) `({[a~l} n { [ á2, , [a~l [ a2 ) }))U
({[ai]} fl { L a2 J,[al] [ a2 J}))á -
(({[ai], [ a2 J , [ai] [ az J } `{[ai] [ az J }) U ~~ó - {[ai], [ a2 J };
~. {[al]}- - (S U {[skip]}) `{[al]} - {[skip], [al], [az], L a2 J } `{[at]} -
{[skíp], [az], [ a2 J };
5. [b]- - S U {[skip]};
6. {[al], [ a2 J } - {[a,]} n { [ a2 J } -
{[skip], [az], [ a' ~ } n {[skip], [ai], [az]} -
az
{e o [b], [skip], [az]}6 - {[skip], [az]}.
2.2.3 S-sequence semantics of action expressions
With the above-mentioned definitions, we can now define the semantics of action expres-
sions from Act.
Definition 2.2.17 Semantic function Q] E Act -~ .A is given by:
1. Qa] -{S E S~a E S};
2.2 Actions 25
,2. QQi; Qz~ - QQi~ o Q~z~;
~3. QQi U i~z~ - Q~i~ U Q~t~;
4. Ql~~ ~l~z~ - QQ~ ] n QQz~ r
5. Q;a~ - QQ~~;
6. Qskip~ - {[skip]};
7. Qfail~ - { [b] };
8. Qany~ - S U {[skip]};
9. Qchange~ - S.
Remark. The meaning of action expression a is expressed by Qa~: we specify the perfor-
mance of elementary action a ( simultaneous with some package of actions). Thus, only
the performance of a is determined. Clause (8) expresses that in the denotation of action
expression any the execution of one arbitrary s-set in S U{[skip]} is specified.
Example 2.2.18 Let A-{al, az, a3}. Then
r 1 r al
~ ~al -{[al ]el az 1 i L a3~i a2 }i
L a3
az
~ 41 - { [ a2 ] , [ a3 ] , a3 , [Sk2~]}i
(' j al
~ a18caz -{ I al J , az };lL az a3
~ al U az -{[ai], [a2],
L az J
~I a1 J ,l az J ,LLL lll aza3 a3
~ Qany~ -{[Sk2P]e [al],[a2], la3]~ I a2 1 ~ L a3 J ~[ a3
~,,al
a3
1 r 1 al al
~ Q(ai~az ; ai az -{~ áz J [skiP], I az J [a3], az [skiP]~ az [as]}.` a3 a3
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In this section, we also introduce an auxiliary notion that we need to be able to refer to the
length of action expressions and the equality of action expressions in terms of the length
and the equality in the semantics of the action expressions.
Definition 2.2.19 Let Q E Act. The length of Q is defined as 1(Q) - 1(QQ]).
Definition 2.2.20 We put Ql -A Q2 iff QQl] - QQ~D.
We can now state the following proposition concerning actions and their relations:
Proposition 2.2.21
~ For ,A, the foldowing properties concerning U and 8c operator hold:
1. QUQ-AQ;
2. Q~Q -.a Q;
3. Qi~Qs -A Qa~Ql;
4. Ql U az -.~ Q~ U al;
J~. Ql~(N2 U F~3) -A ( N1óLQ2) U(Q1ÓLN3);
6. NI U(N2~Q3) -A (Nl U N2)~(Ql U Q3).
~,A satisfies the following properties regardáng `;':
~. Ql U (al; Q~) -d Ql;
~. Ql~(Qz; Q3) -~ (Ql~a2);,~, if l(QQl], Qa~]);
~i. (I'1;N2)~(1~3;h~4) -A (N1~Q3); ( F~2~Q4)i Zf 1(~Ql]iQF~3])i
4. (a; al) ~(Q; Q2) -A Q; (Ql U Q~);
5. (Ql; Q) U (as; Q) -.a (Ql U Qz); Q, if I(QQl], QQs]).
~,.4 satisfies the following properties regardáng r':
1. p U Q-A any if 1(Q) - 1;
2. QBc,Q - ,~ fail;
~. Ql U Q2 -A á1~Q2;
4~ Q1~N2 -A Yl U N2;
5. Q -a Q;
s. h'1; l~2 -A Nl U ( Yl; N2).
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~ For A, the following properties conceraing the special action expressions hold:
1. (i U fail -A ~3;
2. any - ,~ fail;
3. ,0 U any -a anY;
4. any -,~ change U skip;
5. skip - ,~ change.
Proof. Can directly derived from the definitions. See also Meyer (1988) and Dignum
(1989).
Corollary 2.2.22 Let A1 be a subset of A such that for all T E,A1 it holds that l(T) - 1,
then (Al, U, 8e,-, fail) is a Boolean algebra.
Below, we define a normal form for action expressions. This form is needed for some axioms
on the postconditions of actions. These axioms only hold if the action expressions are in
normal form (cf. Dignum and Meyer, 1990).
Definition 2.2.23 An action expression Q E Act is said to be án normal form (or to be a
normal action~ if the following holds.
Every subexpression of Q of the form Ql U Q2 or Q18aQ2 has the property that U{tl n tz~tl E
QQI],t2 E QQ2] and tl ~ tz} - lh, i.e., Q~31] and Q~Z] have no intersection consisting of
s-sequences that do not occur in óoth sets.
The subclass of Act consisting of action expressions in normal form will be denoted by
Acto .
The normal form excludes mainly sequential compositions that are a union of two action
expressions, one of which is a prefix of the other. The simplest example hereof is al U(a1; a2).
Fortunately, the following theorem holds for A:
Proposition 2.2.24 For any action expression ,Q E Act, an action expression (il E Acto
exists such that Q-,~ Ql.
Proof. This is clear from proposition 2.2.21.
IVTote that if ,(31 U~ is in normal form, then QQl U Q2] - QQi] U]~]. And also, if ~18aQ2 is
in normal form, then QQ1ócQ2] - QQl] fl Q~a].
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2.2.4 Positive and negative action expressions
In this subsection, we discuss some special actions: the positive and negative actions. We
will use these special actions in chapter 4. There we will see that it makes a difference
whether a group of actors performs a positive or a negative action. A positive action is an
action that involves a certain kind of physica,l activity: a bodily movement and muscular
activity, whereas a negative action refers to refraining from a physical activity: an omission
(cf. Brouwer, 1990, p. 205). For instance, `to move the table', `to close the window', `to
walk', `to overtake', etc., are all positive actions and `not move the table', `to be silent',
`not walk', etc., all constitute negative actions. However, the difference between positive
and negative actions is not clear cut, beca,use (1) in several cases it is difficult to decide
whether an action is positive or negative, and (2) a negative action is a non-action and, at
the same time, a`mode of action or conduct'.
Omissions are imputed to actors, and have to be taken into account in the dynamic
variant of the deontic logic that treats omission as different from merely by not performing
something. In PD~L, we define omissions (negative actions) in terms of not-performing
and in terms of the notions of ability and opportunity (cf. Van Linden, Van der Hoek and
Meyer, 1996). In this view, someone omitted (neglected) to do something if he could have
done it, but did not do it.
Definition 2.2.25 We define
1. the set Actp of positive action expressions by the following BNF for its elements
ry ::- a~ryi Uryz~ryi8~7z~any~change,
with ry~, ryz E ActP, and
2. the set Act„ of negative action expressions by the following BNF for its elements
ry --- a~7i U 7z~7i~7z~fail~skip,
(7~:
~7i:
with ryl, yz E Act,,.
Note that
~ AdP U Act„ C Act. The converse (Actp U Actn ~ Act) does not hold because, for
instance, alóeáz E Act, but is not an element of Actp U Act,,;
~ Actn fl Act„ - g;
~ ry E Act„ iff ry E Actp. This follows immediately from the definition.
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2.2.5 Actions and worlds
We have to relate the action expressions in Act to worlds in which they are performed.
Intuitively, the performance of an action in a world yields (a collection of) world(s) in
which one arrives after having performed the action. The semantics of action expressions
in a certain world can be given informally as follows.
Imagine a world w in which certain assertions hold. Then, by performing an elementary
action a one moves into a next world w'. In world w', other assertions may hold than in
w, since a may have changed something. For instance, if in w the proposition
~ - `the window is open'
is true and a is the action `close the window', then proposition ~ clearly does not hold any
longer in w', but
~' - `the window is closed'





If one moves into a next world, other assertions may hold, except if one performs the action




In general, QQ] may lead one into one of several, possible worlds, due to the fact that we
have a choice operator U in our language. Thus, Qfi] may map w into a set Wp,w of worlds.
Schematically:
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Now we can give the semantics of the various operators regarding Act:
~(,Q1;Qz): this simply stands for performing Ql first and ~3z next. For elementary
actions al and az, we can present this as follows:
[al~ [az~.--~
w w




where Wp,.~,w - Uw~EW~,,wWQ4,w~.






~~1 U~Z: the performance of Ql or QZ (or both). For elementary actions al and aZ we
get:
In general:
The semantics are based upon world transformations owing to action expressions Q in
Act: given a state w, QQ~(w) yields a collection of worlds which one obtains after having
performed the action expression Q. Formally, we stipulate that a set W of worlds assigns
values to propositional variables and a given function p: S U[b] U[skip] -~ (W -~ W),
which for each s-set yields its behaviour in terms of world transitions. Thus, p(S)(w) gives
the next world, performing all elementary actions in S jointly in world w. Function p is
not further specified here, except for the s-sets [S] and [skip]. For these, it stipulates that
the failing s-set [6] has no successor world and that the s-set [skip] does not change the
successor world.
We choose the s-sets to be deterministic.
Definition 2.2.26
~ p([b])w - 0
~ p([skip])w - w
~ Function R(t) E W- -~ W is defined inductively by
- R(S)(w) - p(S)(w) for S E S U[b] U [skip];
- R(tl o t2)(w) - R(t~)(R(tl)(w)) for s-sequences tl, t2i
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- R(T)(w) -{w' ~ w' - R(t)(w) for t E T} for T E A.
Note that R((tl o t2) o t3)(w) - R(tl o(t2 o t3))(w), since R((tl o t2) o t3)(w) - R(t3)(R(tl o
t2)(w)) - R(t3)(R(t2)(R(tl)(w))) - R(t2 o t3)(R(ti)(w)) - R(tl o(tz o t3))(w).
Definition 2.2.27 The semantics of action expressions in a certain world can now be
given 6y the function Q ~R : Act ~(W -. ~(W)):
QQ~R(w) - R(QQ~)(w).




Having given the semantics of action expressions, we can now discuss the language Ass of
PDeL. The language Ass of PDeL consists of assertions concerning action expressions in
Act, and is given by the BNF:
~ ::- ~I~~ ~ ~zl~t ~ ~21~~ --~ ~21,~1[Ql~,
where ~ denotes a propositional variable in L, being the language of the propositional
calculus. Further, we define V as the propositional variable with liability to sanction as
intended meaning. Expression [Q]~ means that ~ will hold after (i has been performed.
[~i]~ is a refined version of Q~~ in traditional deontic logic, the difference being that
now actions and assertions are strictly separated, and a notion of time-lag is built in.3
With the language Ass, we can formally express when an action is forbidden, permitted
or obliged. To express these notions, we use the following abbreviations:
Definition 2.3.1
F(~i) is an abbreviation of [Q]V;
P(~i) is an abbreviation of ~[Q]V;
O(Q) is an abbreviation of [Q]V.
These three abbreviations justify our claim that we are c,oncerned with deontic logic. Thus,
deontic logic can be reduced to a system of dynamic logic.
3[Q]~ is known in the realm of programming as the `weakest precondition' of action expression (i with
respect to postcondition ~.
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Definition 2.3.2 A model M for PDeL is given by
M - ~A, W, QQ]R, ~),
where A is the set of actions, W a set of possible worlds, QQ]R afunction that associates with
action Q E Act and world w, the set of possible worlds to which the performance of Q leads,
and a the usual truth relation óetween worlds and sentences: ~r : W x L-~ {true, f alse}.
For the semantics of assertions, we employ the semantics Q]R of action expressions:
Definition 2.3.3 For w E W, ~1, ~Z E Assl, w~ ~1 V~Z, . .., w~~~1 are defined as
usual.
For the dynamic part, we define4
w ~ [~]~ t.,~dw'EIR1R(w)zv' ~ ~.
We write ~ ~ tff VwEt.yw ~ ~.
This can be represented as:
G Q~ is the dual of [Q]~: w ~G Q) ~ iff w~~[Q]~~, i.e. 3w~E~pIR~,,,~w' ~~:
Qln words: performing action (i in a world w necessarily renders proposition ~ true iff the propoaition
~ holds for all worlds w' after w and performing Q.
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To be able to reason with language PDeL, we introduce the following derivation rules:
Rules 2.3.4
(N) if ~ ~, then ~ [(~J~;
(s~~-Aa2~[a~l~-[az]~.
Note that the antecedent of rule (S) is not really an expression used in PDeL. It would,
however, not be difficult to axiomatise the equations given on the action expressions and
to incorporate them into our logic. Without formally performing so, we consider this to
be done and will not give all the axioms and derivation rules that are involved in this
axiomatisation. We also have the derivation rule modus ponens.
The following axioms hold for PDeL:
Axiom 2.3.5
1. all tautologies of the propositiorzal calculus;
2. [a](~~ -~ ~~) -~ ([a]~~ --~ [a]~2);
~. (a~; a2J~ - [~11([~21~);
4- [Q~ ~ Q~l~ - [Q~]~ ~ [Q~l ~;
5. [a~l~ ~ [a21~ -~ [Q~~a21~;
6. [failJ~;
7. [skip]~ - ~.
Some remarks
1. Axioms 2.3.5.4 and 2.3.5.5 only hold if the actions are in normal form. Axiom 2.3.5.4:
we have that al -A al U(al; a2), however, al ~~ al ~ n[(al; a2 ]~. Axiom 2.3.5.5:
we have that (al; a2) -,~ a18~(al; a2), and from a1 ~-~ al ~ V al; aZ ~ together
with 2.3.5.5, we get [al ~--~ [a18e(a~;a~)]~, and [alóc(a~; a2)]~ - al [a2 ~. However,
al ~ 74 a~ [a2 ~.
2. The soundness of axioms 2.3.5.1 and 2.3.5.6 is obvious; that of 2.3.5.2, 2.5.3.3 and
2.3.5.4 and rule (N) is proven as in standard dynamic logic. The soundness of 2.3.5.5
is proven as follows. Suppose we have w~[Ql]~, i.e.,
dw~EIPi1R~w)w~ ~ ~.
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Q~318eQ2] - QQi] fl QQ2], thus Q,018t~32] C Qp1] and, therefore, also Q~31Bc,132]R(w) C
Q~31]R(w). Hence, dw~E[p,s~R21R~wlw' ~~ as well, i.e., w~[,018t~32]~. Consequently,
w~[Ai]~ -~ [a~~az]~. Analogously, we can prove that w ~[~2]~ -~ [Q18c~32]~, and
thus w~[Q2]~ V[Q2]~ -~ [~318tQ2]~, which holds for all w. Therefore, axiom 2.3.5.5
is sound.
The soundness of axiom 2.3.5.7 is proven as follows. Suppose we have w~[skip]~,
i.e.,
dw'E[sklPln(w)w ~ ~.
But Qskip]R(w) -{w}, hence w~~, which holds for every w. Thus, axiom 2.3.5.7
is sound.
The soundness of rule (S) is proven as follows. Suppose we have w~[~1]~, i.e.,
dw'EUj11R(w)w~ ~ ~~
then d,,,~E[p,IRlwlw' ~~ holds, i.e., w~[~2]~, since Q~il] - Q,Q2], thus Q~il]R(w) -
Q~32]R(w) for all w E W. Consequently, [Ql]~ -~ [Q2]~. Analogously, we can prove
that w~[~32]~ -~ [Ql]~. Therefore, w~[Ql]~ -[Q2]~, so rule (S) is sound.
Thus, PDeL is sound. The natural question arises whether PDeL is complete with
respect to the semantics we have defined. The problem of completeness of the system
was discussed by Meyer (1989).
3. Axiom 2.3.5.6 states that if one is asked to perform an impossible action, e.g., ~318z~31i
then there are no successor worlds and, consequently, assertion ~ is true in all suc-
cessor worlds (since there are none). With this axiom, it is possible to prove, for
example, ~ O(any) ([fail]~ -~ [fail]V and [fail]V -~ O(any)): `Existence of an
empty normative system'. This theorem is part of the idea of viewing deontic logic
as a normal modal logic, which Von Wright rejected by his principle of deontic con-
tingency: `A tautologous act is not necessarily obligatory, and a contradictory act is
not necessarily forbidden' (Von Wright, 1951, p. 11).
4. Rule (N) states that a norm ~ cannot be remitted by any action if ~ can be derived
from the system.
Now we give some theorems of PDeL:
Proposition 2.3.6
1. ~ [~]true;
~. ~ [!~](~~ n ~~) - [l~l~l ~ [,~1 ~2,
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~i. F [Q~~i ~ [Q~~z -~ [Q~(~i ~ ~z);
4. ~ [Q~l~~ ~ [Qzl~~ -~ [Q~~Qz](~~ n ~z);
s. ~[Qil~1 n[Qzl~2 --~ [QL u Q2l(~1 v~z);
s. ~[Q~ u Qz u(Q~~Q~)]~ -[Q~ u Q~l~;
7. ~ F(Qi ~ Qz) - F(Q~) ~ F(Qz);
8. ~ F(Q~) ~ F(Qz) ~ F(Qi~Qz);
9. ~ F(Qi,Qz) - [Q~~F(Qz);
10. F- 0(Qi,Qz) - ~(Qi) ~ [Qi~O(Qz);
11. ~- O(Q~) ~ o(Qz) -~ o(Q~ ~ Q~);
1.~. ~ o(Q~~Q~) -~ o(Q~) ~ o(Q~);
1~. ~ o(Q~) ~ o(Qz) --~ o(Q~~Qz);
14. ~ P(Q~ ~ Qz) - P(Q~) ~ P(Qz);
15. ~ P(Qi~Qz) ~ P(Q~) ~ P(Qz);
16. I- P(Q~~Qz) -c Q~ ~ P(Qz);
17. f- P(Q) -~ Q ~ ~V;
18. F- P(Q) - ~o(Q);
19. ~ F(Q~) ~ F(Q~~Qz);
~0. ~ O(Q~~Qz) ~ ~(Q~);
21. ~ 0(Q~) -' o(Q~ ~ Qz);
22. F- 0(Q~ ~ Qz) ~ F(Qi) ~ ~(Qz);
2~i. ~ F(Qi~Qz) ~ ~(Qi) - F(Qz) ~ ~(Q~);
,~4. ~ F(Qi~(Q~; Qz)) - F(Q~, Qz);
25. ~ F(Qi ~(Á~~Qz)) - F(Q~) ~ F(Qz);
~s. ~ o(Q~ u Q~) - o(Q~);
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27. ~ O(Ql U Ql) - [fail]V - true.
Proof. 5ee Meyer (1988).
Among these theorems of the system, we find very familiar ones, both evident truths and
more controversial assertions. The desirable theorems include assertions such as
(7) Action Ql U Qz is forbidden iff both actions ,Ql and Qz are forbidden.
(9) Action Ql; Qz is forbidden iff Qz is forbidden if Ql has already been performed.
(10) Action Q1;Qz is obligatory iff Ql is obligatory, and Qz is obligatory once Ql has been
performed.
(13) Action ~318a~3z is obligatory if both actions Ql and ~3z are obligatory.
(17) Action Q is permitted iff there is a way of performing Q that avoids `trouble', i.e., iff
it is not obligatory to perform not-Q.
(19) If action Ql is forbidden, then every simultaneous action together with Ql is forbidden.
(22) If action Ql U Qz is obligatory and Ql is forbidden, then action Qz is obligatory.
Theorems 2.3.6.13, 2.3.6.18 and 2.3.6.27 correspond with axiom schemata (OC), (Df.P)
and (ON), respectively, of SDL. Schema
~[any] V,
corresponding with the schema ( OD) of SDL, cannot be derived from the rules and axioms
of PDeL. To add this axiom to PDeL, we have to introduce the following constraint into
the semantics:
~w~E[any1R(w)w' ~ V for all w E W.
This can be proven as follows. Suppose we have that w~~[any]V, i.e.,
-,tJw~EI~Y1R(w)w' ~ V,
which is equivalent to 3w~E[any1R(w)w' ~ V for all w E W.
Using this extra axiom, we are able to derive some more theorems such as
1. ~ -,p(Q~Q);
2. ~ O(Q) -' P(Q);
3. ~ F(Q) ~ ~O(Q);
4. ~ ,(o(Q) A o(Q)).
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At first glance, the a~ciom does not seem to be controversial, since it merely denies the
existence of impossible obligations. However, with the help of this axiom we can now
derive the formula
,(o(Q) ~ o(Q)),
which is controversial nowadays ( see, e.g., Alchourrón, 1969; Prakken, 1996; Meyer, Dignum
and Wieringa, 1996). The main objection to this formula is that it states that there is no
conflict of duties, which is clearly not in line with situations in daily life.s
It will be obvious that the system PD~L expresses Ought-to-do sentences. We think
that a system expressing Ought-to-do sentences fits better with the common-sense inter-
pretation of legal rules, since norms are essentially related to individuals: it is somebody's
obligation, permission or prohibition (cf. chapter 1). Furthermore, Meyer (1988) and
Meyer, Dignum and Wieringa ( 1994) showed that PDeL avoids some of the very nasty
paradoxes that often appear in other systems, especially in SDL.
2.4 Paradoxes and semantics of the deontic opera-
tors
The theorems and axioms of PDeL give rise to a further inspection of the semantics of
the deontic operators of PDeL. According to theorem 2.3.6.21, we can derive O(,Qr U p2)
from O(Ql). This is the well-known Ross ( 1941) paradox: `post the letter' implies `post
the letter or burn it'. However, this is not a proper anomaly; only if we make use of the
intentional meaning of the word `or', the theorem is contrary to our intuitions. But in our
system, we make use of the extensional meaning of the word `or', which we will call the
passive choice: the choice between ,QI and ~32 is an underspecification, because it concerns
Qr or Q2i without specifying which. Thus, O(Qr U,02) does not mean that the norm subject
is free to choose between Qr and ,02.
It merely means that the norm-subject is obligated to perform at least one
of both acts. In this meaning [O(Qr U QZ)] follows írom [O(Qr)], without it
sIn spite of this objection, some authors defend this schema for a deontic system. However, it would
be naive to think that a normative system is consistent, since we often find inconsistencies among legal
rules. Prakken (1996) gives a pragmatic view on the effect of these inconsistencies:
That in one particular situation a rule is dropped to maintain consistency does not mean that
it has no binding force at all, since in other, unproblematic situations it can still be applied.
I see no compelling reasons why the binding force of a deontic rule should be equated with
its application to every single occasion.
Horty ( 1994) defends this schema with the argument that the deontic systems are too weak without this
scherna.
2.4 Paradoxes and semantics of the deontic operators 39
being paradoxical: if one is obliged to perform [~31], then one is also obliged
to perform at least one of both [~il] and [~32]. By disobeying [O(~31 U ,[32)] thus
by performing [~i18zQz], [O((31)] is disobeyed as well; therefore it follows from
[O(~1)] that [O(~il U QZ)] has to be obeyed. ( Soeteman, 1989, p. 116)
With regard to the deontic status of Q2i nothing is said: QZ may be obligatory, forbidden
or permitted.
Analogously, we can discuss permission P(Q). P(~3) means that it is permitted to
perform ~3 in at least one way. Probably, there are many ways of performing (3, some of
which are forbidden; but if P(~3) holds, not all ways of performing Q are forbidden. This
corresponds with McLaughlin's paradox: `If one is permitted to walk in a public road and
to wear clothes, then one is permitted to walk in a public road' (P(Qlác~32) -~ P(Ql)).
According to McLaughlin ( 1955) it is now also permitted to walk in the public road not
wearing clothes, but McLaughlin misreads P(Ql). This formula does not mean that one is
permitted to perform ,Ol in every possible way. We are not permitted to walk in a public
road simultaneously disregarding traffic rules, or not wearing clothes.
From the above, it does not follow that operators O and P behave identically within
system PDeL. In PDeL, e.g., P(~31U~2) --~ P(,Ql)VP(~Z) is valid, but O(Q1U~i2) -~ O(~31)V
O(~3z) is not, and O(Ql) n 0(~32) -~ O(~318z~32) is valid, but P(Ql) n P(~32) -i P(Q18eQ2) not.
This follows immediately from the semantics.
In contrast with P(~i) and D(Q), prohibition F(~3) means that all ways of performing
~ are forbidden. This follows immediately from F(Q) - O(Q). Thus, F(,Ci) means that we
have to perform ~3, and that we are in trouble when performing Q. If, e.g., it is forbidden
to drive at a speed of more than 100 km~h, then every speed over 100 km~h is forbidden.
What is important here, is that really undesirable assertions such as O(~31) ~ O(,Ql -~
az), o(~) -~ o(o(a)), o(o(a)) -~ o(Q), ((o(~) n(~ -~ o(q)) --~ o(q)), (~ -~ q) ---, o(p -~
q) (see Hintikka, 1971; Castaíieda, 1981; Soeteman, 1989) are either false or nonsensical
(not even well-formed) in system PDeL. Also, in some cases the paradox just vanishes.
For example, consider Chisholm's ( 1963) paradox,s consisting of the following sentences:
1. It ought to be that a certain man goes to the assistance of his neighbours.
2. It ought to be that if he does go he tells them he is coming.
3. If he does not go, then he ought not to tell them he is coming.
4. He does not go.
Intuitively, this set of sentences is consistent, but it is problematic in SDL. In SDL, the
formalisation of these sentences would be:
6A thorough investigation of this paradox can be found in Smith (1994).
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1. O(p);
2. O(P -~ q);
3. ~p -~ O(~q);
4. ~p.
From 1 and 2 we can derive O(q), and from 3 and 4 we can derive O(~q). Thus, these
sentences are contradictory. However, in PDeL the intention is represented without any
problem as far as the first three sentences are concerned. Consider the assertion
o(Q~) ~ [a~lo(~z) ~ [a~]o(~z),
which is equivalent to
~(Q~; Rz) ~[A~](V n F(az)).
It is in principle obligatory to do Ql; Q2i but if Q, is not done, then, besides
already being liable to punishment for not performing ~1i one is also forbidden
to do ~32. So instead of arriving at an inconsistency we get a meaningful assertion
in this case. (Meyer, 1988, p. 120)
2.5 Simple PDeL
In this thesis, we will use a simplified version of PDeL as the basis for the logic we try
to develop. The simplification consists in the restriction to actions: we will not consider
sequences of actions. The inclusion of sequences of actions does not lead to semantic
difficulties, but complicates the syntax and semantics to the point that it would obscure
the issues that we try to clarify in this thesis.
The system Simple PDeL is axiomatised by the following rules of inference
Rules 2.5.1
(N) if ~ ~, then ~ [Q]~;
(S~ Q~ -.a Qz ~ [Q~]~ - [Qz]~.
and the axioms
Axiom 2.5.2
1. all tautologies of the propositional calculus;
~. [a](~, -~ ~z) ~ ([al~~ --~ [a1~2);
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~. [a~ ~ aZ]~ - [a~]~ ~ [a~]~;
4. [a~]~ ~ [a2]~ -~ [a~~a2]~;
5. [fail]~;
6. [skip]~ - ~.
In the remainder of this thesis, we will refer to this system as PDeL. In chapter 4, we will
extend this system to actors and in chapter 5 to authorities. For every action, an actor or
a group of actors will be specified performing the action.
2.6 Conclusions
The system PDeL presented in this chapter (together with its semantics) provides a very
workable framework for reasoning with Ought-to-do statements, in contrast to SDL, which
provides reasoning with Ought-to-be statements. Both systems have their value, since
sometimes we need to formalise Ought-to-do statements and sometimes Ought-to-be state-
ments (cf. chapter 1). We stress again, though, that a comparison between SDL and
PDeL is not a topic of this thesis.
Furthermore, the system PDeL does not contain the very nasty paradoxes that often
appear in other systems in the literature, especially where the connection between actions
and assertions is concerned.
Chapter 3
Relativised deontic modalities in SDL
Most deontic logics disregard the fact that obligations are thought of as obliging some
particular individual. These obligatory acts are impersonal; they relate to one and the
same individual all the time. They leave no possibility for directing acts to a particular
individual or group of individuals, or take account of the fact that some acts are obligatory
for some, but not all, (groups of) individuals. In this chapter', we discuss formalisations
of relativised deontic modalities in standard deontic logic concerning what is obligatory or
permitted for individuals or groups of individuals.
3.1 Introduction
We can distinguish three types of participants who play a very important role in a normative
system: the authorities, who enact the norms, the addressees, to whom the norms are
directed, and the counterparties, who have a`right' against the addressees. In law, the
word `right' is often used to designate `legal power', `legal claim' and `immunity granted by
an authority' (cf. Hohfeld, 1964).
The authorities are responsible for setting the norms and for supervising the enactment
of the norms. In this chapter, we do not discuss the role of the authorities (this will be done
in chapter 5). The role of the counterparties is very limited and is discussed at the end of
this chapter. The major topic of this chapter and the next one is the notion of addressees.
In the sequel, we will call the addressees (groups of~ actors or ~groups of~ individuals.
The notion of (groups of) actors has hardly been formalised (see Bailhache, 1981, 1991;
Royakkers, 1993; Wieringa and Meyer, 1993). Most deontic logicians seem to concentrate
their interest on one specific actor, and then discuss what his obligations are, whether
one obligation follows from another, what is meant when it is said that obligations are
consistent, and so on. Thus, the obligatory acts in these deontic logics are `impersonal'.
1Some of the ideas in this chapter were presented earlier in Hoyakkers and Dignum (1995c).
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We cannot say that
~ acts are obligatory for a particular individual or group of individuals,
or that
~ some acts are obligatory for some, but not all, (groups of) individuals.
Thus, conventional approaches to deontic logic employ impersonal deontic operators. These
approaches implicitly refer to one and the same individual all the time, explicit reference
being unnecessary (Hintikka, 1971). Sentences like `it is obligatory for John that the
window is closed and it is obligatory for Paul that the light is on' and `it is obligatory
for John that the window is closed and it is obligatory for Paul that the window is open'
cannot be expressed within these approaches. They are limited, since they are not able to
deal with problems related to (groups of) individuals.
Some researchers tried to include relativised deontic modalities in standard deontic logic
(SDL) and to define `personal' obligations and permissions in terms of the `impersonal'
ones. Relativised deontic modalities are concerned with what is obligatory or permitted
for an actor or group of actors, as contrasted with what is only impersonally obligatory
or permitted. Deontic operators are relativised to sets of one or more actors. However,
we show that all these extensions have some shortcomings. For instance, in the proposals
made by Bailhache (1991) and Hilpinen (1973), it is not possible to express consistently
normative conflicts of the type `it is obligatory for i~ that p' and `it is obligatory for i2
that ~p' and Hansson (1970) was forced to give up certain basic deontic principles, such
as O(p) -~P(~p), to construct a model for relativised deontic modalities.
If some form of relativised obligation is introduced, then the impersonal obligation can
be interpreted in several ways:
1. It is an obligation for all individuals ( general obligation).
2. It is an obligation for some unspecific individual ( unspecific obligation).
3. It is an obligation that implies the general obligation ( strong obligation).
4. It is an obligation that is implied by the unspecific obligation (weak obligation).
However, Herrestad and Krogh ( 1995) showed that all these interpretations have to deal
with one of the following two problems:2
~ the problem of interdefinability of non-relativised obligation and permission (i.e.,
~(P) - ~P(~P));
ZWe will see that these two problerns are related.
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~ the problem of asymmetry (e.g., the general obligation is coupled with the unspecific
permission).
We do not think that these two problems are problems of the interpretations, but features
of these interpretations. Relativised deontic logic is an extension of SDL; thus, with the
new expressive power and the new definitions of the O-operator, the formulas acquire new
meanings that cannot be expressed in SDL and are, therefore, subject to new intuitions.
In this chapter, we investigate these new intuitions for the interpretations mentioned: we
formalise some realistic, intuitive notions of these interpretations and analyse the properties
that hold for these interpretations.
Thus, in this chapter we add actors and groups of actors to SDL. The concept of
collective obligation - an obligation for a group of actors - is rather new, and can be
seen as an extension of the relativised deontic modalities concerning what is obligatory or
permitted for an actor. The motivation for this extension is that
~ there are situations that only can be accomplished by a group;
~ we can express group liability (e.g., liability for a trading partnership).
In chapter 1, we saw that in SDL norms are expressed by applying sentential operator
O to sentence letters p, meaning that O(p) must be read as an Ought-to-be statement.
We cannot express Ought-to-do statements in SDL, since in SDL we cannot talk about
actions. This means that the relativised obligation O;(p) will be read as `it is obligatory
for i that p' or `it is obligatory for i to accomplish p'. In the following chapter, we will
add actors and groups of actors to PDeL, so that we can express Ought-to-do statements
such as O(~i), `it is obligatory to do Q' and the related relativised obligation 0(i : Q), `it is
obligatory for i to do Q'.
This chapter is structured along the following lines. In section 3.2, some formalisations
of relativised deontic modalities are discussed. These formalisations concern connections
between impersonal deontic operators and deontic operators relativised to individuals.
5ection 3.3 introduces the notion of collective obligation. Here, the deontic operators are
relativised for groups of actors. Further, the strong and weak obligations are introduced,
and we formalise and analyse the properties that hold for these notions. Section 3.4 presents
a recapitulation of the relations of all the notions of obligation and permission that are
discussed in this chapter. In section 3.5, we briefly discuss the directed obligation on the
basis of the correlative terms `duty' and `right'. We finish with some conclusions.
3.2 Formalisations of relativised deontic modalities
In this section, some existing formalisations of relativised deontic modalities are discussed.
In these formalisations, the deontic operators are relativised to individuals: relativised
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deontic modalities are concerned with what is forbidden, obligatory or permitted for an
individual, as contrasted with what is only impersonally obligatory. Such an extension
of deontic logic is concerned with connections between obligations that bind particular
individuals, on the one hand, and impersonal obligations, on the other hand. We can
distinguish several obligations that bind particular individuals:
~ a personal obligation: an obligation for a specific individual;3
~ a general obligation: an obligation for all individuals;
~ an unspecific obligation: an obligation for some individual.
In order to make a comparison between the approaches, we translate the semantics of
the approaches into one and the same semantics. We use the following model structure
.M -(W, I, R, V) for system D; consisting of four elements:
1. the set of possible worlds W-{w1,w2,...};
2. the non-empty set of individuals I-{il, iz, ..., i„};
3. the set R of functions: {R;, ,..., R;,, } for each individual il, iZ, . .., i„ E I. Thus,
7Z. -{R; ~ i E I}. The function R; E 1Z on W returns the deontically ideal worlds
for individual i given a world: R; : W-y 2W ;
4. a valuation function V, which assigns the value `true' or `false' to a proposition at a
world in W.
The truth conditions for O; and P; are defined as follows
~l~i,w ~ O;(p) iff R;(w) C Qp~ (3.1)
and
~,w ~ P;(p) iff R;(w) n QP~ ~~,
with the following constraint (which gives schema (OD) for O;: ~O;(p n~p))
R;(w)~0, forallR;ERandforallwE W.
From the semantics of O; and P; it follows that the rule and all schemata for O of the
system D' are also valid for O;. This is intuitively correct, since the impersonal obligation
3We can also define the personal obligation as an obligation for a person that does not apply to another
person. This definition is much stronger. Therefore, we cal] this interpretation of the personal obligation
the strict personal obligation.
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O(p) is read as an obligation related to one and the same individual all the time, which
corresponds with O;(p), i.e., an obligation related to a single individual i.
The question arises whether there is a relation between the individuals. According to
Hilpinen (1973) and Bailhache (1981, 1991), there is such a relation since they want a co-
herent system without conflicting obligations, such as O;(p) n O~(~p).4 Hilpinen expressed
this in the following condition:
If a set of propositions A is consistent and
{~il (pl)~ Oil (p2)v . . . ~{l (pn, )i
. . . ,
Oi~(i~l)t...Oi~(~n~)i...,Pi~((i)} ~ A,
then lplep2e...rpn1v...aN1i...vYn~e...}
and {pi, ..., p'„~, q} are consistent. (Hilpinen, 1973, p. 143.)
This means that all obligations for all individuals can jointly be realised and that a per-
mission for some individual should not be in conflict with his obligations. Thus, it is not
the case that an individual has an obligation that p and that there is an individual for
whom ~p is obligatory. This can be formalised as
~(~i(p) n 31E~07(~p))i
which is equivalent to
~í(p) ~ diElPi(p).
Bailhache (1981, p. 76) described this as follows:
It is advisable to note that this formula [O~(p) -~ Pz(p)] appears paradoxical
only if the normative addressee is unduly identified with the subject of propo-
sition p. The formula does not say for example that `if y is obliged to go into
that house, then z is also permitted to go in'. The formula only corresponds
to the following: as soon as an addressee is obliged that such a thing is accom-
plished, normative coherence makes it necessary that all other individuals are
not obliged that this thing is not accomplished (in other words, that they are
permitted that it is accomplished).
To accomplish this normative coherence, we have to add the following schema to system
D;:
~(~;(P) n ~i(~P)), (3.4)
which is equivalent to
~i(P) ~ P~(P)-
4A conflict between two obligations means that it is impossible to fulfil both obligations simultaneously.
48 Relativised deontic modalities in SDL
However, Bailhache (1991) wanted to obtain a complete, coherent deontic system, i.e.,
what is obligatory, is permitted for all individuals. Yet, from O~(p) and Oy(p), we can
derive P~(p) and PZ(q), hence PZ(p) n PZ(q), but not PZ(p n q), as required in a complete,
coherent deontic system. Therefore, he added a stronger schema to system D; :
o„(p) n o;, (q) n ... n o,,(v) -~ d;E,P;(p n q n ... n v), (s.s)
which is validated by adding the following constraint
f1;EIR;(w) ~~, for all w E W. (3.7)
This can be proven as follows. Let O;,(p) n O;,(q) n... n O;k(v), then R;,(w) C Qp] n
R;, (w) C Qq] n... n R;k (w) C Qv] and thus (1;EIR;(w) C(1~-r,2,...kR;, (w) C ~ n q n... n v].
And since n;E,R;(w) ~~, it follows that f1;EIR;(w) fl Qp n q n ... n v] ~(~. Hence,
R;(w) n ~p n q n ... n v] ~~, for all i E I and for all w E W. Thus, d;EIP;(pn q n ... n v).
Nowadays schema (3.4), and so also (3.6), is controversial, because this schema states
that there is no conflict of personal duties, which is manifestly not in line with daily life
situations, where we often find conflicts between legal rules, moral codes, promises, etc.
It removes the possibility of expressing conflicts between personal obligations of different
individuals, with the result that the systems of norms must be normative consistent (i.e.,
without conflicting obligations). That is why we do not enforce principles (3.4) and (3.6).
With the semantics of personal obligation and personal permission, we can formalise
the general and unspecific obligations and permissions:
~ the general obligation and permission: b';EIO;(p) and d;EIP;(p);
~ the unspecific obligation and permission: 3;E~0;(p) and 3;EIP;(p).
3.2.1 O(p) as the general or unspecific obligations
In this subsection, we investigate the consequences of some possible definitions for the
O-operator and the P-operator in terms of the O;-operator and the P;-operator. We will
formalise some realistic, intuitive notions and analyse the properties that hold for some
different proposals. Using the above semantics, the following possibilities are most obvious:
1. O(P) - d~Ei~;(p)5 and P(p) - d:EtP:(p);
2. O(P) - 3;EI~t(p) and P(p) - 3ieiPt(p);
3. O(P) -~tei~;(P) and P(p) - dtE~P;(P);
SV;E~O;(p) is an abbreviation ofd;(I(i) -~ O;(p)), with I the predicate symbol for indicating whether its
argument is an element of the set of individuals. Note that O(p) is equivalent to O;, (p) n0;,(p) n. .. h0;,,.
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4.
1.
~(P) - dter~t(P) and P(P) - d:etPt(P)-
0(p) - dtEr~~(P) and P(p) - d;etP;(p).
This proposal for the interpretations of O(p) and P(p) corresponds with Hansson's
(1970) proposal. In his article `Deontic logic and different levels of generality', Hans-
son suggested to interpret O(p) as a general obligation, because
if we say `it is obligatory to do p' in a context where there is no tacit
reference to a special individual, we often mean `it is obligatory for everyone
to do p'. (Hansson, 1970, p. 246)
Thus, according to Hansson, O(p) means `it is obligatory for everyone to do p':
. ~(p) - dtiEro,(p).
Surprising is Hansson's definition of P(p), `it is permitted for everyone to do p':
P(P) - d;ErP;(p).




~P(~p) means that `there is an individual i for whom p is obligatory' and ~O(~p)
means `there is an individual i for whom p is permitted'. Thus, ~P(~p) stands for
the unspecific obligation and ~O(~p) for the unspecific per~mission.s
Hansson arranged the different operators in the following schema ( figure 3.1), where





s~P~~p~ - ~biElPi~~P~ - ~diEl~~i~P~ - 3iEI~i~P~
and ~~~~P~ - ~diEl~i~~i~~ - ~diEl~Pi~P~ -
3:EiP~~P)~
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It is easy to see that the following principles, which are valid in SDL, are also valid
for this proposal:
(a) O(P) n O(9) - O(P n 4)~
(b) ,O(p n ,p);
(~) o(P v ,P);
(d) o(P) ~ P(P).
In relation to individual obligation and permission, the following principles hold:
(a) o(P) ~ o;(P);
(b) P(P) ~ P~(P).
In Kordig's (1975) opinion, non-relativised deontic logic lacks a theoretical niche for
the distinction between general obligations and obligations for a person. There is
no way of saying that p is obligatory for an individual, and not for everyone. The
following formula is not expressible in a non-relativised deontic logic
o;(P) n ,o(P),
but it is expressible within this proposal. This illuminates supererogation. Su-
pererogation means that there are duties `far beyond' the `basic' or `rock-bottom
duties for all'.~
2. O(P) - 3~E~o;(P) and P(P) -~tErP;(P)-
Now, O(p) means `it is obligatory for someone that p' and P(p) `it is permitted for
someone that p'. Just like the previous choice, permission P(p) is not definable as
~O(~p). Thus, P(p) ~~O(~p). ~O(~p) means that `it is permitted for everyone
that p' and ~P(~p) means that `it is obligatory for everyone that p'. Thus, ~O(~p)
now stands for the general permission and ~P(~p) for the general obligation.
Just like in the previous proposal, we can arrange the different operators in a schema






7Cf. Urmson (1969), pp. 62, 64-65, 73.
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The proposal of O(p) as an unspecific obligation leads to an additional consequence
regardless of the definition of P(p): principle O(p) n O(q) -~ O(p n q) (OC) does not
hold. This principle, which is equivalent to
~iElOi(p) n JiEIOi(Q) ~ ~iElOi(p n Q)i
`is clearly counter-intuitive: A janitor might be obliged that the floor in a building is
swept clean every morning, and a financial minister might be obliged that the rate
of inflation is as low as possible. That there is a person for whom it is obligatory
that both the floor is swept and that the inflation rate is as low as possible, we find
strange.' (Herrestad and Krogh, 1995, p. 462)
Consequently, we cannot derive principle
~(O(P) ~ O(~p))~
since it follows from (OC) and (OD). We will denote this principle as (OD').
However, Hilpinen (1973) and Bailhache (1981, 1991) want this principle to obtain
normative coherence, i.e., if an actor is obliged that p, then all actors are permitted
that p. From (OD`), which is equivalent to
~(3iErOi(p) n ~i IO;(,p)),
it follows that formula O;(p) n O~(~p) is contradictory. The principle is validated by
adding the constraint
n;EIRi(w) ~ 0, for all w E W.
This can be proven as follows. Let O(p) and 0(~p) hold. Then 3;EI(R;(w) C Qp~),
say il, and ~;EI(R;(w) C Q~p~), say i2. Hence, R;,(w) n R;,(w) C~p~ n Q~p~ - 0,
and this contradicts that n;EIR;(w) ~ 0, thus ~(O(p) n O(~p)).
This is not what we want, as we already discussed in this section, since it removes
the possibility of expressíng conflicts between the personal obligations of different
individuals.
It is easy to see that the following principles, which are valid in SDL, are also valid
for this proposal:
(a) ~O(P n ~P)~
(b) D(pV ~p);
(~) o(p) -3 P(p)-
52 Relativised deontic modalities in SDh
In relation t.o individual obligat,ion and permission, the following principles hold:
(a) O;(P) ~ O(p):
(b) P~(P) -~ P(P).
3. O(p) - biElOt(P) and P(p) -~tEiP~(P).
In contrast to the previous two proposals, schema (Df.P) holds for this proposal:
P(p) - ~O(~p)-
However, a consequence of this proposal is that we cannot express unspecific obli-
gation and general permission with the help of O(p) and P(p). In the two previous
proposals, we were able to express the two notions of obligation, i.e., general and
unspecific obligation, and their duals, i.e, unspecific and general permission, from
non-relativised obligation O(p) and permission P(p). Now, we can only express the
notion of general obligation, and its dual the unspecific permission.
The following principles, which are valid in SDL, are also valid for this proposal:
(a) O(p) n O(4) - O(P n 4);
(b) ,O(p n ,p);
(~) O(p v ,p);
(d) O(P) ~ P(P).
In relation to the individual obligation and permission, the following principles hold:
(a) O(p) -' O~(p);
(b) P;(p) ~ P(p).
4. O(P) - diElOt(P) and P(P) -`dteiPt(p).
For this proposal, schema (Df.P) also holds. However, just like in the previous pro-
posal, we cannot express the two different notions of obligation with non-relativised
obligation O(p). In this case, we can only express the notions of unspecific obligation
and general permission.
For the same reasons as in the second proposal, schemata (OC) and (OD`) do not
hold. Note that now the principle
O(P) --' P(P)
does not hold, since it is equivalent to (OD'), meaning that `if there is someone for
whom it is obligatory that p, then it is permitted for everyone that p'.
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The following principles, which are valid in SDL, are also valid for this proposal:
(a) ~O(P n ~p);
(b) O(p V -~p).
In relation to the individual obligation and permission, the following principles hold:
(a) Di(P) -~ O(P);
(b) P(p) ~ P~(p).
According to Herrestad and Krogh (1995), these four proposals suffer from one of the
following two problems:
~ the problem of interdefinability;
~ the problem of asymmetry.
In the former two proposals, permission P(p) is not definable as ~O(~p). Herrestad and
Krogh (1995, p. 461) called this the problem of interdefinability. This is why they re-
jected these two proposals, for (Df.P) is one of the fundamental elements of deontic logic
concerning the relation between obligation and permission. In deontic logic, permission is
considered to be the dual of obligation, in the same way as possibility and necessity are in
modal logic (cf. Von Wright, 1951).
In the latter two proposals, we cannot express the four notions with non-relativised
obligation and permission. That is why Herrestad and Krogh rejected these proposals.
About the third proposal they stated:
This suggestion suffers from what we call the problem of asymmetry. It seems
like the notion of non-relativised obligation is a strong notion, while the notion
of non-relativised permission is a weak notion. (...) These notions are thus
impersonal in two different ways. (Herrestad and Krogh, 1995, p. 463)
In the four proposals given, these two problems are related to each other. Since, if we
choose for schema (Df.P), i.e., O(p) -~P(~p), then we meet the problem of asymmetry,
and if we choose to give up schema (Df.P), we meet the problem of interdefinability. The
problems of asymmetry and interdefinability can be solved by accepting two notions of
non-relativised obligation and permission in a system which we will discuss in the next
subsection.
We do not view these two problems as real problems. The proposals, with new defini-
tions for the O- and P-operators and their new expressive power, are extensions of SDL
with new meanings, not expressible in SDL, and are subject to new intuitions. It is,
therefore, a mistake to read the formulas in these proposals as they are read in SDL, and
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it is methodologically strange to reject a proposal just because it does not satisfy some
axiom. For instance, for the general obligation and permission it is obvious that they are
not interdefinable. However, that is not a problem of the formalisation: it is a feature of
these notions.
Finally, we summarise the basic principles in SDL that also hold for the four proposals
in table 3.1.
Table 3.1 The basic principles in SDL and the four proposals
Proposal 1 Proposal 2 Proposal ~ Proposal .j
O(P) n O(4) ~ O(P n 4) f - -h -
~(0(P) n 0(~P)) i- - -F -
P(P) - ~0(~P) - - -F -F
0(p) ~ P(P) ~- -!- -I- -
-1-: the principle is valid.
-: the principle is not valid.
3.2.2 The combined approach
To solve the `problem' of interdefinability and the `problem' of asymmetry simultaneously,
we allow two notions of obligation into the system: general obligation O}(p) with its








We do not enforce principle (OD') for O-, as we stated in the previous subsection. Further,
the following four principles, which correspond with the principles in figure 3.1, are valid:
~}(P) ~ 0-(P) (3.12)
P-(P) ~ P}(P) (3.13)
3.2 Formalisations of relativised deontic modalities 55
O}(P) -' P-(p)
O (P) ~ P}(P)
(3.14)
(3.15)






In contrast to this approach, Bailhache (1991) wanted to keep principle (OD') for O- to
obtain a coherent normative system. This is validated by adding constraint (3.7). Now we
can derive some extra principles, such as
and, therefore,
and
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3.2.3 Herrestad and Krogh
Herrestad and Krogh (1995) combined Kordig's (1975) approach and Hilpinen's (1973)
approach. Kordig introduced a stronger notion (O~) of general obligation Ot(p) and
its dual, a weaker notion (P~) of unspecific permission Pt(p). Hilpinen introduced a
weaker notion (Oe) of unspecific obligation O-(p) and its dual, a stronger notion (Pe)
of general permission P-(p). With the general and unspecific obligations, we can only
express obligations for any or some particular individual in a group. Neither Kordig nor
Hilpinen exactly defined the stronger (O~) and the weaker (Oe) notions of obligation,
respectively. However, Herrestad and Krogh suggested that these notions are collective
notions: a collective obligation as an obligation that rests on the group, and not on any
single individual. They did not offer a(semantic) definition of these collective notions,
however. A drawback of this is that the notions of O~ and Oe are vague and, as a
consequence difficult to apply.









The truth conditions for O~ and P~ are defined as follows:
.M, w~ O~(p) iff R~(w) C Qp~ (3.20)
and
M,w ~ P~(P) iff R~(w) n ~P~ ~~,
with the following condition for accessibility function R~:
U;EiR;(w) C R~(w) for all w E W.
(3.21)
(3.22)
The intuition behind function R~ is that it returns at least the union of all ideal worlds
of all individuals. This corresponds with Kordig's proposal. Note that we do not have
U;EIR;(w) - R~(w), since in that case O~(p) - Of(p).8
dSuppose U;EiR;(w) - R~(w) and Ot(p) holds, then it follows that V;E~R;(w) C Qp], which is equiva-
lent to U;EIR;(w) C ]p], that O~(p) holds. The proof of the converse is analogous.
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From ( 3.3) and ( 3.22) it follows that the following constraint is valid:
R~(w)~~forallwE W.
Thus, schema (OD') holds for O~:
(3.23)
~(O~(P) ~ O~(~P)), (3.24)
which is equivalent to
O~(P) ~ P~(P). (3.25)
The truth conditions for Oe and Pe are defined as follows:
~Lt, w~ Oe(p) iff Re(w) C QP~
and
~1~t,w ~ Pe(p) iff Re(w) n QP~ ~ 0,
with accessibility function Re:




The intuition behind function Re is that it returns the shared ideal worlds of all individuals,
i.e., the ideal worlds that all individuals have in common. This corresponds with Hilpinen's
proposal.
The difference between Kordig's theory and Hilpinen's theory is that Kordig argued that
if something is deontically relevant for one individual, it is also considered non-relativised
deontically relevant (R;(w) C R~(w)), whereas Hilpinen claimed that something is deon-
tically relevant for everybody if and only if it is also considered non-relativised deontically
relevant (f1;E~R;(w) - Re(w)).
Herrestad and Krogh rejected the principle (OD") for Oe:
~(Oe(P) n Oe(~P))~ (3.29)
since this would make principle (OD') for 0- derivable: principle (3.29) is equivalent to
Oe(p) --~ Pe(p), and from (3.18) and (3.19) it follows that O-(p) -~ P-(p). This principle
has been rejected, as we discussed in section 3.2. Thus, they did not add principle
Re(w)~0forallwEW. (3.30)
Consequently, schema (OD) for Oe(p) is not valid:9
~pe(P ~ -,P). (3.31)
9Note that schema (OD) is valid for O-, however.
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However, schema (OC) is valid: let Oe(p) n Oe(q) hold, then Re(w) C Qp] and Re(w) C
Qq], hence Re(w) C Qp] (1 Qq] - Qp n q]. Thus, Oe(p n q). In subsection 3.2.1, we saw
that schema (OC) for O- was counter-intuitive and does not hold. The fact that (OC)
is not valid for O- does not imply that (OC) is necessarily counter-intuitive for Oe. In
subsection 3.3.2, we shall see that it depends on the interpretation of Oe whether schema
(OC) is intuitive or counter-intuitive.
From (3.22) and (3.28) we can derive the constraint
Re(w) C R~(w) for all w E W,
which provides us with the principle
( 3.32 )
O~(p) -~ Oe(P). (3.33)
This can be proven as follows. Suppose that O~(p) holds, then R~(w) C~]. Since
Re(w) C R~(w), it follows that Re(w) C Qp]. Thus, Oe(p). -
Consequently, we can derive
Pe(P) ~ P~(p). (3.34)
The problem of accepting O~(p) ~ Pe(p)
Just as where the general obligation implies the general permission ( 3.14) and the unspecific
obligation implies the unspecific permission ( 3.15), Herrestad and Krogh aimed at holding
these principles for 0~ and Oe:
O~ (P) ~ Pe (P)
Oe (P) ~ P~(p)
(3.35 )
(3.36 )
However, this does not follow from the semantics given so far. That is why Herrestad and
Krogh tried to add the constraint:
if R~(w) C Qp], then Re(w) fl ([p] ~ 0 for all w E W. (3.37)
Now principle (3.35) is valid, and by contraposing (3.35) and substituting ~p for p, we
obtain principle (3.36). However, now it also holds that constraint (3.30) is valid.~o This
provides principle (OD') for Oe, which implies principle (OD') for O-, which Herrestad
and Krogh did not want.
loSince R~(w) C ~pV ~p] is true for all w E W, then by means of (3.37) and modus ponens Re(w) fl
[p V~p] ~ 0 ís also true for all w E W, which is equivalent to Re(w) ~ 0 for all w E W.
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According to Herrestad and Krogh, the problem is due to the validity of (ON) for O~,
i.e., O~(pV ~p). The solution they provided is to block the inference of Pe(p) from O~(p)
when p is a tautology. Instead of (3.37), they offered the principlell
(~p ~ ~~p) ~ (O~(P) ~ Pe(p)). (3.38)
However, the solution is not quite satisfactory, for the reason that we can derive the
following formulas
Pe(P) ~ (Oe(4) ~ Pe(9))~
because Re(w) ~~, if Re(w) fl Qp] ~ m, and by (3.38) also
O~(p) ~ (Oe(4) ~ Pe(4))~
(3.39)
( 3.40 )
if p is no tautology. Thus, if there is a proposition p (and p is no tautology) for which
Pe(p) or O~(p) is true, schema (OD") is valid for Oe. We can solve this problem by
stating that Pe(p) and O~(p) are always false for every p which is no tautology. But the
question then arises why one introduces, for example, a stronger notion of the obligation
where this obligation actually has the value `false'.
We do not think that the problem appears to be the validity of (ON) for O~. In
subsection 3.3.3, we will provide a much simpler solution, based upon the interpretation
of O~ and Oe as collective notions. The collective notions are formalised on the basis of
the collective obligation, which we discuss in the following section.
3.3 The collective obligation
Obligations can also be aimed at a group, since there are cases in which the `addressee' is
not a single individual, but a group.12 For instance, a mother may tell her sons:
`Boys, the table has to be set.'
This command is given to a group of boys, and it requires that the group accomplish
something (i.e., that the table is set). This can be expressed as follows:
Ox (p),
It0 is the possibility sign. Op is true only in case p is true in some possible wotld.
tzThe necessity to use groups of actors is stated as follows by Bailhache (1991, p. 80): `For imagine, for
example, that such masons ought to build the foundation of the house, such roofers to assemble its roof,
such electricians to set its electrical netwotk, and so on: the firm, as the set of all these workers will have
the duty of building the whole house. More generally, if it is obligatory for y that p-. q and obligatory
for z that p, which addressee will be touched by the resulting obligation (that q)? It will be at least the
set of y and z- without being able to say which individual is concerned.'
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where `X' does not refer to an individual, but to a set of individuals, in this case the boys,
and `p' to the statement `the table is set'. Ox(p) can be read as `it is obligatory for X that
p'. `X' is used for the expression of a collective agency. We call these obligations collective
obligations. Relativised obligation Ox(p) does not mean that this is a restricted general
obligation, i.e., that for every actor in X it is obligatory that p, but that X as a group has
to accomplish that p. Consider the following example, taken from Rescher (1966, p. 69):
`John and Paul are obliged that the table is moved across the room.'
If John alone accomplishes that the table is moved across the room, then the group (John
and Paul) satisfies the norm, i.e., the obligation that the table is moved across the room.
This example expresses a collective obligation, because for example `John is obliged that
the table is moved across the room' does not follow. Thus, the obligation does not require
that everyone (in this case, John and Paul) in the group takes part in the act to accomplish
that p.
In the following subsection, we add groups of actors to the system SDL, which can be
seen as an extension of the relativised deontic modalities concerning what is obligatory or
permitted for an actor. Further, we formalise some realistic, intuitive notions and analyse
what properties hold for the relativised deontic modalities concerning groups of actors.
3.3.1 The semantics of the collective obligation
In order to discuss the relativised deontic modalities concerning groups of actors in SDL, we
will use the following semantics. We will use the model structure .M -(W, ~t (I ),1Z1i V)
for system SDLx consisting of four elements:
1. the set of possible worlds W-{w1, w2, ...};
2. the non-empty powerset Pf(I) of the set of individuals I-{i~,i2i...};
3. the set of functions 1ZI -{Rx ~ X E~}(I)}. The function Rx E 7Z~ on W returns
the deontically ideal worlds for group X given a world: Rx : W--~ 2W ;
4. a valuation function V, which assigns the value `true' or `false' to a proposition at a
world in W.
We assume that R;(w) - R{;}(w) for all w E W and i E I.
The truth conditions for collective obligation Ox and collective permission Px are now
defined as follows:
~t, w~ Ox(p) iff Rx(w) C~~ (3.41)
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and
M~w ~ Px(P) ifï Rx(w) n ~ÍP~ ~~. (3.42)
5chema (OD) holds by adding the following constraint:
Rx(w) ~ 0, for all R.x E 7Z~ and for all w E W. (3.43)
Truth conditions (3.41) and (3.42) are sufficient to validate the rule and all other schemata
of system D' for the collective obligation and permission. At first glance, this seems to
be correct, since the impersonal obligation in SDL is read as an obligation related to one
and the same individual or group all the time, which corresponds with D;(p) or OX(p): an
obligation related to a single individual i or a single group X. However, we shall see that
the validity of schema (OD) for Ox depends on the interpretation of collective obligation
ox(~).
3.3.2 The interpretation of OX(p)
We discuss two possible interpretations of Ox(p):
1. the strict collective obligation: an obligation aimed strictly at group X;
2. the weak collective obligation: an obligation for some subgroup of X, i.e.,13
OX(P) - 3YEPt(X)~Y (P). (3.44)
The strict collective obligation
If we interpret Ox(p) as a strict collective obligation, we can discuss the theory of the
relativised deontic modalities concerning groups of actors analogously with the theory
concerning actors, since now every group stands on its own, like the actors. In this inter-
pretation of OX(p), we consider the groups to be single `addressees'. The only difference
with the theory concerning actors is the number of addressees. Let I-{il, ..., i„}, then
we have n addressees for the theory concerning individuals and 2" - 1 addressees for the
theory concerning groups of individuals.
A consequence of this interpretation is that there is no relation between the different
groups if we accept conflicts between collective obligations for different groups, such as
Ox(P) ~ OY(~P).
ia9t(X) stands for the non-empty powerset of set X.
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If we want to obtain a coherent normative system, i.e., every group is permitted what is
obligatory, with the formal counterpart
~x~ (P) n ~xz(q) n... n oxk(v) ~ dxevt(rlPx (P n q n... n v), (3.45)
then there is a relation between the groups, expressed by the following constraint
nxEVt(i)Rx(w) ~~, for all w E W. (3.46)
As we have seen in section 3.2, this removes the possibility of expressing conflicts between
collective obligations for different groups of individuals. That is why we do not enforce
principle (3.45).
The weak collective obligation
Bailhache (1991) stated that if there is a group for which it is obligatory to accomplish p,
say X, and there is a group for which it is obligatory to accomplish q, say Y, then it is
obligatory for at least group X U Y to accomplish p n q. This can be formalised as follows
~x(P) n ~y(q) -~ Oxuy(P n 9), (3.47)
but this does not follow from the semantics given so far.
To validate principle (3.47), we add an extra condition for accessibility function Rx:
Rx(w) C Ry(w) if Y E íD}(X) for all w E W. (3.48)
Thus, if something is deontically relevant to a group X, it is also considered deontically
relevant to every subgroup of X. Note that
Rr(w) - nxEVf~r1Rx(w)- (3.49)
It is easy to show that principle ( 3.47) is now valid: let Ox(p) n Oy(q), then Rx(w) C Qp~
and Ry(w) C Qq~. Since Rxuy(w) C Rx(w) and Rxuy(w) S Ry(w), it holds that
Rxuy(w) C Rx(w) f1 Ry(w) C ~[p~ f1 Qq~ - Qp n q~. Hence, Oxuy(P n q)-
Further, we can derive the formula following immediately from (3.48)
~x(P) ~ Oxuy(p). (3.50)
Thus, if it is obligatory for a group to accomplish something, then it is also obligatory for
every superset of that group. And, consequently,
Pxuy(P) ~ Px(P). (3.51)
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At first glance, this may seem paradoxical, since it is normally incorrect to say, for instance,
that if X is obliged that p, then X and Y are obliged that p. However, we interpret Ox (p) as
an obligation for group X without being able to say to which subgroup of X this obligation
applies. Thus, if `it is obligatory for John to accomplish that the window is closed', then
`it is also obligatory for John and Paul to accomplish that the window is closed', meaning
that John has to accomplish this, or Paul, or Paul and John together. We can formalise
this weak collective obligation as follows:
~X(P) - 3YEPt(x)OY(p), (3.52)
which is valid by constraint (3.48). Suppose that Ox(p) holds, then Rx(w) C([pD.
Hence, 3YE9t(x)(Ry(w) C Qp~), namely X, thus ~yEPt(x)Oy(p). Suppose now that
~YE~t(x)Oy(p), then 3yE9t(x)(Ry(w) C ~~), say Z. Since Z E Pf(X), it follows that
Rx(w) C RZ(w). Hence, Rx(w) C ~] and thus Ox(p).
Consequently, by schema (Df.P), it holds that
Px(p) - dYEVt(x)PY(p)- (3-53)
The `paradox' involved in (3.50) bears resemblance to the well-known Ross paradox,
O(p) -~ O(p V q), (3.54)
which is a valid principle in deontic logic: `it is obligatory that the letter is mailed' implies
that `it is obligatory that the letter is mailed or burnt' (cf. section 2.4).
With this interpretation of Ox(p), we have to give up schema (OD) for Ox if we want
to express conflicts between the collective obligations of different groups, such as
Ox(p) ~ OY(~p)-
This formula does not hold in the semantics so far given, because (Ox(p) n Oy(~p)) -~
(OxuY(P)nOxuY(~p)) and (OxuY(p)nOxuY(~p)) contradicts principle (OD'). Principle
(OD') is derived from schemata (OC) and (OD), thus we have to reject one of these
schemata. We cannot reject (OC), since this follows immediately from the truth condition
for Ox. Furthermore, it would be counter-intuitive to reject this schema. Thus, we reject
schema (OD) by giving up constraint (3.43).14 Now, we are able to express conflicts
between collective obligations of groups. Since (OD) does not hold, we can also express
conflicts between collective obligations for the same group, such as
Ox(P) ~ Ox(~p).
14By giving up constraint (3.43), we also have to give up constraint ( 3.3). Hence, (OD) and (OD') for
O; are not valid any more.
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At first glance, this seems to be a drawback since, if we have a conflict, such as OX(p) ~
Oy(~p), we can derive anything for the group X U Y, for instance OX~y(q), since OX(p) A
Oy(~p) --~ OX~y(p) n OX~y(~p), and from schema (OC) it follows that OX~y(p n~p).
From rule (ROM) it follows that OX~y(q n--~q)) and hence, by using once again the rule
(ROM), it follows that OX~y(q). However, this is not a real drawback since, if a group has
to accomplish something that is impossible, it is hard to say anything meaningful about
that group, so that we can derive anything about the obligations for that group.
3.3.3 The strong and weak obligations
With the semantics of the collective obligation and collective permission, we can also for-
malise the unspecific and general collective obligations and collective permissions. We claim
that the genera] collective obligation and permission are the strongest notions of obligation
and permission, and the unspecific collective obligation and permission the weakest notions
of obligation and permission. We call the general collective obligation the strong obligation,
the unspecific collective obligation the weak obligation, the general collective permission
the strong permission and the unspecific collective permission the weak per~nission. We
can formalise these notions as follows:








Nt, w~ O~(p) iff R~(w) C Qp~ (3.59)
and
Nl, w~ P~(p) iff R~(w) fl Qp~ ~~. (3.60)
To accomplish that these notions are the notions of the strong obligatíon and the weak
permission, we have to restrict accessibility function R~ as follows:
R~(w) - UXEyt(r)RX(w) for all w E W. (3.61)
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Suppose O~(p). This holds iff R~(w) C~~ iff UXEyf(t}Rx(w) C ~~ iff `dxEyf(t}(Rx(w) C
QP~) iff dxEVt(t)OX(p). Thus, with this restriction of R~, we accomplish that O~(p) -
dXEPt(t)OX(P) and, consequently, P~(p) - 3xEVt(t)Px(P).
Note that the following constraint holdsls
U;EIR;(w) C R~(w) for all w E W,
and that truth conditions ( 3.59) and (3.60) are equivalent to




M,w ~ P~(P) iff3xEVt(t)(Rx(w) n QP~ ~~)- (3.64)
Schema ( OD) becomes valid by adding the following constraint:
R~(w) ~ 0 for all w E W, (3.65)
which corresponds with ~xEyt(t)(RX(w) ~ ÍD).
It is easy to see that the following principles are valid:
1. O~(P) n O~(4) -~ O~(p n 4);
2. O~(pV ~p);
3. ,O~(~ n ,p);
4. P~(P) - ~O~ ( ~P);
5. ,(O~(P) n O~(,P));
6. O~(P) ~ P~(P).
The rule and all the schemata of D' are valid for the strong obligation O~. Note that it
does not matter whether we interpret OX(p) as the strict collective obligation or as the
weak collective obligation, since the strong obligation is an obligation aimed at all groups.
Note that the general obligation corresponds with the strong obligation, in the sense that
the principles that hold for O} also hold for O~.
We can define the truth conditions for Oe and Pe as follows
~1, w~ Oe(p) iff Re(w) C~[p~ (3.66)
15We mark again that R;(w) - R{;}(w) for aIl i E I and for all w E W.
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and
~1~1,w ~ Pe(P) iff Re(w) n I[p~ ~ Vl. (3.67)
To accomplish that these notions are the notions of the weak obligation and the strong
permission, we restrict accessibility function Re as follows
Re(w) C nxEyf(I)Rx(w) for all w E W. (3.68)
However, this is not an accurate definition for the weak obligation as the unspecific col-
lective obligation. Now, we can only derive that 3xEyt(~)Ox(p) -~ Oe(p): suppose that
3xEyt(I)Ox(p). This holds 1fE ~XE9t(I)(R,y(JJ) C ~~), hence nxE~t(,)Rx(w) C Qp~ and
since Re(w) C nxEyt(~)Rx(w), it follows that Re(w) C Qp~. Thus, Oe(p). That is why
we define the truth conditions for Oe and Pe as follows:
M~w ~ Oe(P) lff ~xE~f(I)(RX(w) C QP~)
and
(3.69)
M~w ~ Pe(P) lÍf tJxEPt(I)(RX(w) n QP~ ~~). (3.70)
For the weak obligation, it does matter how we interpret Ox(p).ls As we have seen, there
are two possible interpretations for the collective obligation:
1. the strict collective obligation;
2. the weak collective obligation.
1. Suppose that we interpret Ox (p) as the strict collective obligation. Then schema
(OD) for Oe is validated by adding the constraint
dxEVt(1)(Rx(w) ~~) for all w E W. (3.71)
~Oe(p ~ ~p) holds iff ~~xE~t(!)(RX(w) C QP ~~P~) ]ff flxEYf(I)~(Rx(w) C~) iff
dXEPt(I)(RX(w) ~ ~)~
We do not want schema (OD') for Oe, since it removes the possibility of expressing
conflicting collective obligations of different groups. According to the semantics given,
this schema does not hold.'~ Thus, principle Oe(p) --~ Pe(p) does not hold either,
which is equivalent to principle (OD") for Oe.
1sThe strong obligation is an obligation for all groups in Pt(1). Hence, it does not matter how we inter-
pret the collective obligation in a strong obligation, since for every set of individuals the same obligation
holds.
17Schema ( OD') would be valid by adding the constraint nXEytlllRx(w) ~ 0 for all w E W.
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Since we do not have principle (OD") for the weak obligation Oe, schema (OC) does
not hold for Oe either. In subsection 3.2.1, we saw that the formula
(3iElOi(P) ~ 3~EIOi(q)) ~ 3~ElOi(P n q) (3.72)
was clearly counter-intuitive. That was the reason why we gave up schema (OC)
for the unspecific obligation O-(p). Analogously, we will reject (OC) for the weak
obligation O9(p):
(3XEVt(!)~X(P) n 3xEPt(I)~X(q)) ~ 3XEPt(1)~X(Pn9), (3.73)
since this is also counter-intuitive. Suppose that (OC) would be valid and suppose
further that only OX(p) and Oy(q) hold. Then ~XEyt(i)OX(p n q), say Z, thus
OZ(p n q). Hence, it follows that OZ(p) and OZ(q) hold. Thus, the obligation to
accomplish p and q, respectively, is not strictly aimed at group X and Y, respectively,
but also at group Z and this is in contradiction with the interpretation of OX(p) as
the strict collective obligation.
Note that the weak obligation corresponds with the unspecific obligation in the sense
that the principles that hold for O- also hold for Oe.
Further, the following four principles are valid if we interpret Ox(p) as the strict
collective obligation:
(a) O~(P) ~ Pe(P);
(b) Oe(P) ~ P~(P)~
(c) O~(P) -' Oe(P)~
(d) Pe(P) ~ P~(P)-
The former two principles are valid, because of constraint (3.71). The latter two
principles are obvious.
The following figure summarises the logical relations between operators O~, Oe, P~,
Pe, Ox and PX:'s
Figure 3.5
O~ (P) Pe (P)
Ox (P) Px (P)
~ ~
Oe(P) ' P~(P)
~sNote that this figure corresponds with figure 3.3.
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As we have seen in subsection 3.2.3, the theory developed by Herrestad and Krogh
suffers from the problem that principle (OD') creeps back in for 08 if we accept
the prínciple O~(p) -~ Pe(p). The solution they provide - to block the inference
of Pe(p) from O~(p) when p is a tautology - was not satisfactory, since we were
able to derive the undesirable principles Pe(p) -~ (Oe(q) -~ Pe(q)) and O~(p) -~
(Oe(q) ~ Pe(q)), if p is no tautology.
The above consideration is a solution to this problem, since the principle O~(p) --r
Pe(p) is valid and principle (OD') does not creep back in for Oe. Further, the
undesirable principles Pe(p) -. (Oe(q) -~ Pe(q)) and O~(p) -~ (Oe(q) ~ pe(q))
are not valid, which is easy to see from truth conditions (3.69) and (3.70).
This solution consists of substituting the truth condition for O~, P~, Oe and Pe
given by Herrestad and Krogh by the truth conditions given in this section, with
the consequence that O~ is defined as the strong obligation and Oe as the weak
obligation. The justification for these definitions is that we claim that the strong
obligation is the strongest notion of the obligation and the weak obligation is the
weakest notion of the obligation. An advantage of this consideration is that O~
and Oe are defined exactly in contrast to Herrestad and Krogh's theory, where the
notions of O~ and Oe are vague and, as a consequence, difficult to apply.
The interpretation of OX(p) as a strict collective obligation is necessary for this
solution, as we shall see in the consideration of the weak collective obligation below.
2. If we interpret OX (p) as the weak collective obligation, then schema (OC) for Oe is
valid, since for this interpretation the following principle is valid (which we saw in
the previous subsection):
Ox(p) ~ Or(q) ~ Oxuv(p~ 9),
because constraint (3.48) holds. Thus, Oe(p) ~ Oe(q) ~ Oe(p n q) is also valid.
Schema (OD) does not hold for Oe, since (OD) does not hold for the weak collec-
tive obligation either (see previous subsection). Suppose (OD) holds for Oe, then
~08(pn p) holds and this is equivalent to HXEy,~~~~OX(pn ~p). Hence, this implies
that schema (OD) is valid for OX(p). Thus, since we do not have schema (OD) for
the weak collective obligation, we do not have this schema for the weak obligation
either. Consequently, schema (OD') does not hold, since it follows from schemata
(OD) and (OC).
From (3.52) and (3.56) we can derive the following principles
Ot(p) - Oe(P) (3.74)
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and, consequently,
Pi(p) - Pe(P). (3.75)
Thus, O!(p) coincides with the weak obligation and P!(p) with the strong permissioti.
Now, we only need two different notions to distinguish the weak, collective and strong
obligations, since collective obligation O!(p) collapses in the weak obligation Oe(p).
Further, the following two principles are valid
(a) O~(p) -~ Oe(p);
(b) Pe(P) ~ P~(P)-
Principles O~(p) --~ Pe(p) and Oe(p) -~ P~(p) do not hold, since we do not
have constraint ( 3.43), otherwise (OD`) creeps back in for the weak obligation
and, in addition for the unspecific obligation. This can easily be shown. Suppose
O~(p) -~ Pe(P). This holds iff b'XEVt(!)(Rx(w) C QP~) ~ dxEVt(!)(Rx(w) n QP~ ~
~) lff dXEPt(!)(RX(w) ~~) iff R!(w) ~ 0 iff nXEVt(!)Rx(w) ~~. The con-
straint f1XEyt(!)RX(w) ~ 0 validates the constraint ~XEPt(!)(RX(w) C I~P~) ~
dXEPt(!)(RX(w) fl Qp~ ~~). Thus, Oe(p) --~ Pe(p), which is equivalent to prin-
ciple (OD'), creeps back in for the weak obligation.
This corresponds with the problem of accepting 0~(p) -~ Pe(p) discussed in sub-
section 3.2.3 and above.
Note that the principle
o~(p) -~ P~(p)
is valid: `if it is obligatory for all sets of actors that p, then it is permitted for some
sets of actors that p.' Thus, schema (OD') holds for O~, because of constraint (3.65)
and the truth conditions (3.59) and (3.60), but not for the weak collective obligation
OX, since we do not have constraint (3.43).
The following figure summarises the logical relations between operators O~, Oe, P~,




oX (p) PX (~)
1 .~
Oe(p) - O!(P) P!(P) - Pe(P)
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3.4 The notions of obligation
In this chapter, we distinguished six notions of obligations:
1. the personal obligation: O;(p);
2. the general obligation: Of(p);
3. the unspecific obligation: O-(p);
4. the collective obligation: Ox(p);
5. the strong obligation: O~(p);
6. the weak obligation: Oe(p),
with the corresponding notions of permission.
In this section, we summarise the relations between these notions. In the previous
subsection, we saw that the validity of some relations, such as O~(p) ~ Pe(p), depends
on the interpretation of Ox(p). First, we will give the relations between the different
notions if we interpret Ox(p) as the strict collective obligation.
The valid properties of the notions, with Ox(p) as the strict collective obligation, are
summarised in the following figure:
Figure 3.7
Pe(p) -i~ Px (p) P~(p)1 ~1
~~(p)~ ~x (P) -~ ~e (p)
~} (p)~ ~; (p) 0- (p)
~ ~ j ~
P-(p) P,(P) ~ P}(P)
If we consider Ox(p) to be the weak obligation, we do not need six but five different notions
of obligation, since the weak collective obligation OI(p) collapses in the weak obligation
Oe(p). Further, the principles O~(p) --~ Pe(p) and Oe(p) -~ P~(p) do not hold in this
case, as we already discussed in the previous subsection.
The valid properties of the notions, with Ox(p) as the weak collective obligation, are
summarised in the following figure:
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Figure 3.8
Pr(p) Px (p) P~ (P)
~~
~r(P) ~ ~x(P) ~~(p)
~- (p)~ ~~ (p) ~~} (p)
P-(p) Pt(p) P}(p)
3.5 The directed obligation
In this section, we briefly discuss the addition of counterparties to the system SDLx.
The counterparty is an individual or a group of individuals that has a`right' against the
addressee, that has a `duty' ( an obligation). `Right' and `duty' are correlative terms, i.e.,
when a right is invaded, a duty is violated.
Several authors ( Kanger, 1971, 1985; Lindahl, 1977; Makinson, 1986; Herrestad and
Krogh, 1995) analysed or described the types of rights relationships between the addressees
(or bearers) and counterparties from the classic work by Hohfeld ( 1964). Here, no attempt
is made to examine the approaches taken by these authors; we limit ourselves to a sugges-
tion of how counterparties can be indexed in the system SDLx.
The directed obligation yOx(p) can be read as `it is obligatory for X towards Y that
p', with X,Y E~}(I). An example of a directed obligation is that John is obliged towards
Paul that he shall stay away from Paul's land. In other words, Paul has a right against
John that the latter will stay away from Paul's land, the correlative ( and equivalent) being
that John is under a duty toward Paul to stay away from the place ( cf. Hohfeld, 1964).
We will use the model structure Nl -(W,~}(I),7Z'I,V) for system SDLxY consisting
of four elements:
1. the set of possible worlds W-{wl, w2, ...};
2. the non-empty powerset ~}(1) of the set of individuals I- {il,i2i...};
3. the set of functions 1Z'I -{RxY ~ X,Y E~}(I)}. The function RxY E 7Z'I on W
returns the deontically ideal worlds for group X towards Y given a world: RxY :
W -~ 2W ;
4. a valuation function V, which assigns the value `true' or `false' to a proposition at a
world in W.
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The truth conditions for directed obligation yOX and collective permission yPx are now
defined as follows:
M~w ~ YOx(p) iff RxY(w) C QP~ (3.76)
and
M, w~ YPx(p) iff RXY(w) n QP~ ~ 0. (3.77)
Schema (OD) holds by adding the following constraint:
RXy(w) ~~, for all Rxy E 7Z'r. (3.78)
Truth conclitions (3.76) and (3.77) are sufficient to validate the rule and all other schemata
of system D' for the directed obligation and permission. The addition of constraint (3.78)
depends on the interpretation of directed obligation yOX(p). As we have seen in subsection
3.3.2, we have to give up schema (OD) for yOx if we add the condition for accessibility
function RXy:
RXy(w) C RzY(w) if Z E P}(X) for all w E W. (3.79)
Thus, we can derive the formula
YDX(p) - ~ZE9f(X) Y~Z(T~)i
corresponding with the weak collective obligation.
Just like the two possibilities of interpretations of Ox(p), we can distinguish two inter-
pretations of the directed obligation yOx(p) with respect to the counterparty:
1. the strict directive oóligation: an obligation for X strictly towards group Y;
2. the weak directed obligation: an obligation for X towards some subgroup of Y, i.e.,
YOx(p) - ~zEVt(Y) zOx(P). (3.80)
To validate principle (3.80), we have to add an extra condition to accessibility function
Rxy:
Rxy(w) C RXZ(w) if Z E P}(Y) for all w E W. (3.81)
Thus, if it is obligatory for X towards Y that something will be accomplished, then X
is also obliged to accomplish the same thing towards every superset of Y. This bears
resemblance to the paradoxical character of the weak collective obligation (see subsection
3.3.2).
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From the above consideration we showed that there are several interpretations of the
directed obligation yOX(p), depending on whether one adds constraints (3.79) and (3.81).
As with the addition of (groups of) actors to SDL, the addition of counterparties leads to
new deontic operators with a new meaning and therefore subject to new intuitions. From
the above definitions, it can be seen that these changes are similar to those effected by
the addition of actors. Theoretically, an analysis of the new intuitions would therefore
be (for a large part) a repetition oí the previous sections. We will therefore abstain from
such an analysis at this place and just conclude that it is possible to extend SDLX with
counterparties and that the same type of choices with respect to counterparties can be
made as were made with respect to actors.
3.6 Conclusions
The result of the presentations of formalisations of relativised deontic modalities is a dis-
tinction between several levels of notions of obligation and permission. The first level is
the level of the personal notions: O; and P;. The second level is the level of the general
and unspecific notions: O} and P-, and O- and P}, respectively. The third level is the
level of the collective notions: OX(p) and PX(p), and the last level we discussed is the
level of strong and weak notions: O~ and Pe, and Oe and P~, respectively. The relations
between these four levels are summarised in figures 3.7 and 3.8.
The extension by including relativised deontic modalities in SDL provides us with the
possibility of expressing, for example, that an act is obligatory for an individual, but not
for everyone:
O:(P) ~ ~díElDi (P),
which is not expressible within a non-relativised deontic logic.
A problem arose in Herrestad and Krogh's theory when they added the principle
O~(p) -~ Pe(p) to their system, since this gave principle (OD') for Oe and for O-.
They proposed a restricted bridge principle. However, this solution is not quite satis-
factory. Instead, we suggest to define O~(p) as the strong obligation and Oe(p) as the
weak obligation, based on the collective obligation OX(p) interpreted as the strict collec-
tive obligation. We have shown that this smoothly solves the problem without undesirable
consequences. The interpretation of OX(p) as the strict collective obligation is essential
since the problem is not solved if we interpret OX(p) as the weak collective obligation.
This distinction between the interpretations of OX(p) is important since it acquires
different meanings of and intuitions about collective obligations.
Furthermore, we have shown how system SDLX can be extended to counterparties,
and foimalised the various interpretations of the directed obligatión.
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Concluding, we may state that we presented a description of relativised deontic opera-
tors for Ought-to-be statements. This approach avoids the problems encountered in other
approaches. In the next chapter, we will give a description of relativised deontic operators
pertaining to Ought-to-do statements.
Chapter 4
Relativised deontic modalities in
PDeL
This chapterl presents the inclusion of relativised deontic modalities in PDeL concerning
individuals and groups of individuals.
4.1 Introduction
A normative rule is aimed at actors, who are expected to follow the norms specified by
the (relevant) authority. The addition of actors to PDeL allows us to express who has the
responsibility for performing an action. For instance, the applicability of the norm `it is
obligatory to perform action ~3 (O(~3))' depends on the individual for whom the norm is
meant. According to the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, the speed limit for mopeds is 30
km~h within built-up areas and 50 km~h for motor vehicles. Therefore, the norm O(Q),
where ,0 is the action `driving slower than 30 km~h' is aimed at moped riders and not at
motor-vehicle drivers. Thus, moped riders can be fined for speeding with respect to this
norm, but on the strength of this norm motor-vehicle drivers cannot.
It is obvious that an action cannot be performed by itself; it has to be performed by
an actor or a group of actors. We will take an event to be an action initiated by an actor
or a group of actors. We distinguish two kinds of events:
1. individual events, i.e., actions initiated by individuals;
2. collective events, i.e., actions initiated by groups of actors.
With the help of these events, we extend PDeL with actors and groups of actors. The
concept of collective events is new, and can be seen as a modification and an extension of
the actor logic L(SigDy„) developed by Wieringa and Meyer (1993).
1Some of the ideas in this chapter were presented earlier in Royakkets and Dignum (1995a, 19956).
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This chapter mainly deals with a semantic and an axiomatic study of extensions of
PDeL, taking into consideration actors and groups of actors on the basis of dynamic logic.
These extensions of PDeL enables us to distinguish strong, general, personal, group, weak
and unspecific obligations (the same types of obligations as in chapter 3), and to formalise
and analyse the relations between these different notions of obligation.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 deals with the semantics of
individual events and the extension of PDeL concerning the addition of actors on the basis
of individual events. In section 4.3, we discuss the semantics of collective events and the
extension of PDeL concerning the addition of groups of actors on the basis of collective
events. Section 4.4 presents the distinction between the different notions of obligation
and their relations and analyses the properties of some notions of obligation. In section
4.5, we discuss the satisfaction of norms by groups. In the final section, we provide some
conclusions.
4.2 The extension of PDeL with actors
In this section, we discuss the extension of PDeL with actors on the basis of individual
event expressions. First, we discuss the semantics of individua] event expressions.
4.2.1 The semantics of individual event expressions
The non-empty set of actors who initiate the actions is denoted by I. An atomic individual
event is an action initiated by an actor. (For short, we will write `events' instead of
`individual events' in this section.) An atomic event is denoted by an actor i E I and an
action ,!3 as follows: i:~i. We define Evt as the set of atomic events.2
The set of all event expressions Evt can now be determined by the following BNF for
its elements (a):
a ::- i : ~3~ai U~` a2~ai8t~a2~a,
where i E I, al, a2 E Evt and ~3 E Act.
The meaning of al U' a2 is a choice between a~ and a2. Furthermore, a18a"a2 stands
for the simultaneous performance of ai and a2i and á stands for the negation of event
expression a. The event expression i : any means that i performs a universal (`do not
care which') action. The i: change can then be characterised as the performance of a`do
not care which, but not the skip' action by i. The event expression i: skip stands for i
`performing' the empty action, i.e., the event that has no effect (`does nothing'). Finally,
the event expression i: fail means that i performs an action that always fails. After this
event, the system stops and nothing can be done any more. Note that the meanings of
2Note that an action Q in an atomic event is not necessarily an atomic action.
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these event expressions correspond with the meanings of the action expressions discussed
in chapter 2, except that actors are added here.
Remarks.
1. Wieringa and Meyer ( 1993) make a distinction between two kinds of choices:
~ the active choice: the choice labelled by an actor who makes the choice. They
write i : (Ql ~ QZ) for the active choice made by actor i;
~ the passive choice: the choice between Q~ and QZ is an underspecification, be-
cause it is either action Ql or action ~32i but it is not specified which. They write
f for passive choice.
They show that active and passive choices differ. For example, the passive choice is
associative (i :((Ql -~,02) f Qa) - i:(Ql f(~s f As))) and the active choice is not. In
our language of Evt, the choice i : Ql U` QZ stands for the passive choice.
2. The performance of an atomic event, e.g., i: a18ca2 ( e.g., to walk 8t to whistle)
involves the performance of the ( semantical) elementary actions al ( to walk) and a2
(to whistle), possibly together with other elementary actions ( e.g., to look, to cross
the street, etc.). The meaning of i: a18ca2 only stipulates the performance of actions
al and a2 ( corresponding semantical al and a2), but i is free to perform any other
set of elementary actions simultaneous with al and a2.
Formally, we give the semantics of event expressions by means of synchronicity sets, similar
to the ones defined in chapter 2. These synchronicity sets denote performances of `packages'
of (semantical) elementary actions that have to be performed simultaneously by the same
actor.
Definition 4.2.1
1. Set {b} ís a synchronicity set (s-set~.
2. Set {i : skip} is an s-set.
.i. Every pair of a non-empty suóset of A and an indivídual in I is an s-set.
We use S, SI, S2, ... for s-sets. The set of all s-sets, except {b}, will be denoted by S'. In
concrete cases, we write an s-set using brackets. For instance, let A-{a~, a2i a3} and
I- {i~,i2}, then s-set S consisting of the atomic actions al and a2 performed by il is
written as
j a
S-[al : A~], or S- Lii : 1 ,a2
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with A' - {al, az}.
The s-set consisting of event il : skip is written as [il : skip]. Thus, S` -{[i : A'] ~ i E
I, A' C A, A' ~ (~} U{[i : skip] ~ i E I}. For the above example, S` -
{[il : skip]~ [2i : ai], [2i : az]~ [2i : aa], [2i : a~ J , [2i : al J , L 2i : az J , lil :az a3 a3







We use S; to denote the set of all s-sets, except s-set [S], with i as the individual, thus
S; -{[i:A']~A'CA,A'~0}U{[i:skip]}.
Definition 4.2.2 Let I-{il, izi ..., in}, then 7 is defined as the set of the elements of
the indirect product of 5,~, S;z, ..., S;n-1 and S;n . We denote this as 7-de~ XtErS; - f1n
element of T is called a step. We use the letter `t' with possible marks for steps. We use
t; for the set of actions in A in the s-set of t which has i as the actor.
Thus, a step t of 7 is an n-tuple. The order of the s-sets in a step is irrelevant. For
instance, let A-{al, az, a3} and I-{il, iz, i3}, then the triple t consisting of s-sets
alal l
[21 : al], iz : J and i3 : az is written asa3 a3
[21 : ai], I iz :
and this is equal to the step
al
i3 : az , [2i : ai], [iz :
a3 i)al
with, e.g., t;z -{al,a3}. Note that the equality can be formally realised by defining an
equivalence relation between steps. Here, it suffices to give this informal account.
A step denotes a deterministic sets of actions for all actors simultaneously. It shows for
each actor what he will do next. The usefulness of the skip operator is that we can now say
that in a certain situation some actors do nothing or do not affect the situation. Without
the skip operator, we would have to indicate for each moment what actions are performed
a3
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by each actor, even though some actors do not affect the situation. This leads to a very
artificial and counter-intuitive specification, because it is unlikely that every actor does
something all the time. We will use skip to indicate that actions performed by some actor
have no influence on the situation.
Since our language of events contains a non-deterministic ( choice) operator U~, we have
to consider sets of steps t E T. We use T, Tl, T2, ... to denote sets of steps.
Our event domain M7 is now given by:
Definition 4.2.3 MT is the collection of sets T consisting of steps.
Note that MT is the powerset of 7, normally denoted by 2T or P(7). We will use the
operations W, f~ and `(operator for the set-theoretic complement) on the domain MT
as semantical counterparts of the syntactical operators U', 8L' and -, respectively, in our
language Evt of event expressions. Before we give these definitions, we define a handy
operator on sets of steps:
Definition 4.2.4 Let T be a set of steps, then
~,á - T ` {[t~]} tf ~tETt ~ [a]
{[S]} otherwise.
Now we can give the semantical operators on M7. For the simultaneous operator 8t`, we
use a set intersection ra , which is almost the same as the normal set intersection.3




Operator W on sets of steps is defined as follows:
Definition 4.2.6 For Tl, TZ E M7:
T,W TZ - (T, U T2)á.
Thus, the choice between two sets of steps is the union of those two sets minus {[b]}, unless
the union does not contain anything else.
3Note that the definitions aze simpler than in chapter 2, because of the fact that no s-sequences are
allowed.
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The definition of `"' is given as follows:
Definition 4.2.7
1. For a step t,
t - 7 `{t}.
2. For a non-empty set T E MT,
T- - r~ {t-~t E T}.
Thus, for a step t the negation just yields the set-theoretic complement of {t} with respect
to 7. For the negation of a set of steps T, we take the intersection of the sets of the
negation of all the steps contained in T. Note that T C 7 and that 7 E MT. Now we can
define the semantics of event expressions: -
Definition 4.2.8 The semantic fvnction Q] E Evt -~ MT, with a, Ql, Qz E Act, i E I and
a, al, ~z E Evt, is given by:
1. Qi:a]-{tE7~aEt;};
2. Qi:QiuQzl-Qi.QiIWQi-Qz1,'
~i. Qi : aióLQz] - Qi - Qi]~ Qi : Qz],'
4. Qi.Ái]-Qi-pi];
5. Q~i ~~` az] - Qoi]W Qaz],'
6. Qai~`az] - Qai]~ Q~z];
7. Qá] - Qa] ;
8. Qi : fail] - { [b] };
9. Qi : any] - 7;
10. Qi : skip] - {t E 7 ~ t; -{skip}};
11. Qi : change] - 7` Qi : skip] .
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Remarks
1. Qi : a~ expresses the meaning of event expression i: a: we specify the performance
of the elementary action a (simultaneous with some package of actions) by i and
simultaneous with the performance of undetermined actions by the other individuals.
Thus, only the performance of a by i is determined. Qi : any~ stands for the set of
all steps in 7.
Suppose a is event expression il : a U~ i2 : 6, then Qa~ is the set of all steps containing
an s-sets with elementary action a performed by i~ or b performed by i2. In the same
way, Qil : a8t~i2 : b~ is the set of all steps consisting of elementary action a performed
by il and b performed by i2.
2. Definition 4.2.8.7 defines negation as a complement operator. á means: `cY does not
occur, and it is not specified what does occur.' This is similar to the meaning of
negation in propositional logic. Wieringa and Meyer ( 1993) call this interpretation
of event negation passive event negation.
3. From definitions 4.2.8.4 and 4.2.8.7 it now follows that Qi :~~ - Qi : Q~. Thus, the
negation of event expression i: Q stands for not-performing action expression Q by
actor i. Wieringa and Meyer ( 1993) call this interpretation of event negation active
event negation.4 They make a distinction between active event negation in a local
way and in a global way. In a local way, it can be interpreted as the statement that
i does something other than ,0, and in a global way it can be interpreted as the
statement that another actor performs ,Q. We use the local active event negation,
because we can derive Qi : fail~ - Qi : anyD, and this is only reasonable if we assume
local active event negation.s
4. Above we noted that event expression i:~31 U` Q2 stands for the passive choice. This
is expressed formally in definition 4.2.8.2.
Example. Let A- {al,az} and I-{il,iZ}. Then,
~ Qii - ~ -
{ l ~Zl ' a1 ~ ' ~ZZ ' al ~ ~ ' l ~Zl ' al ~ ' ~tZ ' a2 ~ ~ ' l
~il : al ] , [i2 : skip ~ ~ '
4Note that we do not make a distinction between active and passive event negation.
5`The local interpretation of event negation is enforced by the axiom
[i:a]Ml i:a -[i:any].
The global interpretation of event negation cannot be axiomatised in the example specification, for it
tequires a constant that denotes the process "any actor does something".' (Wieringa and Meyer, 1993, p.
305)
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``i~
: al , , [iz :
`LZ1 .
~ Qil : ái - Zi : ai -
al
az J~ `LZ1
. az J [az . al ~ ~ , I I zi : a2 J , [z2 : a2 ~ ~ ,
al
az J~ LZZ , az J I `LZ1 .
a i , [iz : skip J };az
{ l ~~1 ' az ~ ' l~z ' al ~ ~ ' l lZl ' az ~ ' `ZZ ' az ~ ~ ' l lEl ' az , , ~iz : skip 1 ~ '
l ~il : skip ] , ~ZZ ' a' ~ ~ ' l `Z1 : skip ~ ' ~ZZ ' az ~ ~ ' l lZ' : skip ] , [iz : skip ~ ~ '
C `il : az , , LZZ . az 1 I~( lil : skip ], LZZ ~ az J I};
~ Qil : a18a~i1 : az - Qzl : a18taz -
{ 1 [Z1 : az J ~ [zz - a1 ~ J , I I ii : QZ J , [iz : az J ~ ~
`LZI ~ az 1 ~ LZZ . az J ~ ~ `lZl . az ] '
~iz : skip J I };
~ Qil : al U~` il : az - Qil : al W Qil : a2 - Qil : change~;
~ Qil : al U~` iz : az - T` Qil : al U" iz : az - il : al ~l Qiz : az -
{l~Zl ' az ~' ~~z ' a' ~~' l~Zl ' az ] ~ [~z : skip ~~'
~ fi~ : skip ] , ~iz : skip ] ) ' ~ ~z, : skip ~ ' [az ' al , ) };
~ Qil : a18t`iz : az - T` Qil : a18c'iz : az - Qil : al W iz : az - Qi1 : á1 W Qiz : áz .
Note that Qi1 : a18i"il : ál ~ - Qil : fail~ - {[S]} and that Qil : a18c~iz : ál] ~{[S]}.
In this section, we also introduce an auxiliary notion to be used in the sequel:
Definition 4.2.9 We put ~1 -T a2 Z,U Q~lll - Q~2J-
The following proposition can easily be derived from the semantic function:
Proposition 4.2.10
1. For MT, the following properties concerning operators U" and 8t' hold:
Íai aU~~-7a~
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(b) a~"a -7 a;
(c) al U~ a2 -T a2 U~ al;
(d) ai~`az -T az~~ai;
(e) a18L~`(az U~` as) -7 (ai~`az) U~` (ai~~`as);
(f) ai U~ (az~~aa) -7 (ai U~ az)~~(a1 U' as).
2. MT satisfies the following properties regardíng `~':
(a) a8c~ó- -T í : fail;
' (b) a U~ á-T i: any;
(c) ai U~ az -T ~i~~~z;
. -.(d) al ~az -7 ái U az,
(eJ a -T a.
~3. MT satisfaes the following properties regarding the actions performed by an actor i:
(a) i:~lU~`i:~z-TZ:QiU,~z;
(b) i : ~i~~i : ~z -T i : Qi~~z;
(c) i:a-Ti:~i.
,~. M7 satisfies the following properties concerning the special events:
(a) a U' i: fail -7 a;
(b) a8L"i : fail -T i : fail;
(c) (i : change) U~ (i : skip) -T i : any;
(d) (i : change)8t~`(i : skip) -7 i : fail;
(e) i : skip -T i : change;
(f) i : any -T i : fail.
Proposition 4.2.11 (MT, U`, 8c~, - , i : fail) ís a Boolean algebra.
Proof. Follows directly from the equations mentioned above.
Remarks
1. The choice has the usual properties of choice in process algebra: it is commutative,
associative and idempotent. The simultaneous event also has these properties. It
can easily be proven from the equations mentioned above.
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2. In the models presented by Wieringa and Meyer (1993), the formulas i: QU~`i : fail -
i: Q and i:,QÓc~i : fail - i : fail are omitted from the specification. In their models,
these two formulas are not valid. They argue that i:~ U` i: fail - i: Q is only
valid if i : Q is a choice over a set of options that includes i : fail, which, according
to Meyer and Wieringa, is highly questionable. The formula i:~38~`i : fail - i: fail
is not valid, for the following reason: i:~38e~`i : fail does not denote anything at
all, because it means that i performs Q and does nothing at the same time, and is,
therefore, not equal to i: fail, which means that i fails but that other actors can still
perform actions.
In our model of the semantics of events expression, these formulas are valid. The
event expression i: fail is the event that always fails. After this event, the system
stops and nothing can be done any more by anybody ( there is no successor state).
Thus, if i fails, then there are no actors that still perform actions. Thus, in our
model it holds that i~ : fail - i2 : fail, which does not hold in the Wieringa and
Meyer's models. In an analogous way, we can defend the validity of the formula
i:QU~i:fail-i:~3.
The interpretation of the action expression fail in Wieringa and Meyer ( 1993) corre-
sponds more or less with the action skip used here. There, the action expression fail
is interpreted as `to do nothing' and the event expression i: fail as `i fails but the
rest of the world can still continue performing events' (Wieringa and Meyer, 1993,
p. 306), which can be interpreted as the event i : skip: `i does not affect the sit-
uation, but the rest of the world can still do so.' Also, in our system the formulas
i: Q U~ i : skíp ~ i : Q and i: Q8e"i : skip ~ i : skip. The different interpretation
of the action expression fail is the reason why Wieringa and Meyer omitted the two
formulas mentioned above from the specification; it is also the reason why we add
these formulas to our model.
4.2.2 PDeL(Evt)
Now we extend the system PDeL with actors by changing the language Ass of PDQL. The
language Ass consists of assertions pertaining to actions ( and actions that are composed
sequentíally). The expressions of PDeL(Evt) are assertions concerning events in Evt. An
expression ~ of PDeL(Evt) is a norm formulation in Ruiter's ( 1989) terminology.
Definition 4.2.12 The language Ass" of PDeL(Evt) consists of assertions (~~ concern-
ing events in Evt:
~ ::- ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~1 V ~2 ~ ~i n ~s ~ ~1 ~ ~~ ~ ~a~~,
with ~ E L, ~, ~1, ~2 E Ass" and a E Evt.
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As in chapter 2, the deontic operators are defined as follows: F(a) -[a]V, O(a) -
F(~) and P(a) -~F(a), with the special propositional symbol V, which means that
the situation is in contravention of the law. Thus, a is forbidden (F(a)) is reduced to a
dynamic expression as follows:
F(a) - [a]V.
[a] is interpreted as a modal operator of the necessity ( 0) in a Kripke structure induced
by the performance of events.
Definition 4.2.13 A model M for PDeL(Evt) is given by
M - (j,A,W,Qa~a,~)~
where I is the set of actors, A the set of actions, W a set of possible worlds, Qa~R a function
that associates with event a E Evt and wordd w, the set of possible worlds to which the
perform,ance of a leads, and a the usual truth relation between wordds and propositions:
~r : W x L -~ {true, false}.
We stipulate that we have a set W of worlds assigning values to propositional variables
and a given function p: 7-~ (W -~ W), which for each step yields its behaviour in terms
of world transitions. Thus, p(t)(w) gives the next world when each individual i performs
all the semantical actions in t; simultaneously in world w. (t; is the set of actions in A in
the s-set of t which has i as the actor.)
Definition 4.2.14
~ P([a])(w) - 0.
~ For a step t, the function R(t) E W-i W is defined by
R(t)(w) - p(t)(w).
~ For a set T of steps,
R(T)(w) - {w' ~ w' - R(t)(w) for t E T}.
Definition 4.2.15 Function Q~R : Evt -~ (W -a 2W ) is defined as
Qa~R(w) - R(Qa~)(w).
The truth definitions are standard. For dynamic formulas they are as follows:
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Definition 4.2.16
w ~ [a]~ Z~~w~ElalR~w)w, ~ ~~
i.e., sentence [a]~ is true in w i.Q~ holds in every wordd accessible from w by the perfor-
mance of a.
For assertions, we can now give the formal system PDeL(Evt) that is sound with respect
to the given semantics:
Axiom 4.2.17
1. all tautologies of the propositional calculus;
,2. [a](~~ -~ ~2) ~ ([a]~i ~ [a]~z);
~3. [ai U~ az]~ - [ai]~ n [a2]~;
4. [ai]~ V [a~]~ -~ [ai8t'az]~;
5. [i : fail]~;










Note that we do not have the schema ~[i : any]V corresponding with the schema (OD) of
SDL.6 Using the definitions of deontic operators, the following proposition can be derived
immediately.
Proposition 4.2.19 Let ~3, ~31 and Q2 be events, then all the theorems given in proposition
2.3.6 hold for PDeL(Evt).
6To add schema ~[i : any]V to system PDeL(Evt), we have to introduce the following constraint on
the semantics:
3w~El~;anylRiu,~w' ~ V for all tu E W.
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4.2.3 The general and unspecific obligations
In the previous subsection, we formalised the concept of actors in PDeL(Evt), which allows
us to specify which actors are permitted or obliged to perform an action. In this subsection
an analysis is made of the ( restricted) general and (restricted) unspecific obligations and
permissions, which gives us new expressible power, and their relations.
With the help of the personal obligatíon and permission, we can formalise the general
and unspecific obligations and permissions analogous to the previous chapter:
~ the general obligation ( O}(Q)) and permission (P-(p)):
~}(Q) - d;e~0(i : ,Q)7 and P-(Q) - d;e1P(z : Q)-
~ the unspecific obligation (O-(Q)) and permission (Pt((~)):
~-(Q) - ~;er~(i : ~3)8 and P}(Q) - ~;erP(z : Q)~
The restricted general obligation (OX(~3)) is defined as
~X(Q) - d;Ex~(Z : ~),
where X C I, and the restricted unspecific obligation (OX(Q)) as
~z(a) - 3;Exo(i : Q),
where X C 1. Analogously, we define the restricted general and unspecific permissions:
Pz(Q) - ~;exP(z ~ ~)
and
Px(I~) - d;ExP(z : Q).
The general obligations
The best known norms are the legal norms. These norms are mostly aimed at individuals
belonging to a particular group. Most of the normative rules are restricted general norms,
because these rules are aimed not at all actors but at actors of a particular group. For
instance, the various sections of the Dutch traffic regulations are aimed at specific groups
of road users, such as the group of cyclists, motor-vehicle drivers, etc. For instance:
Article 20. Within built-up areas the following speed limits hold:
~Note that the following equivalence holds: d;E~O(i :(3) - I~;EfO(: : Q).
dNote that the following equivalence holds: 3;Er0(i :~i) - V;ErO(i :(3).
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- for motor vehicles: 50 km~h;
- for mopeds and motorised wheelchairs: 30 km~h.
Thus, for every individual in the group of motor-vehicle drivers it is forbidden to drive
faster than 50 km~h (within built-up areas). This prohibition is a generad prohibition with
respect to the group of motor-vehicle drivers: it is a prohibition in force for everybody in
the group of the motor-vehicle drivers. This can be formalised as follows:
diEMF(2 : Q),
where M C I denotes the group of motor-vehicle drivers and ,Q the action `to drive faster
than 50 km~h'. Thus, a motor-vehicle driver satisfies this norm if he does not perform
action Q. A restricted general obligation is aimed at individuals in a certain group and
allows us to express that each individual in that group separately has the responsibility to
satisfy the norm. Thus, a general obligation implies a personal obligation. Let il E I and
Q E Act, then
~}(Q) - d;e~0(i :~) and d;ei~(z : Q) -~ o(il : Q).
The unspecific obligation
The opposite of the general obligation is the unspecific obligation. This is an obligation
for a non-specified individual. It is an obligation in force for at least one of the actors in
the group. We can denote this by the existential quantifier 3. For instance, 3;E~F(i : QI),
where U C I denotes the group of road users and ~il the action `to drive faster than 30
km~h', is a prohibition in force, e.g., for moped riders and not, e.g., for motor-vehicle
drivers.
Note that the (restricted) general obligation implies the (restricted) unspecific obliga-
tion:
~X(N) ~ ~X(N)i
where X C I.
A restricted unspecific obligation is aimed at individuals in a certain group, and allows
us to express that some individual in that group has the responsibility to satisfy the norm,
without specifying whom, e.g., the last person to leave the room has to turn off the light.
Thus, a personal obligation implies an impersonal obligation:
o(i, : Q) -r o-(Q)-
Now we are also able to express that an action ~í is obligatory for a particular person il,
but not for all individuals:
o(il : Q) n ,d;Elo(i : p),
which is equivalent to
o(il : Q) n P}(Q).
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The strict personal obligation
Finally, we define the strict personal obligation. This is an obligation only for a specific
individual; thus, no other individual has that obligation. An example of a strict personal
obligation can be a decision (an order which is not of a general nature, including refusal
of an application for such an order),9 or an obligation for the prime minister. A strict
personal obligation for il can be formalised as follows:
O(ii - Q) n diEl`{;,}~O(i : ,6).
4.2.4 The relations between the notions of obligation and per-
mission
In subsection 3.2.2, we gave the relations between the general, personal and unspecific
notions of obligation and permission. The results were summarised in figures 3.3 and 3.4.
In PD~L, the following two principles are valid:
O}(Q) -' O-(Q) (4.1)
and
P-(a) -~ P}(Q).
The principles relating to a notion of obligation and a notion of permission are not valid,
i.e., Ot(,0) -~ P-(Q), O-(Q) -~ P}(,0), Ot(Q) --r P}(Q) and O-(Q) ~ P-(Q), since we
do not have schema ~[i : any]V corresponding with schema (OD) of D;.
The obligations `it is obligatory for the zoo caretaker to feed the monkeys' and `it is
obligatory for the visitors not to feed the monkeys', with Q the action `to feed the monkeys',
are intuitively not in conflict. In general, obligations O(i : Q) and O(j : Q) are never in
conflict (if i~ j), in contrast to obligations O;(p) and O~(~p) in the extension of SDL
concerning the addition of actors (see previous chapter). Obligations O;(p) and O~(~p)
are always in conflict, since `p' is a description of a state of affairs, for instance `that
the monkeys are fed'. Then, i has to accomplish that the monkeys are fed and j has to
accomplish that the monkeys are not fed, i.e., the opposite of what i has to accomplish.
Thus, principle ~(O;(p)n0~(~p)) and thus also principle ~(D-(p)n0-(~p)) are defensible,
if one wants to obtain a coherent normative system, i.e., without conflicting obligations,
as was considered desirable by Bailhache (1991) and Hilpinen (1973).
The valid principles between the various notions of the obligation and permission can
be summarised in the following figure.
9See section 1:3 of the General Administrative Law Act (`Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht').








4.2.5 The directed obligation
Actions performed by an individual, can be directed towards another individual or group
of individuals (directed actions) or can be independent of another individual or group of
individuals (vndirected actions). Some examples of directed actions are `to give right of
way', `to overtake', `to pay', etc. It matters greatly to whom such an action is directed. For
instance, according to the Dutch traffic regulation it is obligatory for motor-vehicle drivers
to give right of way to motor-vehicle drivers from the right, but they are not obliged to
give right of way to cyclists from the right. Examples of undirected actions are `to drive
at a speed of 50 km~h', `to turn left' and `to park'.
In this subsection, we give a formalisation of directed actions in our semantics of actions.
Let al be a directed action (e.g., `to give right of way') and I-{il, ..., i„}, then al will
be defined as
ai :- ai(zi) lJ ai(z2) U... U al(zn).
The domain of the action al is I. al(ik) will be read as `to give right of way to ik.' Note
that al(ik) is a directed atomic action and al is not.
However, some actions are directed not only to individuals, but can also be directed
to, for example, a union, a firm, a group of individuals, etc. Suppose a stands for the
action `to pay'. This action can be directed towards individuals, but also towards a union,
a firm, a collective group of individuals, etc. The argument of a can be an individual in
I, but also a firm or union. Let F be a firm, then i: a(F) means that i pays to firm F.
Thus, we can extend the language Act by extending the domains of directed actions. The
domain of a directed action depends, first, on the action itself, in relation to its object.
For example, you cannot overtake a firm. Thus, sometimes the domain of a directed action
will be restricted only to individuals or only to unions, etc. And, second, it depends on
the individual or group of individuals that performs the directed action. For example, an
individual cannot overtake himself. Thus, for every directed action we have to determine
its domain.
With the help of these directed actions, we can express directed obligations. The
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directed obligation
O(i : a(~))
is read as `individual i is obliged to give right of way to j', with a the directed action
`to give right of way'. Thus, individual i(the bearer) has a duty and individual j (the
counterparty) has a right (cf. Hohfeld, 1964).
4.3 The extension of PDeL with groups of actors
In this section, we discuss the extension of PDeL concerning the addition of groups of actors
on the basis of collective event expressions. First, we discuss the semantics of collective
event expressions.
4.3.1 The semantics of collective event expressions
It is important to note that collective event X: Q is not an event that is performed if
and only if every actor in group X performs the action Q. A group event X : Q can
be performed if only a subgroup of X(maybe one person or the whole group together)
has performed the action ~3. Thus, we can express, on the one hand, that group X as
a whole has the responsibility to perform action Q, even if the action is performed by a
subgroup (the electricians) of X(the firm). On the other hand, we can model the fact that
if the group as a whole performs an action, none of its members performs that action, for
instance, when a construction company builds a house.
In the discussion of the semantics of collective event expressions, i.e., actions performed
by a group of actors, we see that most definitions are extensions of the definitions of
subsection 4.2.1.
The set of all event expressions Evt' can be determined by the following BNF for its
elements (a):
a ::- X : ~i~ai U~ az~ai~~as~a,
where X E P}(I), with Pt(I) the non-empty powerset of I, al,a2 E Evt' and ~3 E Act.
Definition 4.3.1
1. Set {b} is a synchronicity set (s-set).
,2. Set {X : skip} is an s-set, with X a non-empty suóset of I.
3. Every pair of a non-empty subset of A and a non-empty subset of I is an s-set.
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We use S, S~, S2i ... for s-sets. The set of all s-sets, except {b}, will be denoted by S'.
Let X E Pt(I) and A- {al,a2}, then s-set S consisting of elementary actions a~ and
aZ performed by set X is written as
S-[X:A'],orS- [X: al J,
a2
with A' - {al,aZ}. Thus, S' -{[X : A'] ~ A' C A,A' ~ 0,X E ~t(I)} U{[X : skip] ~ X E
P}(I)}. Let X be the set {il,i2}, then S' --
{[{il} : a~],[{il} : a2],[{il} : skip], L {i1} : á2 ] ,
[{i1,i2} : al],[{i~,i2} : a2],[{il,i2} : skip], ~{il,i2} : á2 J ,
[{í2} : al], [{i2} : a2], [{i2} : skip], I {i2} : ál J }.L z
Further, we use SX to denote the set of all s-sets with X in ~}(I), thus 5~;~ ;~} -{[{il, i2} :
A']~A'CA,A'~~}.
Note that S' C S', if we assume that S; - S{~}.
It is clear that a group can only do something if some members of the group do some-
thing, and it is plausible to assume that the elementary actions of a group are constituted,
in some way or other, by the elementary actions of the members of the group. For instance,
if a member performs an elementary action a, the group also performs this action. How-
ever, the group is not restricted to performing the elementary actions that are performed
by the individual members of the group, since a group can perform an elementary action
that cannot be performed by a single individual. For instance, `to lift a stone of 500 lbs'.
This relationship between the group and the members of the group with respect to their
performances of elementary actions manifests itself in the following definition.
Definition 4.3.2 Let I- {il, i2, .. ., i„}, then T' will be defaned as
T~ -def {xXEPt(I)sX I dX,YE~t(1)Y C X---~ ty C tX,
dX,YEPt(I)tY - {Sk2p} -~ tXuY - tX}~
wíth tX the set of actions in s-set [X : tX], a coef~icient of step t corresponding with X.
An element of T' will be called a step. We use the letter `t' with possible ~narks for steps.
A step t of T' is a 2" - 1-tuple. The order of the s-sets in a step is again irrelevant. T'
is not just the indirect product of all the sets S,'r, with X E P}(I), but a subset of this
indirect product. T' has been restricted for the following two reasons:
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1. Let t be a step in T' containing s-set [Y : tY] with ty -{al, ..., am }, a subset of A.
Thus, group Y simultaneously performs the actions a~, ..., a„~. Then all supersets
of Y also perform these actions, possibly together with other actions in A, because
of the fact that Y is a subgroup of X. (X performs the actions in tY if and only if
some subset of X performs these actions.)
Example 4.3.3 Let A- {al, a2} and 1-{il, i2}, then
l l{ } : al ] , [ {i2} : a2 ~ , [{il,i2} : al ]~ ~ T'.
For instance, if John posted the letter, then also the group John and Paul posted the
letter, because John is a subgroup of the group consisting of John and Paul.
2. Let t be a step in T' containing the s-set [Y : skip]. This means that Y does not
affect the situation. Thus, for every real superset X of Y it follows that the groups
X and X`Y perform the same actions.
Example 4.3.4 Let A- {al, a2} and I-{il, iz}, then
~~{ } : skip ] , [ {i2} : al ] , [{il, i2} : a2 ] ~ ~ T'.
Example 4.3.5 Let A- {al, az} and I-{il, i2}, then T' -
{~[{il} : skip ] , [ {i2} : skip, , [{il,i2} : skip ]) ,
~[{il} : skip ] , [ {i2} : al ] , [{il,i2} : al ~~ ,
~[{il} : skip ] , [ {i2} : a2 ] , [{il,i2} : a2 ~~ ,
I [{il} : skip ] , [{i2} : a2 ] , [{il,i2} :
~[{il} : al ~ , ~ {i2} : skip ] , ~{il,i2} : al ~~ ,
([{il} : al], [{i2} : al], [{il,i2} : al
al
I[{il} : a1], [{i2} : a2], [{il, i2} : al
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C [{il} : al ], I{iz} : Q2 J , I{i~,iz} : Q2 l~,
~~{il} : az ] , ~l{iz} : skip ] ,L~{il,iz} : azJ]) ,
C[{il} : az ] , [ {iz} : al ] , I {il, iz} : a2 11 ,
~[{il} : az], [{iz} : az], ~{ill, íz} : az ~~
,J J
I [{il} : az], [{iz} : az], ~{il, iz} : Q1 1 ~ ,
` zJ
I[{i~} : az l, L {iz} : a2 1, L {il,iz} : Q2 ]~ ,
CL{il} : Qz J ,[{iz} : skip], L {il,iz} : ál 11 ,2 Jj
`L{il } : al J , [{iz} : az], I {il, iz} : al ] ~ ,az L az
`~{il }: QZ J , L {iz} : a2 J , I{il, iz} : Q2 J 1,
C L{il} : Q2 J ,[{iz} : al], L {i~, iz} : al J I}.z j
Since our language of event expressions contains a non-deterministic (choice) operator U',
we have to consider sets of steps t E 7'. We use T, Tl, Tzi ... to denote sets of steps.
Our event model MT~ is now given by:
Definition 4.3.6 MT~ is the collectiorc of sets T consisting of steps.
Note that MT~ is the powerset of T', normally denoted by 2T~ or P(T). We shall use
the operations U, fl and "(operator for the set-theoretic complement) on the domain MT~
as semantical counterparts of the syntactical operators U', éa' and -, respectively, in our
language Evt' of event expressions. Before we give these definitions, we define a handy
operator on the sets of steps:
Definition 4.3.7 Let T be a set of steps, then
Tb - ~ T `{[t~]} 2f ~tETt ~ [ó]
{[b]} otherwise.
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Now we can give the semantical operators on MT~. For the simultaneous operator ói', we
use a set intersection n, which is almost the same as the normal set intersection.
Definition 4.3.8 ForT1iT2 E MT~,
Tlf1T2 ifT, flT2~0
Tl n T2 - {[ó]} otherwise.
Operator LJ on sets of steps is defined as follows:
Definition 4.3.9 ForT1iT2 E MT~,
T, u Tz -(T, U TZ)b.
Thus, the choice between two sets of steps is the union of those two sets minus {[ó]}, unless
the union does not contain anything else.
The definition of ``' is given as follows:
Definition 4.3.10
1. For a step t,
t - 7' ` {t}.
2. For a non-empty set T E MT~,
T- - n{t-~t E T}.
Thus, for a step t the negation just yields the set-theoretic complement of {t} with respect
to 7'. For the negation of a set of steps T, we take the intersection of the sets of the
negation of all the steps contained in T. Note that T C T' and that 7' E MT~.
Now we can define the semantics of event expressions in Evt':
Definition 4.3.11 The semantic function Q~ E Evt' -~





MT,, with ,0, Ql, QZ E Act, X E
5. Qai U' a z~ - Qai~ U Qaz~;
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6. Qai~'az~ - Qai] n Qaz~;
7. QáD - Qa~ ;
8. QX : fail~ - {[S]};
9. QX : anY] - T';
10. QX : skip~ - {t E T'~b'yEyt(x)ty -{skip}};
11. QX : change~ - T' ` QX : skip~.
Remarks
1. QX : a] expresses the meaning of event expression X: a: it is the set of all steps in
T' which contains the s-set [X : tx] with a E tx: X performs the elementary action
a possibly together with other elementary actions.
2. Qa~ stands for the set-theoretic complement of QcY~ with respect to T'. QX : á~ is
the set of all steps in T' which contains the s-set [X : tx] with a ~ tx. Thus, no
subgroup of X performs action a.
3. QX : any~ stands for the set of all steps in T'.
4. QX : skip~ is the set of all steps, such that for every non-empty subset Y of X it
follows that [Y : skip] is an s-set in these steps. If a situation is not affected by group
X, then it is also not affected by a subgroup of X.
To understand the semantical function, we provide some examples.
Example 4.3.12 Let A-{al, az} and I - {il, iz}, then
~ Q{il} : al -{t ~ t{t,} E{{al}, {al,az}},VxEPt(!),x~{:,}tx E P}(A)} nT';
~ Q{i~, i2} : ál - Q{i1i iz} : al - T' `Q{il, iz} : al -
{t I t{;,,;,} E{{skip}, {az}},vxE~t(!),x~{ti,,i2}tx E v~-(A)} nT';
~ Q{il,iz} : skíp~ - {t ~ t{;,,;2} -{skip},tíxEyf(!),x~{;,,tZ}tx E P}(A)} nT' -
{t ~ dxEpt(r)tx - {skip}};
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~ Q{il} : al U' {i2} : ~ - 7' `Q{il} : al U' {i2} : a2 - Q{il} : al fl Q{i2} : ay -
{t I t{;,} E{{skip}, {a2}},HXEVt([),x~{„)tx E vf(A)}n
{t ~ t{;2} E {{skip}, {al}},`dxeyf(~),x~{ ~,}tx E vt(A)} n 7' -
{t ~ t{;~} E{{skip},{aZ}},t{;2} E{{skip},{al}},t{;,,;,} E P} (A)} nT'.
Note that every time we take the intersection with 7' to ensure that the constraints defined
on steps are enforced.
Note that Qil :,0~ is not equal to Q{il} : Q]. il : Q is an individual event expression,
and the semantic function for individual event expressions ( definition 4.2.8) differs from
the semantic function for group event expressions (definition 4.3.11).
Proposition 4.3.13 Let I 6e the set of actors, X,Y E P}(I) and ~il„02 E Act. Then
1. QX : Qi~~a~ C QX - Qi~;
2. QX : Qi~ C QX : Qi U Q2~;
~. Qx : Q~~'X : Q~ - {[ó]},
.~. tlx,y {QX : fail~ - QY : fail~ };
5. tlx,Y { QX : any~ - QY : any~ }.
Proof
1. Qx:p18~'p2B -Qx:Q,~nQx :p2~~Qx:l~~~.
2. Qx:~~~sQX:a~~~QX:~2~-QX:a~~,a2~.
3. QX:p,~'X:p1~-QX:p~~nQJf:p,]-QX:pI~nQX:p,~-{[SJ}.
4. Follows immediately from 4.3.11.8.
5. Follows immediately from 4.3.11.9.
If some actors in a group X perform action a, and other actors in X do not perform a,
then this does not mean that X performs action a8eá. X performs action a if and only if
some subgroup of X performs a, and X does not perform a if and only if no subgroup of
X (thus, also no actor of X) performs action a. Thus, a group X, just like individuals,
cannot perform an impossible action Q8c~3. Event X :~3ócQ means that the action QóL~3
performed by X always fails.
In this section, we also introduce an auxiliary notion that we will use in the sequel:
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Definition 4.3.14 We put al -T~ a2 iff Qal] - Qa~].
Proposition 4.3.15 All the equations of proposition 4.~2.10 hold for MT~ with X:
instead of i: Q, X E~t(I) and a1ia2 E Evt'.
Proposition 4.3.16 (M7~, U', 8e',-, X : fail~ is a Boolean algebra.
a
In chapter 2, we made a distinction between positive and negative action expressions. We
saw that a positive action expression expresses an action that involves a certain form of
physical activity, and a negative action means not carrying out that physical activity: an
omission (see subsection 2.2.4). This distinction carries much weight with collective event
expressions, since a group performs a positive action ry if and only if a subgroup of that
group performs action y and a group `performs' a negative action y if and only if every
subgroup of that group does not perform ry.
The following principles are valid for a special kind of collective event expressions:
positive or negative actions performed by groups of actors.





5. QX U Y: y] C QX : 78c'Y : ry];
6. If Y E ~}(X) then QX : y8e'Y : ry] -{[b]}.
Proof
1. Let Y E Pf (X ) and t E QY : y]. Then t contains an s-set [Y : ty], with ty C A.
By definition 4.3.2, the s-set with group X also contains ty, possibly together with
other actions in A, because ry does not contain negative actions. Thus, t E QX : y].
Hence, Y E~}(X) ~ QY : ry] C QX : y].
2. Let Y E P}(X). Then, by 4.3.17.1, QY : y] C QX : ry]. This is equivalent to
T`QX : ry] C T' ` QY : y]. Hence, by 4.3.11.4 and 4.3.11.7, QX : ry] C QY : y~.
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3. Let t E QX fl Y: ry]. Then, t contains an s-set [X fl Y: tX~y], with tX~y C A. By
definition 4.3.2, the s-sets with group X and group Y also contain tX~y, possibly
together with other actions in A, because y does not contain negative actions. Thus,
t E QX : ry] n QY : ry]. Hence, QX (1 Y: y] C QX : ry] n QY : y]. The converse does not
hold. Suppose I-{il, iz, i3} and A-{al, az}, then step t:
( [{il} : al , , [{i2} : a2 J , [{i3} : al ] , I {il, z2} : a2 J ,
j l al
I{21, 23} : al J,




is an element of Q{i1i i2} : al] n Q{i2i i3} : al], but not an element of Q{il, i2} fl {izi i3} :
al] - Q{iz} : al], because al ~ t{t,}.
4. Let t E QX : ry] LJ QY : y]. Then t contains an s-set [X : A'] or [Y : A'], with
A' C A. By definition 4.3.2, the s-sets with group X U Y also contain A', possibly
together with other actions in A, because ry does not contain negative actions. Thus,
t E QX U Y: ry]. Hence, QX : y] LI QY : ry] C QX U Y: y].
5. By 4.3.17.4, 4.3.11.4 and 4.3.11.7 it follows that QX U Y: y] - QX U Y: ry] C
QX : y] u QY : y]. This is equal to QX : y] n QY : y - QX : y] n QY : ry] - QX-
~YBz'Y : 7].
6. Let Y E P}(X). Then QX : 78t'Y : ry] - QX : y] n QY : y] C QY : y] n QY : y] -
QY:ry nQY:ry]-{[b]}.
4.3.2 PDeL(Evt')
At this point, we are able to extend the system PDeL with groups of actors, by changing
the language Ass of PDeL. The language Ass' consists of assertions concerning actions.
The expressions of PDeL(Evt') are assertions concerning events in Evt'. An expression ~
of PDeL(Evt') is a norm formulation in Ruiter's (1989) terminology.
Definition 4.3.18 The language Ass' of PDeL(Evt') consists of assertions ~~) concern-
ing events in Evt':
~ ::- ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~1 V ~z ~ ~t h ~2 ~ ~1 -~ ~z ~ [a]~,
with ~ E L, ~, ~1i ~z E Ass' and a E Evt'.
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Definition 4.3.19 A model M for PDeL(Evt') is given by
M - (P}(j), A~ W, Qa~n, ~),
where Pf(I) is the non-empty powerset of the set I of actors, A the set of actions, W a set
of possible worlds, Qa~R a function that associates with event a E Evt' and world w, the
set of possible worlds to which the performance of a leads, and ~r the usual truth relation
between worlds and propositions.
We stipulate that we have a set W of worlds assigning values to propositional variables
and a given function p: T' -~ (W -~ W), which for each step yields its behaviour in terms
of world transitions. Thus, p(t)(w) gives the next world when each group X performs all
the semantical actions in tX simultaneously in world w. (tX is the set of actions in the
coefficient of t which has X as its group.)
Definition 4.3.20
' P([ó])(w) - ~.
~ For a step t, the functàon R(t) E W-i W ás defined by
R(t)(w) - p(t)(w).
~ For a set T of steps,
R(T)(w) -{w' ~ w' - R(t)(w) for t E T}.
Definition 4.3.21 The function Q D : Evt' -~ (W --~ Pow(W)) is deftned as
Qa~R(w) - R(Qa~)(w).
The truth definitions are standard. For dynamic formulas they are as follows:
Definition 4.3.22
w ~ [a]~ Z~dw~EIa1R(w)w ~ ~,
i.e., sentence [a]~ is true in w iff ~ holds in every world accessible from w by performing
a.
For assertions, we can give the formal system PDeL(Evt'), which is sound with respect to
the given semantics:
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Axiom 4.3.23
1. all tautologies of the propositional calculus;
2. [a](~1--~ ~z) -~ ([al~l -~ [a2l~z);
~. [al U' az]~ - [ai]~ n [az]~;
~. [ai]~ V [az]~ ~ [ai~~az]~;
5. [X : fail]~;
6. [X : skip]~ - ~.
, Rules 4.3.24
(MP)







Using the definitions of the deontic operators, the following proposition follows immedi-
ately.
Proposition 4.3.25 Let ,Q,~31iQz E Evt', then all the theorems given in proposition 2.~.6
hold for PDeL(Evt').
Finally, we introduce the notion of involvement between events in Evt':
Definition 4.3.26 Let al, az E Evt', then we define `al involves az' (al D az) as follows:
ai D a2 z.,~ QaiD C Qaz~-
Corollary 4.3.27 Let al, az E Evt', then we have
al D az ~ ([az]V ~ [al]V).
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4.4 The strong and weak obligations
We take as a primitive notion the relativised obligation O(X : Q), which means that `group
X is obliged to perform (~'. In this section, we show that it is possible to define all sorts
of notions of collective and individual obligation in terms of O(X : Q), and discuss the
relation between all these notions of obligation and permission. With the help of group
obligation O(X : Q), we can distinguish three notions of obligations:
~ the strong obligation (O~(~3)): for every set in ~}(I) it is obligatory to perform ~i:
tlxEyf (~)O(X : p),~o with I the set of actors;
~ the weak obligation (Oe(Q)): there is a set in Pt(I) for which it is obligatory to
perform ~3: ~xEVt(t)~(X : ~3),11
~ the group obligation: for the group X it is obligatory to perform Q: O(X :~3).
It is clear that the strong obligation implies group obligation, and that group obligation in
turn implies the weak obligation.
In comparison with the strong and the weak obligations, the restricted strong and weak
obligations are restricted to a set in ~}(I) instead of to I itself. Let X E P}(I), then
OX(Q) (equivalent to dYEyt(x)O(Y : ,0)) is an example of a restricted strong obligation.
4.4.1 The relations between group and individual norms
Most existing formalisations of relativised deontic modalities are relativised to actors and
not to groups of actors. In section 4.2.3, we distinguished, analogous to the collective
obligations, three notions of obligations:
~ the general obligation (O}((i)): for all actors it is obligatory to perform Q;
~ the personal obligation (O(i :~i)): for i it is obligatory to perform Q;
~ the unspecific obligation (O-(Q)): for some person it is obligatory to perform R.
It is obvious that we have a distinction between the notions of obligation with the personal
obligation as the primitive notion and the notions of obligation with the group obligation
as the primitive notion. The notions of strong, weak and group obligations enable us to
analyse obligations concerning groups of actors: collective obligations, and the notions of
general, unspecific and personal obligations enable us to analyse obligations concerning
actors: individual obligations.
loNote that the following equivalence holds: VgEy~(~)O(X :(i) - nxevt(t)~(X : Q).
11Note that the following equivalence holds: 3XEyf(~)O(X : Q) - VXEyt(~)O(X : Q).
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However, we can formalise the general, personal and unspecific obligations ín terms
of group obligation O({i} :~3). Group obligation O({i} :,Q) can be considered to be an
individual obligation. Therefore, we can formalise
~ the general obligation (O}~(,Q)) as
d;E~o({i} : a)
~ the personal obligation as
O({i} : ~3)
~ the unspecific obligation (O-~(~3)) as
~;E,~({i} : p)
With the help of the two new notions O}~ and O-~ we can define the different notions of
collective obligation (i.e., strong, weak and group obligations) and individual obligation
(i.e., general, unspecific and personal obligations) in the same semantical model.
Note that O({i} :~) is not the same as O(i :~3), since they differ semantically. O(i : Q)
is an assertion concerning an event in Evt and O({i} :~) is an assertion concerning an
event in Evt'. However, both obligations express the same: `An obligation for i to perform
the action ~i.' The only difference in interpretation is that in O({i} :~3) individual i is
considered to be a group of one individual and in O(i :~3) to be just an individual.
Now, the following two relations hold:
~ The strong obligation implies the general obligation:
~~(~) ~ ~} (~).
~ The unspecific obligation implies the weak obligation:
~- (Q) ~ ~e(~).
If something is obligatory for all groups of a set of actors (the strong obligation), then it
is also obligatory for all groups consisting of one actor, i.e., the general obligation, and if
something is obligatory for a group consisting of one actor, thus for an actor, then it is
also obligatory for some group of actors (the unspecific obligation).
In contrast to the two relations mentioned above, the relation between the group obli-
gation and the personal obligation is not fixed. However, in certain cases the relation is
determined by the kind of action ( i.e., a positive or negative action), which we will discuss
in the next section.
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Figure 4.2 represents all these notions of obligation:12
Figure 4.2
strong obligation O~(Q) - O}~(~) general obligation
group obligation O(X :~3) O({i} :~3) personal obligation
1 1
weak obligatíon Oe(~3) ~ O-~(~3) unspecific obligation
In chapter 3, we discussed the problem of the interdefinability of obligation and permission.
This problem does not pose itself for the group obligation and permission, since we have
O(X :~) -~P(X : Q). We call P(X : Q) the dual of O(X : Q): the principle of
interdefinability ( cf. Herrestad and Krogh, 1995). Also, for the strong and weak obligations
we do not have this problem; however, the (restricted) weak permission is coupled with the
(restricted) strong obligation, and the ( restricted) strong permission with the (restricted)
weak obligation. This is called the asymmetry between permission and obligation:
~ O~(Q) -~P~(,0)13: `for every group it is obligatory to perform f~' is equivalent to
`there is no group for which it is permitted not to perform ~3';
~ ~e(~) -~pe(Q)aa ~there is a group for which it is obligatory to perform Q' is
equivalent to `it is not permitted for all groups not to perform Q'.
The valid relations between the different notions of obligation and permission can be sum-
marised in the following figure, which corresponds with figure 3.8:1s
izThe arrows indicate provable consequences.
13~~(Q)
- dXE9t(I)~(X . R) - dXEPt(~)~P(X : Q) - ~3XE~t(I)P(X : Q) - ~P~(Q).
ia~e(Q) - 3XEVt(~)~(X : Q) - 3xEVt(~)~P(X : Q) - ~dXEVi(i)P(X Q) - ~Pe(Q).
1sNote that in figute 3.8 principle O~(p) y P~(p) is valid, and that the corresponding principle
O~((3) -~ P~((i) is not valid in PDeL(Evt').





o}~(~) Oc{i} : Q)
P-'(Q P({i} : ~3) -P}~ cQ)
4.5 When does a group satisfy a norm?
In this chapter, we have formalised the concept of groups of actors (PDeL(Evt')) in dy-
namic deontic logic, which allows us to specify that a group is obliged, prohibited or
permitted to perform an action. The addition of groups of actors in a deontic system gives
us the opportunity to express which group has the responsibility to perform an action. In
this section, we investigate when a group of actors satisfies a norm.
We consider sets of actors. Suppose that four friends go to a restaurant, and after their
meal they (for short, group X) have to pay 50 dollars. This event `X:to pay 50 dollars'
is performed if and only if some subgroup of X pays 50 dollars. Thus, this obligation is
fulfiled if and only if a subgroup of X pays 50 dollars. Not everyone has to pay 50 dollars,
to satisfy the norm `it is obligatory for X to pay 50 dollars'. Even if no one pays the
50 dollars, it is possible that the event will be performed, for example, if everyone pays
12.50 dollars. Thus, O(X : Q) is not equivalent to tl;ExO({i} : Q) (the restricted general
obligation), with Q the action `to pay 50 dollars'.
Suppose that for group X it is forbidden to steal 50 dollars. Group X satisfies this
norm if the event is not performed. Thus, no subgroup of X may steal 50 dollars to satisfy
the norm.
In this example, we see that sometimes a group X fulfils obligation O(X :~3) if and
only if every subgroup has to perform action ~, and sometimes it is sufficient that some
subgroup performs action ,0 to fulfil the obligation. In the former case, it concerns a
negative action, and in the latter, a positive action:
1. A group X `performs' negative action y, i.e., does not perform action ry, if and only if
every subgroup of X does not perform action ry. Thus, X is obliged not to perform ry
if and only if every subgroup of X is obliged not to perform y. The formal counterpart
of this is:
O(X : -y) - dYEVtcxl~(Y : 'r).
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This can be proven as follows. Suppose that dyEyt(x)O(Y : y). X is a subset
of X, hence b'yE~t(x)O(X : y) --~ O(X : ry). Suppose now that O(X : y) and
Y E~} (X ). Then, it follows by 4.3.17.1 that QY : ry~ C QX : y~, and by 4.3.26
and 4.3.27 that [X : y]V -~ [Y : ry]V. This holds for every set Y in Df(X), thus
[X : ry]V -' b'yE~t(x)[Y : y]V. Hence, O(X : ry) -, dYEVt(x)0(X : 7).
2. A group X performs positive action ry if and only if a subgroup of X performs actíon
y. Thus, X is obliged to perform action ry if and only if some subgroup of X is
obliged to perform action ry.ls The formal counterpart of this is:
O(X : y) - ~YEPt(X)~(Y : 'Y).
This can be proven analogously as above.
Now it is easy to see that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4.5.1 Let X E P}(I) and y E Actp, then
1. O(I : y) - ~~(y);
,2. O(I : ry) - ~e(ry).
Thus, the strong obligation collapses in group obligation O(I : f~), if ,Ci is a negative action,
and the weak obligation collapses in group obligation O(I : Q), if ~3 is a positive action.
Further, the following two relations hold between group obligation O(X :,Q) and per-
sonal obligation O({i} : ~):
Proposition 4.5.2 Let i E X E ~t(I). Then,
O(X:~)-i0({i}:Q) i~jQEAct„VX-{i};
O({i} :~3) --~ O(X : Q) iff ~ E Actp v X-{i}.
If it is obligatory for X not to perform a positive action, then for every subgroup of X it
is forbidden to perform that action, thus also for every actor of X. If it is obligatory for
an actor i E X to perform a positive action, then it is also obligatory for every set with i
as an element to perform that action, thus also X.
Finally, we present a proposition that enables us to obtain a better understanding of
group events in PDeL(Evt'), with respect to positive and negative actions.
1sNote that formula O(X : ry) -. O(X U Y: y) is valid, which seems pazadoxical, more or less in the
same way as Ross's paradox. See also section 3.3.2.
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Proposition 4.5.3 Get X,Y E P}(I) and y,,ryz E Actp, then
1. O(X U Y: y,) -~ O(X : y,);








and O(X : ry,) n O(Y : ry,) --~ O(X : y,). Hence, by modus ponens it follows that
O(X U Y: y,) --~ O(X : 7i).
2. O(X:ryl)-[X:-yl]V,[X:ry,]V-~[X:ry18t'Y:7,]V,[X:-y,8e'Y:ry,]V-~[XUY:
ry,]V, and [X U Y: 7i]V - O(X U Y:-y,). Hence, by modus ponens it follows that
O(X:ry,)-~O(XUY:y,).
3. D(X:7,)v0(Y:-y,)-[X:ry,]VV[Y:-y,]V,[X:y,]Vv[Y:y,]V-~[X:y,B~'Y:
ry,]V, [X : y,8c'Y : ry,]V -i [X nY : ry,]V, and [X nY : y,]V - O(X nY : ry,). Hence,
by modus ponens it follows that O(X : ry, U' Y: y,) --~ O(X n Y: ry,).
4. O(X:y~)n0(Y:ry~)-[X -7~]Vn[Y:ry~IV -[X :y~U'Y-7~lV, [X .7~U'Y:




ry,Bcryz). Hence, by modus ponens it follows that O(X : ry,8t'Y :~yz) ~ O(X n Y:
7i~1's).
6. O(X : y,8~'Y : ryz) - O(X : ry,) n O(Y : ryz), O(X : ryl) n O(Y : ryz) -~ O(X u
Y : y,) n O(X U Y : ryz), and O(X U Y: ry,) n O(X U Y: ryz) - O(X U Y:
ry,8e'X U Y: ryz) - O(X U Y: ry,8eryz). Hence, by modus ponens it follows that
O(X : y~~'Y : ryz) ~ O(X U Y: ry~~ryz).
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The formulas in proposition 4.5.3 include the following assertions:
1. If a negative action is obligatory for a group, then it is also obligatory for every
subgroup.
2. If a positive action is obligatory for a group, then it is also obligatory for every
superset of that group.
3. If it is obligatory that a group `performs' a negative action or that another group
`performs' that action, then that action is obligatory for the intersection of both
groups.
4. If it is obligatory that a group performs a positive action or that another group
performs that action, then that action is obligatory for the union of both groups.
5. If it is obligatory that a group `performs' a negative action and another group `per-
forms' another negative action, then it is obligatory for the intersection of the groups
to `perform' both actions.
6. If it is obligatory that a group performs a positive action and another group performs
another positive action, then it is obligatory for the union of the groups to perform
both nctions.
4.6 Evaluation and conclusions
In this chapter, we formalised the concept of (groups of) actors in PDeL, a deontic system
as a variant of dynamic logic. The concept of groups of actors in PDQL is new. With
the addition of groups of actors, we are able to express who (a group or an actor) has
the responsibility for performing certain actions, and when a group or an actor satisfies a
norm.
To express the notions of individual obligation ( i.e., the general, personal and unspecific
obligations) we first used individual events. However, we showed that these notions can also
be expressed using collective events. This enabled us to express all the different notions
of the individual and collective obligations in the same semantical model. Further, we
investigated the relations between these different notions of obligation, analogous to the
relations discussed in chapter 3.
With the introduction of collective events, it is now possible to make a distinction
between actions performed by all members of a group X and actions performed by a group
X as a whole. The type of action is very important to indicate when a group fulfils an
obligation; e.g., if a group X has to perform a positive action, then some subset of that
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group has to perform that action, and if a group has to `perform' a negative action, then
every subset of that group has to `perform' that action.
Finally, we show how the concepts developed in this, and the previous, chapter can
help to formalise and analyse the following two judgements. The first judgement concerns
an individual obligation and the second, in my opinion, a weak collective obligation.
The first case reads as follows. According to the `Reglement van Politie voor de scheep-
vaart op de Merwede' (Police regulations concerning navigation on the river Merwede), it
is prohibited for more than three boats to be moored next to one another breadthways in
the river outside harbours.
The High Court specified this norm as follows:l~
It is prohibited to perform an action resulting in an unwanted situation. Such
a situation was created by the fourth captain, who moored his boat last.
The second case reads as follows. Under the Dutch Road TrafFic Act, it was prohibited for
three cyclists to cycle next to one another. In its 1948 ruling, the High Court considered
all three cyclists to have broken the law, because each one of them was able to bring an
end to the situation.ls
In the case of the four boats, the person who creates the illegal situation is obliged to
bring an end to that situation. We can formalise this by using the system SDLx:
~;. ( ~P),
with p`more than three boats are moored next to one another breadthways in the river
outside the harbour' and i4 the fourth captain, who moored his boat last. Thus, here we
are concerned with a personal obligation.
In the case of the three cyclists, all three are obliged to bring an end to the illegal
situation:
- ~iEX~i(~~Í)~
with X the set of the three cyclists and q `more than two cyclists are cycling next to one
another'. Here we are concerned with a restricted general obligation. This is very strange,
since if one of the cyclists ends the situation, the other cyclists are released from their
obligation. A better formalisation would be that they, as a group, are obliged to bring an
end to the situation, so
~x(~4)-
Although all three are considered to have broken the law, this does not alter the fact that
they, as a group, are responsible for bringing an end to the illegal situation. Note that we
17HR, 19-1-1931, NJ 1931, 1455.
1sHR, 9-3-1948, NJ 1948, 370.
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are here concerned with a weak collective obligation, not with a strict collective obligation.
Suppose, for example, that four cyclists are cycling next to one another. In this case, none
of them individually can bring an end to the illegal situation, and the general obligation
diEY~i(q)~
with Y the set of four cyclists, would be a void obligation, because each cyclist is not able
to bring an end to the illegal situation. The individual is not able to end that situation,
the group, however, is:
~Y(~q)~
with Y the group of four cyclists.
However, the formalisation is not really satisfactory, since it does not fit into our system
of criminal law. The law is geared to unlawful behaviour and illegal situations. Criminal
law is concerned with behaviour: if an illegal situation is mentioned in the description of
an offence, the question is raised as to who created this situation (by action or by omission)
and who is responsible for continuing the situation (omission). From the illegal situation
a certain type of behaviour is derived, as it were.
The derivation of an action or a set of actions from a situation is not a clear-cut matter.
Take, for instance, obligation OX(~q): `it is obligatory for group X that no more than two
cyclists cycle next to one another.' Now, we want to derive an Ought-to-do statement from
this Ought-to-be statement. However, one can think of many actions to be taken by group
X that would end the illegal situation.
Many human actions are described by their results, something on which von
Wright in particular has focussed. Thus, according to the suggestion mentioned,
in the case of John opening the window, John selects and runs a routine such
that at the end of that routine the window is open; in the case of John eating
(all of) an apple, John selects and runs a routine at the end of that routine
John has eaten an apple; etc. Thus there is a large class of actions of the type
`doing A', where A is a proposition expressing a state-of-affairs. (Segerberg,
1989, p. 327)
In his article `Bringing it about', Segerberg ( 1989) introduced an operator ó such that `b(p)'
will carry the informal meaning of `bringing about that p' or `doing p'. Thus, ó(p) is the
actiorz with p as the result (or state of affairs).19 In general, ó(p) is a choice between several
actions Ql, ...,~3,,, which all bring about that p. Thus, ó(p) is equal to QI U,~z U... U Q,,.
With the help of the operator `b', we can smoothly formalise the obligations belonging
to the two ca.ses:
19For the fotmal representation of ó(p) we refer to Segetberg (1989).
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1. in the case of the four boats:
O(i4 : b(~p)).
2. in the case of the three cyclists:
O(X : b(~q)).
From the above consideration we can conclude that it is important to distinguish Ought-
to-do statements (which may be interpreted as expressing imperatives of the form `an ad-
dressee ought to perform an action') and Ought-to-be statements (which express a desired
state of affairs without necessarily mentioning addressees and actions bearing relations
with that state of affairs). There are situations in which we would like to formalise norms
as Ought-to-be statements, and there are situations in which we would like to formalise
norms as Ought-to-do statements. In the case of the Penal Code, the formalisation of
obligations as Ought-to-do statements fits better than as Ought-to-be statements. Thus,
with regard to the Penal Code, PDeL(Evt') is to be preferred to SDLX.
Chapter 5
Deontic systems and authorities
This chapterl, presents the addition of (sets of) authorities in SDLX and PDeL(Evt') such
that we can consistently express normative inconsistencies, i.e., conflicting norms enacted
by (sets of) authorities.
5.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, we added actors to the norms, in order to be able to spec-
ify to whom the norms pertain. The addition of actors already reduces the number of
inconsistencies normally found in formal representations of legal code. Still some `inconsis-
tencies' remain, one of the main reasons being the fact that norms are enacted by different
authorities in a legal system. If the authorities are not accounted for in the logical system,
some formulas might be inconsistent, whereas if authorities are added, they would not.
This is identical to the following example expressing the change from propositional logic
to predicate logic: p ~~p -false, but p(a) n~p(b) is not necessarily false, with variables a
and b (e.g., being authorities).
In order to deal with this type of inconsistencies, we add (sets of ) authorities enact-
ing the norms to the deontic systems SDLX and PDeL(Evt'), which were discussed in
the previous two chapters. The normative authorities play an important role in a norma-
tive system since they are responsible for establishing the norms and for supervising the
enactment of the norms.
First, corresponding with Bailhache's (1981, 1991) theory, we develop a theory for
a coherent deontic system, i.e., a normative agreement between all (sets of) authorities.
A drawback of this theory, however, inherent to the purpose of this theory, is that we
cannot express conflicts between enacted norms. These conflicts exist since norms come
into being and cease to exist in complex ways, involving different authorities at different
iSome of the ideas in this chapter were presented earlier in Royakkers and Dignum (1994).
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times in different places (cf. Prakken, 1993). Second, we show that this theory has to deal
with serious problems concerning the power of expressibility. For instance, in this theory
we cannot express that a permission has been enacted by a set of authorities.
To overcome these problems and especially to express normative inconsistencies in a
consistent way, we modify the theory. A consequence of this modification is that the theory
becomes more powerful, certain formulas acquire new meanings differing from Bailhache's
theory. These new meanings are discussed formally for systems DÁ and PDeL`~(Evt').
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: in section 5.2, we extend SDLX to sets
of authorities on the basis of Bailhache's theory. This theory excludes the possibility of
expressing normative inconsistency, which is discussed in section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents
system DÁ, a modification and extension of the system discussed in the previous section,
which enables us to express conflicting norms enacted by sets of authorities. The addition
of sets of authorities to system PDeL(Evt') is discussed in section 5.5. In section 5.6 we
introduce the term `normative system' in relation to the norms enacted by the authorities.
In the last section, we draw some conclusions.
5.2 Authorities in SDLX
In this section, we discuss the addition of sets of authorities on the basis of Bailhache's
(1981,1991) theory. Bailhache wanted to obtain a deontic coherent system, i.e., a normative
agreement between all sets of authorities. This is accomplished by avoiding any conflict
between the obligations enacted by the sets of authorities. It is necessary and sufficient for
each set of authorities not to forbid - in other words to permit - what a set of authorities
makes obligatory.
To add authorities to system SDLX, we have to introduce the set NA of authorities.
Let a E NA, then OX(p) can be read as `a makes it obligatory for X that p'. If there is a
normative agreement between all the authorities, then this means that norm OX(p) holds.
Now it seems natural to make a reduction in statement OX(p) of SDLX to statement
OX(p): norm OX(p) holds if and only if there is an authority which enacted that norm.
This can be expressed as
OX (p) -def 3aENAOX (p).
We refer to the two directions of the equivalence of (5.1) as (5.1)~ and (5.1)~. There is
an argument against the intuitive validity of (5.1)~.
~ Implication (5.1)~ asserts that if an authority enacts a norm OX(p), that norm holds.
In a coherent deontic system this seems very plausible.
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~ Implication (5.1)~ asserts that if norm Ox(p) holds, then an authority enacted that
norm. This is simply not true. As a counterexample, consider obligation Ox(p n q),
which is equivalent to Ox(p)nOX(q). Suppose that OX(p) was enacted by authority a
and Ox(q) by authority b, then norm OX(pnq) was not enacted by a single authority,
but by the two authorities a and b, in other words by a set of authorities. Thus, the
formula
(~aENA~X(p) n ~nENA~X (~I)) ~ ~aENA~X (T~ n q)
(5.2)
is counter-intuitive and it would be strange if it were valid in a formal system (cf.
Hansson, 1970, p. 244), in contrast with the formula in SDLX:
Ox(P) ~ Ox(q) ~ Ox(p ~ 4). (5.3)
Hence, a norm that holds is not necessarily enacted by one authority.
Thus, the definition for OX (p) as 3QENAOX (p) is inadequate. This above problem can be
solved by using sets of authorities. This leads to an extension of system SDLX to SDLA,
where the norms are enacted by sets of authorities. Let A be a subset of NA, then OX(p)
will be read as `A makes it obligatory for X that p'.







together with the following axiom schemata
(OAC) (OX(P) ~ Oz(q)) ~ Oz(p ~ q)
(OAN) Ox(p~~p)
(OAD) ~OX(P ~ ,p)
(DI-PA) Pz(p) - ~Oz(~P)
For the semantical interpretation of this system SDLA we use the following model structure
~1~1 -(W,R,P}(NA),Pt(I),V), with 7Z the set of functions {RX',RX2,...} for each set
of authorities A1iA2,... E~}(NA) and for all X E~}(1), and the non-empty powerset
~}(NA) of the set of authorities NA -{al,a2i...}. The function RX E R on W, which
returns the deontically ideal worlds for set A of authorities and for set X of individuals
given a world: RX : W-~ 2W .
The truth conditions for OX and PX are defined as follows:
M,w ~ OX(p) iff RX(w) C Qp~ (5.4)
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and
M, w~ Pz(P) iff Rz (w) n ~P~ ~ 0.
The following additional constraínt gives schema OAD. Let RX E R, then
RX(w)~0forallRXETZandforallwE W.
The constraints
if RX, RX E R and B E P}(A), then RX(w) C RX(w) for all w E W (5.7)
and
if RX, Ry E R and X E P}(Y), then Ry(w) C RX(w) for all w E W (5.8)
validate rules (ROAM2) and (ROAM3), respectively.
Rule (ROAM2) states that if a set of authorities is included in another set, every
obligation enacted by the former is also an obligation enacted by the latter. Rule (ROAM3)
states that if a set of authorities makes it obligatory for a set X of individuals that p, then
this set of authorities makes it also obligatory for every superset of X that p. Now it
follows thatZ
OX(P) - 3YE~t(X)OY(P)~
Thus, the collective obligations enacted by sets of authorities are interpreted as weak
collective obligations (see section 3.3.2). In the sequel of this thesis, we will interpret the
collective obligation as the weak collective obligation.
From constraint (5.7) we can derive the constraint
if RX E R, then nBEVt(A) RX(w) - RX(w) for all w E W (5.9)
Hence, t1A ,BEpf(NA)(RX (w) n RX(w) ~ 0), since 1~ ~ RzA(w ) - nAEPt(NA)RXA (w)
RX(w) n RX(w).
Proposition 5.2.1 Let X E P}(I) and A,B,C E P}(NA). Then,
1. OX (Ti) -' PX (P)i
~. OX(~) ~ oX(9) -, oX~B(~ ~ 4);
~. OX(P) - 3BEVt(A)OX(P)i
C
ZSuppose that OX(p) holds, then there is a subset Y of X, such that Oy(p) holds, namely X. Thus,
3yEyt(X~OX(p). Now suppose that 3yEyt(X)O"y(p), say Z. Since Z E ~}(X), it holds by rule (ROAM3)
that OX(p).
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Q. PX (p) - dBEYt(A)PX (P)~
5. Oz(P) ~ Oz (q) ~ Pz(p ~ 9) .
Proof
1. Suppose that OX(p) holds. It follows from rule (ROAM2) that OX(p) -~
OXuB(p)
From (OAD) and (OAC) it follows that OXuB(p) -, PXuB(p) On the basis of
(Df.PA) and (ROAM2) it holds that PXuB(p) -~ PX(p). Hence, by modus ponens,
it follows that OX(p) -~ Px(p).
2. Suppose that OX(p) n OX(q) holds. Then, by (ROAM2) OXuB(p) n OXug(q) holds.
From (OAC) it now follows that OXUS(p n q)
3. Suppose that OX(p) holds, then there is a subset B of A, such that OX(p) holds,
namely A. Thus, ~BEPt(A)OX(p). Now suppose that ~BEyt(A)Oz(p), say C. Since
C E P}(A), it holds by rule (ROAM2) that OX(p).
4. Follows immediately from 5.2.1.3 and (Df.PA).
5. From 5.2.1.2 it follows that OX(p)nOX(q) -~ OXuB(pnq), and from 5.2.1.1 it follows
that OXuB (p n q) -~ PX (p n q). Thus, by modus ponens OX (p) n OX (q) --~ PX (p n q).
Proposition 5.2.1.1 expresses the normative agreement between all the possible couples of
sets of authorities. Proposition 5.2.1.5 expresses that we have a complete deontic coherent
system, i.e., a normative agreement between all sets of authorities (cf. Bailhache, 1991).
Deontic (or normative) coherence makes it necessary that it is not obligatory for all sets
of actors that some thing is accomplished as soon as it is obligatory for some set of actors
that this thing is accomplished. Thus, if sets of authorities enacted that p and q are
obligatory for a certain set of individuals, then every set of authorities has to respect this
and should permit that p n q for that set of individuals. The question arises how we have to
interpret the words `should permit'. It would be very strange to interpret this as `enacted
the permission', since this is counter-intuitive with the fact that there is a normative
agreement between all the sets of authorities. Consider, for example, the formula
~X(p) ~ Pz(,p) (5.10)
and A~ B. This formula is not contradictory in the system SDLA. However, if we
interpret PX (~p) as `A enacted that it is permitted for X that ~p', then formula (5.10) is
counter-intuitive for a deontic coherent system. It expresses that A enacted that OX (p) and
B enacted that Px(~p). Now, there is no normative agreement between these two sets of
authorities, since the enacted norms are conflicting: Ox(p)nPX(~p) -~Px(~p)~Px(~p).
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We have to interpret `should permit' as `has not enacted that it is forbidden'. Now the
formula (5.10) is not counter-intuitive. It only expresses that A enacted OX(p) and that
B did not enact FX(~p), i.e, OX(p). Thus, PX(p) has to be read as `A did not enact that
it is forbidden for X that p'.
5.2.1 The relation between SDLX and SDLA
Now that we have accomplished a normative agreement between all sets of authorities,
we can attempt a reduction in statements of SDLX to statements of SDLA: norm OX(p)
holds if and only if there is a set of authorities that enacted that norm. This can be
expressed as
~X(p) -deJ ~AEPt(NA)~X(p)r (5.11)
and so we can say that norm PX(p) holds if and only if every set of authorities did not
prohibit that p, which corresponds with PX(p) -~OX(~p). Thus,
PX(p) -def dAEPf(NA)PX(p)' (5.12)
Note that 3AE~t(NA)OX(p) is equivalent to OXA(p) and that tlAEyt(NA)PX(p) is equivalent
to PzA(P). Thus, OX (p) - OzA(p) and PX (P) - Pz~(p).
~ Implication (5.11)~ states that if there is a norm OX(p) that holds, then there is a
set of authorities that enacted that norm. This seems correct, since a norm can only
hold if it has been enacted, and a norm can only be enacted by authorities.
~ Implication (5.11)~ states that if a set of authorities enacted a norm OX(p), this
norm holds. This also seems correct in a coherent deontic system.
The semantics can easily cope with both cases when we add the constraint
RX(w) - RXA(w) for all w E W and for all X E P}(I). (5.13)
This can be proven as follows. Suppose OX (p), hence RX (w) C ~[p], which is equivalent
t0 RXA(w) C ~[p]. COnsequently, 3AE~f(NA)(RX(w) C ~]), SO 3AEPt(NA)OX(p). NOW
SllppOSe ~qEPf(NA)OX(p), then ~AE~t(NA)(RX(w) C Qp]), Say that thlS Set of authorities
is B, thus RX(w) C Qp]. Since RX(w) - RXA(w) C RX(w), it follows that RX(w) C ~[p],
thus OX(p). The validity of (5.12) follows immediately from PX(p) -~OX(~p) and the
proof above.
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The relations between statements Ox(p) and Px(p) of SDLx and the statements OX(p)
and PX ( p) can be summarised in the following figure:
Figure 5.1
Pz (p) Px (P)
At first glance, this theory based on Bailhache (1981, 1991), seems a good approach for
a coherent deontic system, i.e., a normative agreement between all the sets of authorities.
However, this approach has two serious drawbacks. We cannot express that
1. a set of authorities enacts a permission. Only obligations (and thus also prohibitions)
can be enacted by the sets of authorities. Conversely, we can not express that a set
of authorities does not enact an obligation, but only permissions;
2. a set of authorities enacts a combination of collective obligations, e.g., Ox(p)V Ox (q).
The sets of authorities can only enact an atomic collective obligation (Ox(p)).
Another drawback - although, this drawback is inherent to the developed theory - is that
we cannot express normative conflicts, i.e., inconsistencies between enacted norms.
5.3 Normative inconsistencies
In the previous section, we developed a coherent deontic system: a deontic system with a
normative agreement between all sets of authorities. However, it is a fact that authorities
enact rules that conflict with norms enacted by other authorities; this happens very fre-
quently. The conflicts arise when these norms become part of the same normative system,
not if they belong to different systems.
Before we develop a theory that can establish a normatíve agreement between autho-
rities with several ranks of authorities - in spite of the normative inconsistencies between
the norms enacted by the authorities - in chapters 6 and 7, we have to develop a theory to
allow normative inconsistencies in our system, such as
Oz(P) ~ Fx(p). (5.14)
In SDLA, this formula is contradictory, since OX (p) n FX (p) -r OXuB(p) n OXuB(~p), and
OXUe(P) ~ OXUa(~p) -, OXua(p) ~~OzuB(p).
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To deal with this, we can choose to give up rule (ROAM2) or schema (OAD) of system
SDLA.
~ If we choose to give up rule (ROAM2), we can express formula (5.14) if A~ B.
However, then we cannot derive formula
Oz(P) n Ox(q) -~ OX~a(P ~ 4), (5.15)
which is counter-intuitive. Suppose NA -{a,b}; a has only enacted Ox(p) and b
only Ox(q). Then, norm Ox(pnq) intuitively holds, thus the norm has to be enacted.
The only possibility is that the norm was enacted by the set {a, b}. Thus, we cannot
give up rule (ROAM2).
Furthermore, we would not be able to derive formula
Oz (P) ~ Fz (p), (5.16)
since this is blocked by axiom (OAD). A set of authorities can enact conflicting
rules; for example, let A- {a,b} and a enacted Ox(p) and Fx(q), and b enacted
Ox(p -~ q), then A enacts Ox(q) as well as Fx(q). This cannot be expressed if we
give up rule (ROAM2). Thus, we cannot give up rule (ROAM2).
~ It would be preferable to give up axiom (OAD). (OAD) removes the possibility of
expressing conflicts between norms enacted by sets of authorities, with the result
that the deontic system is coherent. By eliminating axiom (OAD) from SDLA, we
can express formulas (5.14), (5.15) and (5.16).
However, this is not a real solution, since we cannot consistently express that, for example,
an authority a enacted Ox(p) and an authority b~Ox(p). Then, we can derive OX(p) and
~OX(p), with A-{a, b}, and OX(p) n~OX(p) is false.
To express these normative conflicts between enacted norms, we choose for another
approach. Instead of A modifying Ox(p), we choose to treat A as a modal operator.
Writing A: Ox(p), and instead of ~OX(p) we write A:~Ox(p). This seemingly small
change has large consequences. The system becomes more powerful, because we can express
~ that a set A of authorities does not enact a norm, for example, Ox(p):
~(A : Ox(p));
~ that a set A of authorities enacted a combination of norms, for example, Ox(p) V
Ox (q):
A : (Ox (p) V Ox (q) );
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~ normative conflicts, for example:
A : Ox(p) n A : ,Oxíp).
Thus, this new approach acquires new meanings, not expressible in SDLA, and are therefore
subject to new intuitions, which we analyse in the following section.
5.4 The system DÁ
Let A E Pt(NA) and O a well-formed formula (wff) of SDLx, then A: O has to be read
as `A makes that O' or `A enacted O'. ~(A : O) has to be read as `A did not enact 0'.
Thus, ~(A : Ox(p)) states that `the set A of authorities did not enact that it is obligatory
for the set X of actors that p', which cannot be expressed in the system SDLA.
The system DA, which we discuss in this section, is an extension of SDLA in three
ways, considering:
1. the possibility of expressing conflicting norms;
2. the possibility of expressing that norms, especially obligations, are not enacted by a
set of authorities;
3. the possibility of expressing that a set of authorities enacts permissions and combi-
nations of norms.
The language D of DÁ consists of assertions concerning the enactment of norms by sets of
authorities and can be determined by the following BNF for its elements (~):
~::-A:O~~~~~ln~sl~,v~s~~,-~~z,
with A E Pt(NA), ~,~1i ~z E D and O a wff of SDLx.
The system DÁ is given by the following axioms and rules:
Axiom 5.4.1
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R2
B E P}(A)
B : 0, -~ A : O,
R33
~i -~sDZ,X Oz
A : O, -i A : Oz'
with 0, and Oz wffs of SDLX.
For the semantical interpretation of this system DÁ, we use the following model structure
~1~1 -(W,1Z~, RNq, Pt(NA), P}(I), V), with 1ZNq, the set of functions {Rq', Rq2, ...}
for each set of authorities A,, Azi ... E Pt (NA). The function Rq E RNq on W, which
returns the ideal worlds for set A of authorities given a world: Rq : W-~ 2W .
The sentence `A enacted OX(p)' does not say that the norm OX(p) is valid (is the case),
in the sense that OX(p) is applicable - instead, it says that OX(p) is valid in a world which
is ideal for A(see chapter 6). Thus, the statement `A enacted that p is obligatory for
X' describes some idealised world for A and not the actual world, since the norm can be
overruled by, for example, a norm enacted by a superior authority or a norm enacted at a
later point in time. In other words, a norm that is enacted by a set A of authorities in the
actual world is valid in an ideal world for A.
The truth condition for A: O, with O a wff of SDLX, is defined as follows:
Nl, w~ A: O iff Rq(w) C QO],
and Rq(w) C QO] is defined as follows:
. if O - OX(p), then
R`~(w) C QO] lff ll,u~ERa(w)(Rx(w~) C~])i
. if O - P,x(p), then
Rq(w) C ~ ]ff d.wiERA(w)(RX(w,) n Illp)] ~~)r
. if O- 0, n Ozi then
Rq(w) C QO] iff Rq(w) C QO,] and Rq(w) C QOz],
with 0,, Oz wffs of SDLX;
(5.17)
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~ if O- Or V 02, then
RA(w) C QO~ iff RA(w) C QO1~ U Q02D,
with 01i OZ wffs of SDLx;
~ if O - ~O1i then
RA(w) C QO] iff RA(w) C Q~O,~ iff RA(w) n QO,~ - 0,
with Ol a wff of SDLx.
The constraint
RA(w) C RB(w) for all w E W, B C A and A, B E P}(NA), (5.18)
validates rule R2. From constraint (5.18), it follows that
RA(w) - nBEVt(A)RB(w). (5.19)
Rule R2 states that if a set of authorities is included in another set, every norm enacted
by the former is also a norm enacted by the latter. Note that in SDLA - expressed by
rule (ROAM2) - this only holds for the obligation and not for the permission, since the
meaning of PX(p) does not correspond with the meaning of A: Px(p): in contrast to PX(p)
meaning that A does not enact that p is forbidden, A: Px(p) means that A enacted that
p is permitted for the group X of actors. Thus, A: Px(p) -' dBEnt(A)B : Px(p) does not
hold in contrast to the formula in SDLA: PX(p) -~ tlgEDt(A)PX(p)~
Furthermore, the formula 3AEVt(NA)A : Ox(p) -~ dBEVf(NA)B : Px(p) does not hold,
in contrast to the corresponding formula in SDLA: 3AE~t(NA)OX(p) ~ dBEVt(NA)PX(p).
This last formula is used to obtain a coherent deontic system, which removes the possibility
of expressing conflicting norms enacted by the authorities.
For the axioms and for rule R2 it does not matter whether we interpret Ox(p) as a
strict collective obligation or as a weak collective obligation (see subsection 3.3.2). However,
for rule R3 it does matter which interpretation we use, since, for example, formula A:
Ox(p) ~ A: Ox~Y(p) is valid for the weak collective obligation, but not for the strict
collective obligation. As we already mentioned, we treat the collective obligation in the
sequel as the weak collective obligation.
5.4.1 Conflicting norms or normative agreement
Conflicting norms
With the help of this new approach, we can simply express conflicting norms enacted by
authorities. Suppose a enacted Ox(p) and b~Ox(p), then we can derive A: Ox(p) and
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A:-~OX(p), with A- {a, b}. Thus, in contrast to the system SDLA, we can express that
a set of authorities enacted conflicting norms, for example,
A : OX (P) n A : ,OX (P).
This is the reason why we do not add the constraint
dAEPf(NA)RA(w) ~ 0 for all w E W,
since this constraint would make ( 5.20) contradictory.4
Normative agreement
Constraint (5.21) would validate principle




meaning that if set A of authorities enacted the norm O, then no set of authorities did not
enact the negation of that norm, i.e., ~O. This can be proven as follows. 5uppose A: O,
then RA(w) C QO~. Then, by constraint (5.18), it follows that RNA(w) C QOD. Hence,
RNA(w) fl QO~ ~~. From constraint (5.19) it follows that f1BEpt1n,A1RB(w) fl QO~ ~~,
hence tJBEPt1n,A1(RB(w) ~ Q~O~). Thus, ~(B :~O) for all B E Pt(NA).
Principle (5.22) expresses the normative agreement between all sets of authorities.
Thus, we obtain complete deontic coherence if we add constraint (5.21) to our seman-
tics, which validates principle (5.22).
If we compare system DÁ including axiom (5.22) with SDLA (corresponding to Bail-
hache's theory), we can conclude that both theories obtain a complete deontic coherent
system; system DÁ including axiom (5.22) is more powerful, however, because we can ex-
press for each norm (or combination of norms) whether it was enacted or was not enacted
by sets of authorities.
5.4.2 Some properties of DÁ
The following proposition shows a number of properties for DÁ, part of which follows from
the properties of SDLX.
Proposition 5.4.3 Let A,B E P}(NA) and X,Y E Pf(I). Then,
i. A:(O,n02)-~(A:O,nA:02);
2. (A:O,vA:02)-~A:(O,V02);
4Suppose that RA(w) ~ 0. A : OX(p) n A:-~OX(p) holds iff RA(w) C[OX(p)] fl [~OX(p)] - 0, which
is in contradiction with the assumption that RA(w) ~ 0.
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~. A : O - 3BEPt(A)B : O;
.~. ,(AUB:O)--~~(A:OVB:O);
5. ,(A : O n,(A u B: O))
6. A: ox (p) ~ A: Oxuy (p);
7. A: Ox (p) n A: Or(p) -' A: Oxuy (P);
8. A: Ox(p) V A: Ox(q) -' A: Ox(pV q);
9. A: Px(p n 4) -~ A: Px(p) n A: Px(q);
lo. A: ox(p) n B: oy(q) -~ A u B : oxuy (p n q).
Proof
1. Since Ol n 02 -~ O1 and O~ n 02 -~ Oz, it follows from rule R3 that A:(O1 n O2) -~
A:Ol andA:(O1n02)-~A:02. Hence,A:(O1n02)-~A:O1nA:02.
2. Since 01 -~ Ol V O2 and O2 --~ O1 V 02i it follows from rule R3 that A: Ol -r A:
(Ol V 02) and A: 02 -~ A:(O1 V 02). Hence, (A : Ol V A: Oz) -~ A:(O1 V OZ).
3. Suppose that A: 0 holds, then there is a subset B of A, such that B : O, namely A,
thus 3aEyt(A)B : O. Suppose now that 3BEVt(A)B : O, say C, hence C: O. Since
C E~}(A), it holds by rule R2 that A: O.
4. By rule R2 and contraposing, we obtain ~(A U B: O) ~~(A : O) and ~(A U B:
O) ---~ ~(B : O), thus ~(A U B: O) --~ ~(A : O) n~(B : 0), which is equivalent to
~(A U B: O) -~ ~(A : O V B: O).
5. Suppose A: On~(AUB : 0) holds, then it follows from R2 that AUB : On~(AUB :
O) also holds, which is a contradiction. Hence, ~(A : 0 n ~(A U B: 0)) is true.
6. It holds that Ox(p) -~ Oxuy(p). Hence, by R3 it follows that A: Ox(p) --~ A:
~xuy (P).
7. Follows immediately from 5.4.3.6.
8. By rule R3 it follows that A: Ox (p) -~ A: Ox (p V q) and that A: Ox (q) --~ A:
Ox(pV q). Thus, A: Ox(p) v A: Ox(q) -~ A: Ox(p n q).
9. Since Px(p n q) -~ Px(p) n Px(q), it follows from R3 that A: Px(p n q) -~ A:
Px(p) n Px(q), and from 5.4.3.1 that A: Px(p) n A: Px(q).
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10. Suppose that A: Ox(p) n B: Oy(q) holds, then by R2 and R3 it follows that
A U B: Oxuy(p) n A U B: Oxuy(q). By axiom 5.4.1.2 it now follows that A U B:
(~xuy(P) n ~xuy(q)) and by R3 that A U B:(Oxuy(p n q)).
The converse of 5.4.3.4 does not hold. Suppose A: Ox(p) and B: Ox(q) hold, and
suppose further that ~(A : Ox(p n q)) and ~(B : Ox(p n q)) also hold, then we can derive
AuB : ~x(pnq), thus formula ,(A : Ox(pnq))n,(B : Ox(pnq)) -~ ,(AUB : Ox(pnq))
is not valid. In general, we can say that if a set of authorities did not enact a norm O,
then no subset of that set of authorities enacted O.
Proposition 5.4.3.3 states that a set of authorities enacted norm O iff a subset of that
set of authorities enacted that norm. Proposition 5.4.3.4 states that if a set of authorities
did not enact norm 0, then no subset of that set enacted that norm. Proposition 5.4.3.5
is equivalent to
A:O-rAUB:O.
In general, this expresses that if a set of authorities enacted a norm, then all supersets of
that set of authorities enacted that norm.
The major point of the theory discussed in this section is that we can consistently
express conflicting duties with norms expressing Ought-to-be statements in system DÁ.
Thus, we cannot say that a norm, say Ox(p), is valid, in the sense of being applicable (see
chapter 6), if there is a set A of authorities that enacted that norm, i.e., A: Ox(p). This is
only possible in a normative consistent system. In the next chapter we will see how Ox(p)
can be constructed on the basis of A: Ox(p) by using a hierarchy on authorities. Before
we do that, we show how PDeL(Evt') can be extended to sets of authorities in the same
way as SDLx.
5.5 Authorities in PDeL(Evt')
In this section, we extend system PDeL(Evt') to system PDeLA(Evt') with sets of author-
ities. This extension corresponds with the extension of system SDLx to system DÁ. The
extension to PDeLA(Evt') mainly consists of changing the language Ass' of PDeL(Evt')
into the language AssA. The language AssA of PDeLA(Evt') consísts of assertions con-
cerning the enactment of norms by sets of authorities.
Definition 5.5.1 The set of assertions in the language AssA can be deter~rcined by the
following BNF for íts elements (~Y~:
~ ::- A : ol,~l~~ ~ ~~I~~ n ~21~~ -a ~z,
with A E P}(NA), ~,~Y1, ~2 E AssA, O E Ass'.
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A: O states that set A of normative authorities enacted norm 0. The formula A: 0 is a
norm formulation in the terminology of Ruiter (1989).
Now we can give the formal system PDeLA(Evt') for assertions in AssA, which is sound
with respect to the semantics given:5
Axiom 5.5.2




~rl -~ ~z, ~i
~i ~(PD~L(EvE~)) ~s with O1i 02 E Ass'
A:Ol ~A:02
A E Pf(B) with O E Ass'A:O-~B:O'
For the semantical interpretation of the assertions in AssA we use the following módel
structure Nl -(W, A, R~yq, Pt(NA), P}(I), Qa]R, a), with RNA, the set of functions
{RA',RA',...} for each set of authorities A1iA2,... E~}(NA). The function RA E R,va
on W, which returns the ideal worlds for set A of authorities given a world: RA : W- r 2W .
This corresponds with the model structure of the system DÁ.
The statement `A enacted O' (A : O) describes some idealised world for A and not the
actual world, since the norm O can be overruled. In other words, a norm that was enacted
by a set A of authorities in the actual world is valid in an ideal world for A.
The truth condition for A: O, with O E Ass' is defined as follows:
~I~t, w~ A: O iff RA(w) C QO],
and RA(w) C QO] is defined as follows:
~ if O - [a]V, then
RA(w) C ~[~] 1fldw~ERA(w)(Il~]R(w ) ~ ILV])i
(5.23)
SThe proof is obvious and has therefore been left out.
6ei ~(PD.t.(e~s~ll e z means that 61 implies A2 in PDeL(Evt').
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~ if 0 - ~[~]V, then
RA(w) C p lff lÍ,,,~ERA(w)(Qa~R(w') n QV~ ~ 0),
~ if O - O1 n 02i then
RA(w) C QO] iff RA(w) C QO1D and RA(w) C QO2~,
with Ol, Oz E Ass';
~ if O- O1 V O2i then
RA(w) C QO~ iff RA(w) C QOI~ U Q02~,
with O1i 02 E Ass';
~ if O - ~Ol, then
RA(w) C Qp] iff RA(w) C Q~Ol~ iff RA(w) fl QOI~ - 0,
with Ol E Ass'.
The constraint
RA(w) C RB(w) for all w E W, B C A and A, B E P}(NA), (5.24)
validates rule (R2). From constraint (5.24), it follows that
RA(w) - naEYt(A)RB(w).
Some remarks
1. The axioms of PDeLA(Evt') correspond with the axioms of DÁ. Rules (Rl) and
(R2) correspond with rules R2 and R3 of DÁ.
2. Since we do not have the constraint
dAE~t(NA)(RA(w) ~ ~) for all w E W, (5.25)
principle
A : O -~ ~(B : ~0)
is not valid, which is equivalent to
,(A : O n B : ,0).
(5.26)
(5.27)
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This principle would remove the possibility of expressing conflicting norms enacted
by sets of authorities. Since this principle is not valid, we can consistently express
conflicting norms enacted by the same set of authorities or by different sets of au-
thorities. For example,
A: O(X :(~) n A :,O(X : Q),
expresses that A enacted that X is obliged to do Q, as well as that X is not obliged
to do ~3.
Now we give some properties of system PDeLA(Evt'). Note that the properties concerning
the relation between sets of authorities correspond with the properties of DÁ.
Proposition 5.5.4
i. A: (O, n 02) --~ (A : 0, n A: 02);
2. (A:O1VA:02)~A:(O,V02);
~3. A : O - 3BEVt(A)B : O;
4. ~(A U B: 0) --r ~(A : 0 V (B : O);
5. ,(A : O n,(A u B: O))
6. A: O(X :(3) -~ A: O(X U Y: Q);
7. A: O(X : p) n A: O(Y : p) -~ A: O(X u Y: Q);
8. A: O(X : Q, ) V A: O(X : Q2) -~ A: O(X : p, U Q2);
9. A:P(X:Q,B~QZ)-~A:P(X:Q,)nA:P(X:p);
10. A: O(al) n B : O(~2) --~ (A U B) : O(a18c'~2).
Proof. The proofs of propositions 5.5.4.1 up to and including 5.5.4.9 are analogous to the
proofs of propositions 5.4.3.1 up to and including 5.4.3.9, respectively. Proposition 5.5.4.10
can be proven as follows. Suppose that A: O(al ) n B: O(a2), then A U B: O(~1) n A U B:
O(a2) follows by R2. Hence, by axiom 5.5.2.2 it follows that AU B: 0(cYl) n 0(~2), which
is equivalent to A U B: O(c~18z'a2), because O(al) n O(o2) -(pD~L(Evt'll ~(~i~~~a).
With systems DÁ and PDeLA(Evt) we can formalise that individual authorities or sets of
authorities have enacted a certain norm. Furthermore, we are able to formalise consistently
that ( sets of) authorities enacted conflicting norms.
With the help of the norms explicitly enacted by the individual authorities, we can
define the term `normative system', which we discuss in the following section, and will be
used in the next chapter.
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5.6 Normative systems
A normative system is defined as all the norms enacted by competent normative authorities,
and all the logical consequences of these norms. The set of competent normative authorities
will be denoted by NA.
Definitio~n 5.6.1 Let N be a set of norras. Then, we define Cn(N) as the set of norms
that includes N and all its consequences. Set N is called the basis of system Cn(N).
Thus, Cn(N) is the transitive closure of N with respect to the derivation (~).
Definition 5.6.2 Let a 6e a nornzative authority ~a E NA). Then, Na is defined as the
set of nornzs explicitly enacted 6y authority a.
Cn(Na) is called the individual normative systerrt enacted by authoráty a.
As a matter of fact, set Na will always be finite, because it originates in a finite number
of legislative acts. The individual normative system as a whole, i.e., the set Cn(Na), is
infinite, however. Note that Cn(NQ) - Cn(Cn(Na)).
If we only consider single authorities, it is obvious that we obtain a normative system
consisting of the rules of the individual normative systems. Suppose that A- {a1,a2},
and that al enacted O(a~) and a2 O(a2). So, O(al) and O(a2) are elements in the
system obtained: Cn(Na,) U Cn(Na,). However, O(a18c'a2) is not an element, because
Na, I~ O(a18c'a2) and Naz I~ O(a18e'az). We can remedy this situation by considering
sets of authorities. Let NA be a set of rules explicitly enacted by set A of authorities:
NA - Na, U NaZ. Thus, we get system Cn(Na, U Na,). Now we can not only derive
the rules from the individual normative systems, but also all the rules that are logical
consequences of NA, because Cn(Na,) U Cn(NQ~) C Cn(Na, U Naz).
Definition 5.6.3 Let A E Pt(NA) and A- {al, ..., a„}. Then we define Cn(NA) as the
norrrzative system induced by the set of norncs enacted by the set A of normative authorities.
NA is the set of adl the norms explicitly enacted by the set A of authorities:
NA - Na, U... U Na„ .
It is often the case that two authorities enacted two contradictory norms. The consequence
is that the normative system - with these two rules - loses its meaning in a logical sense,
since in case of inconsistency everything can be deduced. In the next chapter, we will
introduce the term `authority hierarchy' to overcome this consequence, by ordering the
norms at the basis of the hierarchical relations between the authorities, so that we can
determine, for example, which of the two conflicting norms actually holds.
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5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we extended SDLX and PDeL(Evt') with sets of authorities, which en-
ables us to express who enacted a certain norm. Furthermore, it enables us to treat several
classical issues: hierarchical norms (see chapter 6), completeness of a legal system (univer-
sality, see chapter 6) and normative inconsistencies (i.e., conflicting norms enacted by sets
of authorities).
First, we discussed system SDLA, based upon Bailhache's theory. This theory was
developed to obtain a deontic coherent system. Inherent to this theory is that we cannot
express conflicts between enacted norms. A major innovation of this theory is the use
of sets of authorities. Sets of authorities are needed to determine the consequences of
obligations, enacted by a combination of individual authorities.
However, we have seen that this theory has some serious drawbacks. We cannot express
that
1. a set of authorities enacts a permission. Only obligations can be enacted by the sets
of authorities. Conversely, we cannot express that a set of authorities does not enact
an obligation, only permissions;
2. a set of authorities enacted a combination of norms, for example, OX (p) V OX (q). In
this approach, sets of authorities can only enact atomic collective obligations (OX (p)).
To deal with these drawbacks we have chosen for another approach: instead of the set A
of authorities modifying a norm O, the set A is treated as a modal operator. With the
help of this (seemingly small) change, the drawbacks disappear in system DÁ (extension
of SDLX) and system PDeLA(Evt') (extension of PDeL(Evt')).
Furthermore, in both systems we can consistently formalise normative inconsistencies,
i.e., conflicting norms enacted by sets of authorities. Consider the following example (see
subsection 1.3.2): car driver il is on a major road and approaches a junction, where car
driver i2 approaches from the right. According to art. 15 of the Dutch Traf~ic R.egulation
1990, il has to give way to i2, who approaches the junction from the right. Also, according
to the right-of-way signs (A6 and A9), i2 has to give way to il. On the ground of the
principle of trvst, i2 does not have to give right of way according to art. 15, and on
the ground of the traffic signs, i2 has to give right of way. In PDeL(Evt'),' we cannot
consistently express this, since this is formalised as follows:
~O({iZ} : ~3) A O({í2} : ,(3),
':~otc that ~~e use system PDeL(Evt') instead of SDLX, since the obligations considered are Ought-
to-do statemenis.
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where Q stands for the action `to give right of way'. This formula is a contradiction.
However, in PDeLA(Evt') we can express this as follows:
A:,O({~z} : Q) n A: O({~ } : Q),
where A is the set of authorities that enacted the articles in the Dutch Traffic Regulation
1990. This formula expresses, in a consistent way, that the authorities enacted two con-
flicting norms. Which norm should be followed will be a topic of discussion in the next
two chapters.
The axioms, rules and propositions from DÀ and PDeLA(Evt') correspond, since the
addition of sets of authorities is independent of the kind of norms (Ought-to-be statements
or Ought-to-do statements) they enact. Now that we can express who enacted a norm, we
can define a hierarchy of norms - to deal with normative inconsistencies - on the basis of





When we consider the norms in a legal code, we often find inconsistencies between them.
A major cause for these inconsistencies is the fact that norms are enacted by different com-
petent authorities in a legal system. In this chapter, we describe how these inconsistencies
can be handled with the help of an authority hierarchy.
Furthermore, we discuss two basic types of legislative acts of the normative authorities:
promulgation and derogation, with respect to the authority hierarchy. Finally, we discuss
the concept of universality for legal norms.
6.1 Introduction
Law changes - the `dynamic' character of law - as new norms are incorporated by competent
normative authorities, and existing norms are repealed and so removed from the legal order.
It is our task here to identify of all the norms that were enacted and the validity of these
norms at a certain moment. The norms which are used to express and illustrate the issues
discussed in this chapter, are norm expressions of PDeL(Evt').1
The term `validity', as it is used in legal discourse, is ambiguous. It is possible to
distinguish several meanings in which a legal norm can be said to be valid. In this chapter,
we are concerned with two such meanings (two concepts of validity): membership and
applicability. Both of them play a central role in law and in legal theories (cf. Bulygin,
1982).
~ A norm can be said to be valid in the sense that it belongs to or is a member of a legal
system. `Membership' is a descriptive concept, because the sentence `O(a) is valid'
~ We might also have used norm expressions of DÁ; however, we have chosen for norm expressions of
PDeL(Evt') for no pazticular reason.
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is a descriptive proposition, not a norm. There are various criteria for membership,
but we restrict ourselves to the criterion of competence of the authority that has
created the norm: a norm is valid if it has been issued (enacted, promulgated) by a
competent authority.
~ A norm is often also said to be valid in the sense that it is obligatory or has a`binding
force'. `Applicability' is also a descriptive concept, for to say that a norm is valid
in this sense is not to give a prescription, but to state that there is a prescription
according to which the norm must be applied. Here the sentence `O(a) is valid' is
again a proposition, though referring to a norm.2
In this chapter, we investigate the relation between these two concepts on the basis of the
hierarchical structure of the legal system and two types of legislative acts: promulgatíon
and derogation. Law changes by promulgation and derogation: norms are incorporated by
promulgation and norms are repealed by derogation.
When we consider the norms in a legal system, we can often discern some kind of
hierarchy among the norms: some are regarded as more basic than others.
It may be determined in part by considerations arising from the text of the
regulations themselves, such as the existence of cross-references from one to
another; and it may also be determined in part by factors of a more extrinsic
kind, such as the powers and competences of the issuing bodies, dates of pro-
mulgation and amendment, and the degree of specificity or generality of the
regulations made. (Alchourrón and Makinson, 1981, p. 125)
With the help of such a hierarchy of norms, we can overcome some logical imperfections
in the legal code, especially conflicting norms. In this chapter, we define the hierarchy of
norms on the basis of the competences of the normative authorities that enact the norms,
following an authority hierarchy.
If authority a has enacted norm O(o!) and authority b norm O(~), we say that the two
norms are conflicting, since event a is obligatory and at the same time forbidden. This is the
`classical' notion of norrrcative inconsistency. Two authorities promulgating (enacting) two
contradictory or conflicting norms is an extremely frequent phenomenon, at least in certain
areas like law (see Alchourrón and Bulygin, 1981). The conflict arises when the norms
become members of the same normative system, not if they belong to different systems.
Such a system loses its meaning in a logical sense in the case of inconsistency: everything
ZA norm has a`binding fotce' may also mean that there is a prescription to obey and apply the norm.
Then we have a normative concept of validity: `a norm is valid' is to describe that it should be obeyed
and applied; so, in this sense, `O(a) is valid' is not a proposition, but a prescription, i.e., a norm.
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can be deduced and, in particular, all obligations, permissions, etc., are deducible ( ex falso
sequitur quodlibet).
In this chapter, we develop a theory to overcome some normative inconsistencies among
the norms promulgated (enacted) by the authorities with respect to their hierarchical order,
and to determine which norms, members of a given legal system, are applicable; i.e., which
norms must be obeyed and applied.
Another issue we discuss is the possibility of a universal legal system. A universal
system is a normative-consistent system, such that all events are prescribed, prohibited or
permitted in that system.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. In section 6.2, we determine the hierar-
chical structure of a legal system on the basis of sets of normative authorities to overcome
some normative conflicts between enacted norms. Section 6.3 discusses two basic types of
legislative acts of the normative authorities: promulgation and derogation, with respect to
the authority hierarchy. Section 6.4 presents (postulated) universality. In the last section
we draw some conclusions.
6.2 Authority hierarchy
The sources of law give rise not only to norms, but also to hierarchical criteria that de-
termine the relative importance of various norms that form part of a legal order. The
identification of the material of which a legal system is composed must include a series of
relations determining the relative weight of norms. The clearest example is the criterion
based on the level of the authority that enacted the norm: for example, a constitutional
rule is hierarchically superior to a rule enacted by the ordinary legislature, and the latter,
in turn, is superior to a rule enacted by a city council. This criterion is called the `Lex
Superior'. The `Lex Superior' principle is based on the general hierarchy of a legal system:
normative authority is divided along the lines of the hierarchical structure of the normative
system; authorities with a lower rank of authority have to respect what was enacted by an
authority with a higher rank.
There are more criteria or rules of preference to resolve normative inconsistencies, such
as `Lex Specialis' and `Lex Posterior'.3 So, the law is not merely a set of norms, but a
hierarchical system.4 Each of these principles determines different hierarchical relations
between norms and their role is to give a solution in those situations in which one has to
choose from among different norms. For convenience, we will restrict ourselves to the `Lex
Superior' principle, but the theory can easily be extended with other rules of preference.
In this section, we develop a deontic system with normative agreement between the
3These rules of preferences are generally not codified.
4This is emphasised by several authors (e.g., Alchourtón, 1982; Bulygin, 1982).
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sets of authorities in the same normative system with respect to their hierarchical order, to
overcome some normative inconsistencies between the norms enacted by sets of authorities.
The authorities will be ordered in a hierarchical system, which helps to determine which
norm should be followed in cases of deontic inconsistencies. The authorities are thus used
to prioritise the norms they enacted.s The hierarchy of authorities does not resolve all the
inconsistencies; norms with the same priority may still be inconsistent. In such a case, the
judge or lawyer may resolve these inconsistencies with the help of interpretative strategies,
e.g., the grammatical and the teleological strategies. The theory of authority hierarchy
does not solve the latter problem, but indicates and locates this problem.
First, we will introduce a partial ordering of the authorities:
Definition 6.2.1 Let a, b E NA. We define
~ a~ 6 iff a and b have the same rank of authority;
. a~ b iff a has a higher rank of authority than b;
~ a~óiffa~bVa~6.
Definition 6.2.2 Let A;, Aj C NA. We define
~ A; ~ Aj 1ff daEA~d6EA,(a } b)i
~ Ai ~ Aj Z,~I daEA,~d6EAj (a ~ b);
~ Ai } Aj ZJJ daEA,3bEA~(a Y- 6 V a~ b).
Proposition 6.2.3 ~ over 2NA is transitive and reflexive, but in general not symmetric.
~ over 2NA is transitive and asymmetric, and thus a strict partial ordering of 2NA.
Definition 6.2.4 Let A C NA. Then, NA is defined as the set of norms enacted by the
authorities in set A (cf. definition 5.6..~).
Definition 6.2.5 Let A1, A2, . .., A„ C NA. Then, D(Al, AZ, ..., A„) is an authority
hierarchy iff -
di~jlA~ r A7) n d~da,bEA,1a ~ b)~
In D(Al, ..., A„), A1 is the set of authorithies with the highest ranking authority and A„ the
set with the lowest ranking authority. The ordering of authorities in an authority hierarchy
is a total ordering: for every two authorities a and b in U;lA; it follows exclusively that
a~b,b~aora~b.
SThis gives a priority logic in the tradition of Brewka (1991). See also Prakken (1993).
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Example 6.2.6 Let a, b, c, d, e E NA and a~ b, 6~ c, c~ d and d~ e. Then,
D({a, 6}, {c, d}, {e}) is an authority hierarchy.
Definition 6.2.7 Let D(A1, AZ ..., A„) be an authority hierarchy, A C U;l A„ and let
k- max{i~A fl A; ~ 0}. Then we define S(NA) as the set of norms enacted by all the
authoritíes superior or equal to the authorities of A:
S(NA) - Uk ,NA;.
NOte tllat ~IA'CAnAYA'(s(NA) - s(NA')).
Example 6.2.8 Consider example 6.,2.6, and suppose that a enacted O(al), b enacted
P(a2) and O(a3), c enacted O(a4), d enacted P(as) and ~O(a3) and e enacted P(a3).
Then, we obtain, for eaample,
1. S(N{a}) - S(N{b}) - S(N{a,b}) - {O(a1), P(az), ~(as)};
2. S(N{~}) - S(N{d}) - S(N{c,d}) - S(N{a,c}) - S(N{a, d}) - S(N{b ,c}) - S(N{b,d}) -
S(N{a,b,c}) - S(N{a,b,d}) - s(N{a,6,c,d}) -
{0(al)~ P(a2)i ~(a3)i ~(a4)i P(a5)i ~0(a3)}i
~. S(N{e}) - S(N{a,b,c,d,e}) -
{(7(al)i P(a2)i 0(a3)f ~(a4)i P(a5)i ~~(a3)~ P(a3)}i
4. s(N{a}) ~ s(N{c}) ~ s(N{e}).
To overcome normative inconsistencies among the enacted norms in a normative system,
we have to remove at least one of the norms. This can also be achieved by more generous
subtractions, such as removing all the norms. However, this is absurd. What is wanted is
to remove a minimum of norms, on the basis of the authority hierarchy, compatible with
the requirement that the resulting set of norms is normative-consistent. Before we define
this formally, we give a definition of normative-consistency (N-consistency).
Definition 6.2.9 Let N be a set of norms. Then,
N is N-consistent iff -~3aEEv2'((N ~ O(a)) I~ (N ~ O(á))).
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Note that if N is N-consistent, then N is also consistent, since if N is inconsistent, every-
thing can be deduced; thus, also O(a) and O(á). The converse does not hold. Suppose
that N-{O(cr),O(á)}, then N is consistent, but not N-consistent.s
By means of N-consistency, we can define a maximal N-consistent system for a given
authority hierarchy as follows:
Definition 6.2.10 Let D(Al, AZ ..., A„) be an authority híerarchy and A C U; rA;. Then,
the maiimal N-consistent system Sys(D(Al, A~, ..., A„)) is defined as S(NA), such that
~ S(NA) is N-consástent;
~~3A'CU-,A,(A Y~ A~ n S(NA~) is N-consistent~.
System Sys(D(Al, A2i ..., A„)) is based upon the individual normative systems of the
authorities in the authority hierarchy, with respect to their ranks of authority. However,
this definition does not give acceptable results, because if two `higher' norms conflict, no
norms enacted by lower ranked authorities ca,n be determined.'
Example 6.2.11 Suppose that a enacted O(X : Qr) and O(Y : (~2), that b enacted ~O(X :
~1) and P(Y :~3), and that c enacted P(Z : Q4). Then,
1. Sys(D({a, b}, {c})) - (~;
~. Sys(D({a}, {b}, {c})) - {O(X : ,Qr),O(Y : ~iz)};
S. Sys(D({a, c}, {b})) - Sys(D({a}, {c}, {b})) - {O(X : ,~r), D(Y : ~3~), P(Z : Qq)}.
We can solve this problem by removing only the norms that are responsible for the norma-
tive conflicts. Therefore, we change the definition of maximal N-consistent system. A set is
maximal N-consistent with respect to system S(N,y) by removing only the norms in S(NA)
which are responsible for the normative conflicts, depending on the authority hierarchy. If
two norms, enacted by authorities with different ranks of authority, are conflicting, then
6These terms, i.e., N-consistency and consistency, are equivalent if we add schema -~[aU'á]V to system
PDeG(Evt') by introducing the following constraint on the semantics:
3w.Ela~,~Rlwlw' [E V for all w E W.
Note that this schema corresponds with schema (OD) of SDL.
Suppose N is N-inconsistent. Then there is an event, say a in Evt', such that N F O(a) and N F- O(á).
From the schema ~[a U' á] V we can derive principle O(a) - . ~O(á). Hence, it follows that N F O(á) and
N~~O(á). Thus, N is inconsistent if N is N-inconsistent. Hence, N is consistent if and only if N is
N-consistent.
~In the study by Alchourrón and Makinson ( 1981) the same problem arose. Alchourrón and Makinson
suggested that an additional notion of relevance is necessary, but they gave no formal definition.
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the norm enacted by the authority with the lower rank will be removed, and if two norms
enacted by authorities with the same rank are conflicting, then we have to choose which
norm will be removed.
Definition 6.2.12 Let D(Al, AZ ..., A„) 6e an authority hierarchy and A C U; lA;, with
the dowest ranking authority comíng from Ak. Then, D is a maximal N-consistent set of
S( Nn ) i.,(Í
1. D C S(NA);
,2. D is N-consistent;
~. ~3rES(Nq)`D({r} U D is N-consistent);
~. 3D'EMC(S(Nqk-,))(D~ C D).
MC(S(NA)) is defined as the set of all the maximal N-consistent sets of S(NA).
The first three conditions are obvious and are needed to express that D is N-consistent and
maximal with respect to S(NA). Without the fourth condition, the maximal N-consistent
sets of S(NA) would be independent of the given authority hierarchy.
Example 6.2.13 Let D({a},{b}) be an authority hierarchy, N{a} -{O(al),F(a2)} and
N{b} - {P(a2), P(a3)}. Then,
{O(al), F(a2), P(a3)}
is the only maximal N-consistent set of S(N{a,b}). The set {O(al),P(a2),P(a3)} is not
an element of MC(S(N{a,b})), since it does not satisfy the fourth condition of defcnition
6.2.1,2: {O(al), F(a2)} is the only maximal N-consistent set of S(N{a}), but is not a subset
of set {O(a~),P(a2),P(a3)}.
Corollary 6.2.14 Let D(Al, A2 ..., An) be an authority hierarchy and A C U;lA;. Then,
1. S(Nq) is the only maximal N-consistent set of S(NA) iff S(NA) is N-consistent;
,2. there are at least two maximal, consistent sets of S(NA) iff S(Nq) is N-inconsístent.
Example 6.2.15 Let D({a,6}) be an authority hierarchy, N{a} -{O(al),F(a2)} and
N{y} -{P(a2), P(a3)}. Then, we have two maximal N-consistent sets of N{a,e}:
Mc(s(N{a.b})) - {{o(a,),F(a2),P(a3)},{o(a,),P(a2),P(a,)}}.
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There is no logical criterion according to which we can decide which of these two sets
should be used. This we call logical indeterminacy (cf. Navarro and Redondo, 1990). The
decision is a matter of interpretation by the judge or lawyer.
In the introduction we already mentioned that law changes by promulgation and dero-
gation. In the following section, we analyse the consequences of these two legislative acts of
the authorities for the validity of the norms, in the sense of inembership and applicability,
on the basis of the theory developed in this section.
6.3 The promulgation and derogation of norms
Two basic types of legislative acts can be distinguished: promulgation and derogation.
Frequently, promulgation has been referred to as the introduction of a norm into a legal
system, and derogation as the removal of a norm from a legal system. We will see that
there is more to it than that by investigating what the consequences are for a legal system
when an authority enacts or derogates a norm.
According to Alchourrón (1982), an important feature of promulgation is that the
resulting system is perfectly identified and that this process differs from derogation since
the result of derogation is not always determinate: there is not always one, unique system
that can be identified as the result of a process of derogation. We will see that the result
of promulgation is not always determinate either, in contrast to Alchourrón's statement.
Before we discuss the two legislative acts, we make some assumptions to be used in the
sequel. We assume in this section that N is a maximal N-consistent set of S(NA„) with
respect to the given authority hierarchy D(Al, Az, ..., A„). Further, Cn(N) is the set of
norms that embraces N and all its consequences (cf. section 5.6).
6.3.1 Promulgation
Legal norms take effect by the promulgation of laws. In the Netherlands, this is done
by publication in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees. At the same time, the date of the
law's taking effect is determined. Businesses and institutions have their own procedures
for the promulgation of current standards. Ethical norms (for example, one should not kill
a human being) are not promulgated as such. By way of political discussions, such norms
will be reflected in the legislations of most states. Matters concerning the principles and
developments of ethical norms are discussed in the philosophical literature.
In the promulgation of a norm r to an N-consistent system Cn(N), two cases ca,n be
distinguished:
1. system Cn(N U{r}) is N-consistent;
2. system Cn(N U{r}) is N-inconsistent.
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System Cn(N U {r}) is N-consistent
In the case of N-consistency, two subcases ca,n be distinguished:
1. Cn({r}) C Cn(N): this we call N-consistent redundant promulgatáon. The promul-
gated norm was already deducible and is, therefore, redundant. In other words, norm
r was already applicable in system Cn(N). Norm r becomes a new member of the
system if r has not been enacted explicitly by the authorities before the promul-
gation. This may be important. Suppose r was not a member of the system, but
deduced from norm p. If p is derogated, then r is no longer deduced. Thus, it matters
greatly that r becomes a member of the system. Anyway, r becomes a member of
the individual normative system of the authority that promulgated norm r. Further,
it can restrict the competence of inferior authorities to derogate norm r.
2. Cn({r}) ~ Cn(N): this we call N-consistent material promulgation. The system
changes because the number of deducible norms increases. In this resulting system,
the new norms are not only the ones pertaining to this norm and its consequences,
but also those that can be derived from the promulgated norm and the rest of the
already existing norms. From this viewpoint of a formal reconstruction, this has
consequences for the sum of the two following sets:
~ the existing ( explicitly enacted) norms N and
~ the explicitly promulgated norm r.
Thus, the act of promulgation of r leads from system Cn(N) to system Cn(NU {r}),
and not to system Cn(N) U Cn({r}).s In this case, norm r is a new member of the
system and is applicable.
We illustrate such cases of promulgation in the following example ( for norm expressions of
PDeL(Evt')).
Example 6.3.1 Let
- N{a,} - {C(ai)~P(~z)};
- N{az} - {~(as)~~(a4U~a1)}~
- N{a,} - {O(áz)}.
We defene the following authority hierarchy: D({al},{az},{a3}), thus A1 -{al}, Az -
{az} and A3 -{a3}. Then there is one maximal N-consistent set N for the given authority
hierarchy:
N - {O(al), P(czz),O(a3),O(a4 U' ~1)}.
sNote that Cn(N) U Cn({r}) C Cn(N U{r}).
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Let us consíder the followáng two cases:
1. authority a2 promulgates norm O(a18a'a3);
l. authoríty al promulgates norm O(as).
1. If a2 promulgates O(a18z'a3), then Cn(N U {O(alóa'a3)}) - Cn(N), since N~
O(a18t'a3). Thus, the promulgation of norm O(a~8s'a3) by authority a2 ís a redun-
dant promulgation.
2. If al promulgates O(a5), then Cn(NU {O(as)}) is N-consistent and Cn({D(a5)}) ~
Cn(N). Thus, the promulgation of norm D(a5) by authority al is a material pro-
mulgation: norm O(as) is a new member and also applicable. Further, it holds
that Cn({O(as)}) U Cn(N) C Cn(N U {O(as)}), since O(a38t'as) ís an element of
Cn(N U{O(as)}) and not of Cn(N) U Cn({O(as)}).
System Cn(N U{r}) is N-inconsistent
In the case of N-inconsistency, two subcases can be distinguished:
1. {N} - MC(S(NA„)U {r}): this we call N-inconsistent redundant promulgatíon. The
negation of the promulgated norm is deducible from a set of norms enacted by a set
of authorities with higher ranks of authority than the authority promulgating norm
r. Norm r becomes a member of the system, but is not applicable.
2. {N} ~ MC(S(NA„) U{r}): this we call N-inconsistent material promulgation. In
this case, there is no set of authorities with higher ranks of authority enacting the
negation of the promulgated norm than the authority promulgating norm {r}. This
case can again be subdivided into two cases:
~ N~ MC(S(NA„)U{r}): the negation of the promulgated norm is only deducible
minimally from sets of norms enacted by sets A of authorities with lower ranks
of authority than authority a promulgating norm r, i.e., {a} ~ A. Norm r
becomes a member and is also applicable.
~ N E MC(S(NA„) U{r}): the negation of the promulgated norm is deducible
minimally from a set of norms enacted by a set A of authorities with an authority
with the same rank of authority as the authority promulgating norm r. Norm
r becomes a new member of the system if the norm was not enacted before the
promulgation, and is applicable in some, but not all, maximal N-consistent sets
in MC(S(NA„) U{r}). Anyway, norm r becomes a member of the individual
normative system of the authority that promulgated norm r.
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We illustrate this with the following example.
Example 6.3.2 Let
- N{a,} - {~(ai), P(az)};
- Nla,} -{O(a3), O(a4 U' a2), O(áz)};
- N{a3} - {-,P(a3)}.
4Ve define the following authority hierarchy: D({al}, {az}, {a3}), thus AI -{al}, .9z -
{az} and A3 -{a3}. Then there is one maximal N-consistent set N for the given authority
hierarchy:
N-{O(al ), P(az), O(aa), O(a9 U' az) }.
Let us consider the following three cases:
1. authority az promulgates norm ~P(az);
~2. authority al promulgates norm ~O(a3);
3. authority az promulgates norm O(á4).
1. If authority az promulgates ~P(az), then Cn(N U{-~P(az)}) is inconsistent, thus
also N-inconsistent. There is a set A of authorities with A~{az}, namely the set
{al} that enacted P(az). Thus, the promulgation of norm ~P(az) by authority az is
an N-inconsistent redundant promulgation. Note that ~P(az) is now a member of
the system, however.
2. If authority ai promulgates ~O(a3), then Cn(NU{~O(a3)}) is inconsistent. There is
no set A of authorities with A~{al}, such that A: O(a3), thus the promulgation is
an N-inconsistent material promulgation. Thus, we have to determine the maximal
N-consistent sets of set S(NA,) U{~O(a3)} for the given authority hiernrchy:
MC(S(Na3) U{~~(a3)}) - {{~Q(a3), ~(al), P(a2), ~(a4 U~ az), ~P(a3)}}.
The consequences of this promulgation are:
(a) the membership of ~O(a3);
(b~ the applicability of ~O(a3);
(c~ nornt O(a3) is not applicable any more;
(d) norm ~P(a3) becomes applicable.
Note that N~ MC(S(NA„) U {~O(a3)}).
144 Deontic inconsistency and universality
~3. If authority a2 promulgates O(á4), then Cn(N U {O(c~4)}) is inconsisfent. There is
no set A of authorities with A~{a2}, such that A:~D(~9), thus the promulgation
ís an N-inconsástent material promulgation. We have to determine the maximal
N-consistent sets of set S(NA,) U{O(~4)} for the given authority hierarchy:
Mc(s(NA,) u {o(a4)}) - {{o(a,),P(~~),0(~3),o(a, u~az)},
{O(~, ), P(o2), C(a3), C(a4)} }.
Norm O(á4) is now a new member of the system and is applicable in one of the two
maximal N-consistent sets. Note that N is still a maximal N-consistent set, though
not the only one.
The promulgation by authority a2 of this last example shows that the result of a promulga-
tion, in contrast to Alchourrón's statement, is not determinate since there is not one unique
system that can be identified as the result of a process of promulgation. Note that the
result of promulgation of a norm to a system Cn(N) is determinate if system Cn(N U{r})
is N-consistent.
6.3.2 Derogation
One important charact.eristic of legal rules is their persistence over time.9 This means,
among other things, that if a norm belongs to a system S, then it belongs to all successive
systems of S, until it is removed from one of them. It is, therefore, possible to ask: when
is it true that a norm r has been removed from a system S? The following answers can be
given:
1. when a competent authority derogates r;
2. when r is only a logical consequence of a set {rl, r2, ..., r„} of norms, and one of
these norms has been removed from the system;
3. when norm r has restricted the temporal extension of its validity;
4. according to some theories, whether a norm is a member of a legal system not only
depends on the actions of the normative authorities, but also on the acts of the
addressees of the norm; in this sense, an ineffective norm does not belong to a legal
system:
... the effectiveness of a norm consists in the fact that it is actually observed
by and large ... Effectiveness is a condition for validity to the extent that
9Cf. Hart ( 1961), pp. 77-78.
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a single norm and a whole normative order lose their validity - cease to
be valid - if they lose their effectiveness or the possibility of effectiveness.
(Kelsen, 1991, p. 139)
We do not consider cases 3 and 4, because our purpose here is to look at legislation as a
technique for the introduction and removal of legal rules.
Derogation is a common technique for the removal of legal rules from a legal system. A
normative authority may decide that a norm r has to be removed, and in order to obtain this
result, the authority decides on a derogatory disposition d, i.e., a non-normative disposition
which has the function of indicating a set of legal dispositions that must leave the system.
Thus, the objects of dispositions of type d can be rules, definitions, etc. In this chapter,
we consider only the derogation of norms. The decision on a derogatory disposition can be
seen as the result of a specific normative act: the rejection of a norm (cf. Navarro, 1993).
Therefore, the derogation process begins with the promulgation of some disposition d. In
other words, the process of removing a norm r begins with introducing a disposition d. The
promulgation of d by some authority a is important, because it prevents authorities inferior
to a from introducing, for example, the norm being the object of rejection. We formalise
the enactment of a derogatory disposition, i.e., the rejection of a norm r, by enacting
the negation of that norm (i.e., ~r), on the understanding that this last norm does not
become a member of the individual normative system of the authority that decided on the
derogatory disposition (if it was not a member of that system already). Such a norm we
call a disposition oóject.
We distinguish two cases of derogation of a norm r of a N-consistent system Cn(N):
1. r~ Cn(N): this we call derogation in advance. No norm in N is removed; how-
ever, a consequence of this derogation is the restriction of the competence of inferior
authorities.
2. r E Cn(N): in this case, two cases can be distinguished:
(a) {N} - MC(S(NA„) U {~r}): this we call redundant derogation. Norm r is
deducible from a set of norms enacted by a set of authorities with higher ranks
of authority than the one enacting disposition object ~r.
(b) {N} ~ MC(S(NA„)U{~r}): this we call material derogation. In this case, there
is no set of authorities with higher ranks of authority enacting norm r than the
authority enacting disposition object ~r. This case can again be subdivided
into two cases:
~ N~ MC(S(NA„) U{~r}): Norm r is only deducible minimally from sets of
norms enacted by sets A of authorities with lower ranks of authority than
authority a enacting disposition object ~r, i.e., {a} ~ A. Note that norm
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~r does not become a member of the system if it was not enacted before
the enactment of disposition object ~r, and that norm r is not a member
nor applicable any more.
~ N E MC(S(NA„) U {~r}): Norm r is only deducible minimally from sets of
norms enacted by sets A of authorities with an authority with the same rank
of authority as the authority enacting disposition object ~r. Norm r will be
rejected in some, but not all, maximal N-consistent sets in MC(S(NA„) U
{~r}).
In the case of material derogation, the question may be raised what norms should be
removed from set N in order that norm r is not deducible any more. What is wanted is to
remove a minimum of norms in N compatible with the requirement that norm r cannot be
derived.to This allows us to formulate the following adequacy conditions for the process of
derogation:
1. the derogated norm r cannot be derived in the resulting systems, and
2. one should not eliminate more norms in N than is strictly necessary in order to
achieve the first condition.
We can accomplish this by determining the maximal N-consistent sets of S(NA„) U{~r}.
The resulting systems are these maximal N-consistent sets without norm ~r, if ~r ~
S(NA„ ).
Remarks
1. It is possible to obtain more than one resulting system after a material derogation.
Such a derogation, which gives rise to more than one resulting system, will be called
indeterncinate derogation (cf. Alchourrón, 1982).
2. The derogation of a norm r corresponds to the promulgation of ~r with the exception
that ~r does not become a member of the resulting system if it was not enacted before
the enactment of disposition object ~r.
Example 6.3.3 Let
- N{a,} - {~(ar), P(az)};
- N{az} - {0(os),C(aa U~ ai)};
- N{a,} - {O(~z)};
- N{a.} - {P(as)}.
loThis is a process of shrinking or contracting a theory to eliminate a norm. For a formal approach of
this process, with the notions of safe contraction and partial meet contraction, we refer to Alchourrón and
Makinson (1982) and Alchoutrón, Gárdenfors and Makinson (1985).
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We define the following authoráty hierarchy: D({al}, {a2i a3}, {a4}), thus A1 -{a~ }, AZ -
{a2,a3} and A3 -{a4}. Then there is one maximal N-consistent set N jor the given
authority hierarchy:
N- {O(ai), P(as)~ ~(aa), ~(aa U~ ái), P(as)}.
Let us consider the following four cases:
1. authority a~ enacts disposition object ~O(as);
2. authority a4 enacts disposition object ~O(a4);
3. authority al enacts disposition object ~O(a4);
,~. authority a3 enacts disposition object ~O(a3).
1. Authority al enacts disposition object ~O(as). Nowever, the negation of this norm,
i.e., O(as), is not an element of Cn(N). Thus, this is a derogation in advance. It
restricts the competence of authorities a2i a3 and a4. For example, a3 can promulgate
O(as), but this norm will not óelong to the resulting system since the norm has not
been promulgated 6y a`competent' authoráty, i.e., an authority with a rank equal to or
higher than authority al. Thus, derogation 6y authority al restricts the competence
of authority a3.
,2. Authority a4 enacts disposition object ~O(a4). Norm O(a4) E Cn(N), since {al} :
O(al) n{a2} : O(a4 U' ál) -~ {al, aZ} : O(a4). This is a redundant derogation, since
norm O(a4) is enacted by a set of authorities with higher ranks of authority than the
one enacting disposition object ~O(a4). Thus, O(a4) is still a member of the system
and applicable.
.i. Authority a~ enacts disposition object -~O(a4). Norm O(a4) E Cn(N). This is a
material derogation since there is no set of norms enacting 6y a set of authorities with
higher ranks of authority than the one enacting disposition object ~O(a4). Further,
it holds that
MC(S(Nn,) U {~O(a4)}) - {{O(al), P(az),O(as), ~O(aa), P(as)}}.
Thus, N~ MC(S(NA,) U{~O(a4)}). Note that ~O(a4) will not óelong to the
resulting system, i.e., the set
{O(ai), P(az)~ ~(as), P(as)}.
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The consequences of this derogation are:
(a~ norm O(a4 U' cYl) will 6e removed from the normative system; thus, is not ap-
plicable any more;
(b~ it restricts the competence of authorities a2i a3 and a4, since it prevents these
authorities, for example, from introducing the derogated norm.
~. Authority a3 enacts disposition object ~O(a3). Norm O(a3) E Cn(N). This is a
material derogation since norm O(a3) is only enacted minimally by authority a2 with
the same rank as the one enacting disposition object ~O(a3). Thus, norm O(a3)
will be rejected in some, but not all, maximal N-consistent sets in MC(S(NA,) U
{~O(a3)}):
{N, {O(al), P(aa),~O(a3), O(a4 U' al), P(as)}}.
Note that N in an element of MC(S(NA3) U{~O(a3)}). The resulting systems are
N and {O(al), P(a2),O(a9 U' ál), P(as)}}.
6.3.3 Evaluation
The relationship between `promulgation entrance' of norms into a system and `derogation
departure' of norms from a system is only one aspect of the process of introduction and
removal of norms. On the one hand, through the promulgation of a norm r, we not
only introduce r into a system, but also restrict the competence of inferior authorities,
i.e., authorities with a lower rank of authority than the authority promulgating norm r, as
regards the set of norms which enters the system as a consequence of the promulgation of r.
On the other hand, the derogation of a norm usually takes place through the promulgation
of a derogatory disposition d. The promulgatíon of d modifies the normative system in two
ways:
1. a disposition enters the system;
2. the set of norms indicated in d is removed from it.
Besides modifying the system, the derogation of a set of norms has the function of prevent-
ing any authority inferior to the one enacting disposition d from introducing the derogated
norm(s) into the system. Therefore, derogation and promulgation have two features in
common:
1. the modification of the applicable norms;
2. the restriction of the competence of inferior authorities.
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Promulgation and derogation of norms are structurally similar processes: both operations
may result in norms being introduced into or removed from a normative system.
Sometimes the promulgation or derogation of a norm leads to an undecided situation
with respect to the norms of a normative system N.
Example 6.3.4 Let
- N{a,} - {P(as)};
- N{a2} - {~(ál), ~(al U' a3)}.
We define the following authority hierarchy: D({a~}, {az}). Then there is one maxi~nal
N-consistent set N for the given authority hierarchy:
N - {P(a2),O(cYl),O(al U'á3)}.
Suppose authority al pro~rrculgates norm D(a3) or enacts disposition object ~O(á3). Rule
O(á3) is an element of Cn(N). In both cases, one of the two norms enacted by a2 becoines
inapplicable; however, which one is undetermined. This is called the `logische Unbestirrzmt-
heit des Normensystem.snl or logical indeterminacy.
In the following section, we discuss the notion of universality. A universal system is a
normative-consistent system, such that all events are prescribed, prohibited or permitted.
Thus, for every event there is a norm enacted by a set of authorities, which is applicable.
6.4 Universality
The question whether universality can be reached can be formulated as follows: is it possible
to set norms for all events such that the obtained set of norms is N-consistent? In other
words: can all events be prescribed, prohibited or permitted in a normative-consistent
way?
Of course, the set of norms concerned has to be consistent. In the case of an inconsistent
set, the question of universality would lose its meaning: everything would be deducible and,
in particular, every norm that prescribes, prohibits or permits an event would be deducible.
In order to deal with the question of universality, some concepts need to be introduced.
We have to keep in mind that universality concerns three sets (cf. Sarlemijn, 1985):
1. the set of norms that prescribes, prohibits or permits events;
2. the set of events (Evt');
3. the set of events that are actually regulated (Evt`).
11Bulygin, 1976, p. 619.
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A system N is universal if there is a norm for every event a E Evt', that is Evt' - Evt'
and if N is N-consistent. Usually, Evt" is only a real subset: Evt' C Evt'. To give a more
precise formulation:
Definition 6.4.1 N is universal iff for every a E Evt' it holds (exclusively~ that:
O(a) E Cn(N), or
F(a) E Cn(N), or
(P(~) n P(a)) E Cn(N).
From this definition it follows that a universal set is N-consistent.
Proposition 6.4.2 If N is universal, then N is N-consistent.
Proof. Assume that N is N-inconsistent. Then it holds for an event a that N~ O(a)
and N~ O(á). Hence, O(a) E Cn(N) and F(a) E Cn(N). Thus, N is not universal.
Proposition 6.4.3 Every N-consistent set N can be extended to a universal set N".
The extension is based on the countability of the formulas. The notion of countability does
not establish the precise order of the formulas. It has been avoided, however, that both
O(a) and 0(~) occur in the universal set. From the above it also is clear that this possibility
is purely a logical one, and in practice may entail a very difficult (promulgation) process
(for example, in legal practice or in the practice of making a traffic system universal). The
contents of N" have indeed not been determined unambiguously. This appears from the
nature of the construction process of N". On the basis of purely logical considerations, a
certain order in counting cannot be enforced. We call this the dogical indeterntinacy (cf.
Navarro and R.edondo, 1990). But in practice, that is where important decisions will be
made as to the norms that are to be promulgated or not.
From this it appears that, starting from a certain set of norms, many different universal
sets can be obtained. In this sense, the concept is ambiguous. However, it has to be stated
that a universal set cannot be constructed in practice,r2 .
~ because of the incredibly great number of events in Evt';
~ because some events do not need to be regulated according to a legislator;
~ because of the creation of ever more new actions, and so also new - and thus not yet
regulated - events.
As a result, all events that have been regulated by law constitute a subset of the set of




As we have seen above, the introduction of a universal system of norms meets with practical
difficulties. These difficulties are, in fact, well known, and one tries to get round them by
formulating general closure rules such as:
~ All acts that are not forbidden, are permitted.
~ All acts that are not expressly permitted, are forbidden.
The former corresponds with the legal expression nulla poena sáne lege, stated in article 1
sub 1 of the Dutch Penal Code. The latter is used in the rules of certain games (such as
chess, checkers and football).
To show that the general rules mentioned above are not altogether unproblematic, we
concentrate on the former rule. This rule is in conformity with `whatever is not forbidden,
is permitted'. In what way is this rule interpreted? The obvious thing would be to accept
the following principle:
~F(a) -~ P(a).
This principle seems to be in accordance with what is meant, but does not add anything,
because it is already incorporated in our system. If interpreted in this way, the rule
mentioned does not guarantee universality, for axioms, theorems and definitions have to
be applicable to non-universal systems. The principle
`what is forbidden is permitted' addresses the judge and forbids him to extend
the whole of legal prohibitions on the grounds of his own or someone else's
political or moral conviction. (Soeteman, 1989, p. 189)
This interpretation can be formulated as follows:13 Let N be a N-consistent set of norms,
then,
if F(~) ~ Cn(N), then P(a) E Cn(N).
This means that it is forbidden for a judge to prohibit events which have not been prohibited
up to today. Thus, this rule is regarded as a norm of judicial decision-making (cf. Soeteman,
1989).
The rule mentioned above, which is supposed to guarantee universality, also poses a
problem of an entirely different nature. If we interpret the rule to mean that every event
13We can also formalise this in terms of authorities. Let NA be the set of authorities enacting the norms
of a certain legal system. Then we can formalise `what is forbidden, is petmitted' as follows. If the set of
authorities has not enacted that a is forbidden, then a is permitted:
~(NA : F(a)) --~ NA : P(a).
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is permitted unless it is explicitly or implicitly prohibited, then we encourage people to
find loopholes in the law. Yet, this kind of practice is considered to be against the spirit of
the law. It cannot be the intention of legal principles (such as the rule mentioned above)
to encourage acting against the spirit of the law (the danger of postulated universality).
For example,14 in 1935 the owner of a taxi company hid illegal pamphlets in the car of
his competitor after he had heard that the latter had to go to Germany to pick up a
`fare'. The man notified German customs, hoping that his competitor would be caught
and convicted. But German customs informed their Dutch colleagues, who prevented the
man from crossing the border with the pamphlets. On the basis of article 328bis of the
Dutch Penal Code, the former entrepreneur was convicted of `unfair competition'. The
man lodged an appeal on the basis of the consideration that the act had nothing to do
with competition (which involves clients). The High Court's reply is interesting:ls
The fraudulent practice does not have to involve a potential client. It is shown
clearly by the suspect's proven ingenuity that a rule stated in general terms
has the advantage that types of unfair competition not thought of when the
law came into effect, can still be dealt with under criminal law.
Cases that were not thought of by members of government or parliament when the law
was created can still be dealt with under that law on the basis of the consideration that
they are determined by the spirit of a certain (criminal) law. From this it appears that
the general principle which states that everything is permitted that is not prohibited,ls is
limited by the rule that it is not permitted to violate the `spirit' of the (criminal) law.
In the construction of universality, it appears that the interpretation of norms plays
an important role. The conclusion that `this act is not explicitly províded for by the
legislator' can be drawn prematurely. We have to look for the cause `in den semantischen
Eigenschaften der Sprache (aktuelle und potentielle Vagheit der Begriffe)' (Alchourrón and
Bulygin, 1977, p. 25).17 Then the set of possible instances of a concept is not determined
in advance of the application of that concept. Only a judge can decide whether an object
is an instance of a certain concept or not, e.g., is a`surfboard' an instance of the concept
`boat' ?
In the philosophical literature (see Alchourrón and Bulygin, 1971, especially chapter
7), it has been mentioned that universal systems of norms restrict the freedom and respon-
sibility of the individual. Do individuals still possess the personal intellectual freedom to
develop systems of norms for themselves on the basis of which they can responsibly act
14I am in debt to Prof. dr. A. Sarlemijn for pointing out the two judgements discussed in this subsection.
1sHR, 246-1935, NJ 1936, 91.
16This principle can, in the context of criminal law, be associated with the principle of no punishment
without preceding statutory law.
I7In English: `in the semantic properties of language (topical and potential vagueness of concepts).'
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in a certain manner? In our opinion, this question springs from an incorrect application
of the notion of universality. Not universality of a legal system restricts the freedom and
responsibility of individuals, but the extensions of obligations and prohibitions to that legal
system.ls Permissions do not restrict personal intellectual freedom.
In a legal sense, it is manifest that the legislator leaves room for an individual system of
norms. Consider the following example. In 1943, M.M.V. abused a mentally handicapped
girl. He was convicted of `having intercourse with someone who is incapacitated' (article
243, Penal Code). But the High Court later acquitted the man on the grounds of the
following consideration:19
An offence that formerly was not provided for in an article can later be incorpo-
rated because the meaning of a legal term or concept has changed in the course
of time. In this way, a judge can pass a verdict that takes full account of the
societal convictions about the punishability of behaviour. This is not the case
here. The Penal Code has been with us for over sixty years; it has frequently
been revised, and those involved in its revision were fully aware of the fact that
`incapacitation' only refers to the physical absence of power. Those involved
in the revision of the Penal Code saw no reason to modify the article in this
respect.
The reasoning is clear: the legislator has frequently revised formulations in the law. It
can be assumed that the legislator knew that this particular rule only referred to physi-
cal powerlessness. Yet, the legislator did not change the formulation. Let us, therefore,
assume that the legislator did not want to include non-physical powerlessness (mental pow-
erlessness) in the rules of this law. To ensure that the above example be well understood,
we should like to point to the following particulars that are important in the judgement
thereof.
1. In criminal law, it indeed holds strictly that the law should not be extended on the
basis of the reasoning that the legislator was not concerned with this type of cases;
should he have done so, he would have reasoned analogously. This approach is not
pursued here.
2. In the former case (the owner of the taxi company), one starts from the assumption
that the legislator wanted to state explicit rules for this case as well.
1sA good example of this can be found in the replacement of the Dutch 1}affic Regulation 1966 by the
Dutch Ttaffic Regulation 1990. In the explanatory memorandum it is stated: `Because of the unequivocal
formulation of many rules for relatively uncomplicated situations the road user is deprived of part of his
responsibility. There is no need for him to think; the government has done that for him.' (Dutch Traffic
Regulation 1990, explanatory memorandum, pp. II-B-7).
19HR, 21-6-1943, NJ 1943, 559.
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In the former case, we have to do with analogous reasoning.20 In the latter case, we have
to do with reasoning from the spirit of the law.
The philosophical assumption that universality hinders an individual's norms awareness
appears not to hold in practice: according to the High Court's judgement, abusing a
mentally handicapped woman is permitted in the sense that it is not a punishable act. It
will, however, be clear that personal, normative judgements may differ.
6.5 Conclusions
A normative system Cn(N) can be (normative-)inconsistent since norms are enacted, for
example, by different authorities. To obtain a maximal normative-consistent system of a
normative system Cn(N), we introduced an ordering of the authorities with respect to
their competence, in other words, an authority hierarchy. For example, a norm O(~),
enacted by an authority a, is not applicable if there is a set A of authorities all with higher
ranks of authority than a which enacted O(~) or ~O(a).
The theory of the authority hierarchy provides a very workable framework for reason-
ing with other orderings; for instance, D(Al, ... , A„) can be interpreted as a specificity
hierarchy. Ak stands for the rank of specificity of a certain norm. For example, a norm
with rank A1 of specificity has a higher priority than a norm with rank A2 of specificity.
This can easily be applied to a deontic system, in this chapter system PDeL(Evt'). For
example, suppose Ar stands for the rank of specificity of traffic signs, and A2 stands for the
rank of specificity of traffic rules. By art. 63 of the Dutch TrafTic Regulation 1990, traffic
signs override traf)'ic rules in as far as specific rules are incompatible with specific signs.zl
Thus, we can state that A1 ~ A2. Consider the following example (see section 5.7): car
driver i1 is on a major road and approaches a junction, where car driver i2 approaches
from the right. On the ground of art. 15 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, i1 has to
give way to i2, who approaches the junction from the right. But, on the grounds of the
right-of-way signs (A6 and A9) and the principle of trust, il does not have to give way to
i~. We can formalise this as follows:
A, :,O({ir} : p) n A~ : O({ }:Q),
where ,0 stands for the action `to give right of way'. Thus, we can consistently express these
conflicting norms with the addition of specificity. Further, norm -~O({il} : Q) is applicable
- in contrast to norm O({i~} :~), since norm ~O({il} :~3) has a higher rank of specificity
than norm O({il} : ~3).
ZoThe analogous reasoning is as follows: `Just as the legislator wanted to set rules against the abuse of
physically impaired people, he also wanted to set rules against the abuse of the mentally handicapped.'
Such analogous extensions in law are not applied in criminal law.
Z1The expressing of such a meta-statement needs further research (cf. Prakken, 1993).
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A normative system changes by promulgation (the introduction of a norm into a legal
system) and derogation (the removal of a norm from a legal system), i.e., the dynamic
character of law. We have seen that these two legislative acts by authorities have two
features in common: the modification of the applicable norms and the restriction of the
competence of inferior authorities. Furthermore, we have seen that not only derogation but
also promulgation may lead to logical indeterminacy, in contrast to Alchourrón's (1982)
statement.
Finally, we discussed (postulated) universality, and the way in which universality can
be reached by a closure rule, such as nulla poena sine lege, expressed in art. 16 of the
Dutch Constitution and art. 1 sub 1 of the Dutch Penal Code. We argued that postulated
universality does not restrict individual freedom and responsibility: the individual's norms
awareness is restricted by the extension of the whole of legal prohibitions.
In this chapter, we have seen how we can deal with normative inconsistencies on the
basis of an authority hierarchy. A drawback of our approach is that we can only deal
with norms and, more precisely, with unconditional norms. We cannot deal with, for
example, inconsistencies between `classification rules' (interpretation rules). To deal with
such inconsistencies, all sorts of consistency-based approaches have been developed, such
as the non-monotonic logic of McDermott and Doyle (1980) and the default logic of Reiter
(1980, 1987). In the following chapter, we will develop a defeasible deontic reasoning
formalism based on preferences, which can deal with conditional norms and inconsistencies
between interpretation rules.
Chapter 7
Defeasible reasoning with legal rules
Over the last few years, several defeasible deontic reasoning formalisms have been developed
to solve the problem of deontic inconsistency. However, these formalisms cannot deal with
some very common forms of deontic reasoning since, e.g., their expressiveness is restricted.
In this chapterl, we establish a priority hierarchy of legal rules to solve the problem of
deontic conflicts, and we present a mechanism to reason about nonmonotonicity of legal
rules over the priority hierarchy. The theory presented here is based on default logic, and is
a modification and extension of Prakken's argumentation framework. It adequately deals
with some shortcomings of other defeasible deontic reasoning approaches.
7.1 Introduction
Logical analysis of reasoning with inconsistent rules is a very relevant area for AI-and-
Law research, since rules used in the legal domain are often conflicting. `Prioritised' rules
received attention in the research on the formalisation of nonmonotonic reasoning, par-
ticularly as a way of modelling the choice criterion in dealing with exceptions (cf. Poole,
1988; Shoham, 1988; Brewka, 1991; Prakken, 1993).
To deal with the inconsistencies, various sorts of consistency-based approaches have
been developed, such as McDermott and Doyle's (1980) nonmonotonic logic and Reiter's
(1980) default logic. But these approaches fail to reason about conflicting norms since they
are all based on non-modal logics. As a way of solving the problems of deontic conflicts,
forms of defeasible reasoning (cf. Pollock, 1987) have been adopted, which provide a
mechanism to establish preference hierarchies of norms and to select a more applicable
norm from among conflicting ones in a specific situation (cf. Alchourrón and Makinson,
1981; Royakkers and Dignum, 1994). The existing formalisations of defeasible deontic
reasoning approaches (Horty, 1994; Tan and Van der Torre, 1994; Ryu, 1995) cannot deal
'Some of these ideas in this chapter were presented eazlier in Royakkers and Dignum (1996).
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with several highly common forms of deontic logic (cf. Prakken, 1993).
A first problem is the absence of the notion of permission in certain approaches (Horty,
1994; Tan and Van der Torre, 1994). In these approaches, the conditional obligation is
represented as O(p~q): `p is obligatory in case of q', and is treated as a normal default; it can
be read as a Reiter default q: p~p: a non-deontic Reiter default. Inherent in this treatment
is the absence of a reasonable Reiter default for the negated obligation (permission).
Another problem is the defeasibility of only a single opposing statement in some ap-
proaches (Horty, 1994; Prakken, 1994; Tan and Van der Torre, 1994). In these approaches,
only couples of statements are considered to check inconsistencies. For instance, take the
three statements O(a), O(~a V b) and ~O(b). No single statement is in conflict with the
other single statements. However, the group of statements O(a) and O(~a V b) implies
O(b) in standard deontic logic, which is in conflict with statement ~O(b).
The third problem is that most approaches (Horty, 1994; Tan and Van der Torre, 1994;
Ryu, 1995) can only deal with defeasible conditionals that are deontic. But deontic defaults
are not the only defaults in legal reasoning. Consider the deontic default a: O(b)~O(b).
With this default, it is very often the case that a is derived by another default rule, e.g.
c: a~a, which is called a`classification rule' or an `interpretation rule'. In the legal domain,
it is accepted that these rules are also defeasible (cf. Hart, 1961). Prakken showed this by
extending Hart's standard example on a park regulation that forbids vehicles to enter the
park:
Not only this rule itself may turn out to be defeasible, for example, if the vehicle
is an ambulance, but also rules on when something counts as a vehicle may be
defeasible: imagine that a court says that objects on wheels that are meant for
normal transport are vehicles: then roller skates used by people on their way
to the office might be recognised as an exception. (Prakken, 1996)
In this chapter, we develop a theory of defeasible deontic reasoning which adequately deals
with the above-mentioned problems. The theory is an extension and modification of the
argumentation framework in default logic developed by Prakken (1993), and Prakken and
Sartor (1995). Further, our theory is an extension of Dung's (1993) theory, which only
considers argumentation frameworks with one kind of conflict between arguments.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 7.2, we give the representation of
legal rules, which we subdivide into rules and conditional norms. Section 7.3 discusses the
argumentation framework for rules. The argumentation framework for norms depending on
rules selected from the argumentation framework for rules is discussed in section 7.4. Here,
we concentrate on defeasibility and violation. We end this chapter with some conclusions.
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7.2 Legal rules: rules and conditional norms
The fundamental logical structure of legal knowledge gives rise to the nonmonotonicity of
legal reasoning (Reiter, 1980; Delgrande, 1988): the consequences that may follow from a
set of legal and factual premises can be invalidated by further information. This means that
rules can be `defeated' by other or new rules and facts. The principal idea of this chapter,
which goes back t.o Rescher (1964), is to allow the rules to be ordered and to use this
ordering in such a way that conflicts can be solved in a logical argumentation framework
using nonmonotonic logic. Such an ordering can often be discerned when considering
the rules in a legal code. The `Lex Superior' principle, for instance, is based on the
general hierarchy of a legal system; the rules are divided along the lines of the hierarchical
structure of the normative system. Rules with a lower rank of priority have to respect
the consequences that follow from a higher ranked rule (see chapter 6). To describe the
ordering between the formulas, we use the following notation. Let ~ and y be legal rules,
then `~ ~ y' means that y is preferred to x; `x ~ y' is an abbreviation of `x ~ y and y~ x';
and `x ~ y' is an abbreviation of `x ~ y and y~ x'. The ordering relation ~ is reflexive
and transitive.
Legal rules, or in any case most of them, subordinate a legal effect to a legal condition.
By legal effect we mean every qualification generated by a legal norm: the ascription of
deontic or normative modalities, status, professional titles, other legal qualities of per-
sons and things. By legal condition we mean every condition to which a legal effect is
subordinated. The legal rules are represented as conditional statements of the type
a1na2l~...na„~B,
where B is the legal effect and al, a2, ..., a„ are the elements of the antecedent: the con-
junction of literals,2 representing the legal condition. If B is a norm: an obligation (O(~))
or a permission (P(~)), with ~ a formula of the propositional logic, then the conditional
statement is called a conditional norm. Thus, the conditional obligation is represented as
al A a2 n... n a„ ~ O(p), instead of O(p~al I~ aZ ... n a„) as in Horty (1994) and Tan and
Van der Torre (1994).3 If B is a literal, then the statement is called a rule.
The statement A~ B has to be interpreted as a normal default according to Reiter's
(1980, 1987) theory, A: B~B: `If A, and it can be consistently assumed B, then we can
infer B.' This means that ~ is not interpreted as the material implication, but as an
inference rule that can be defeated. From A and A~ B, we can infer B unless ~B can be
proven. This representation corresponds to the formalisations usually proposed by legal
theory and legal logic (cf. Sartor, 1993).
ZA literal is any atomic propositional formula and any negation of an atomic propositional formula.
3For a discussion of the problems of the formalisation of the conditional norms, we refer to Alchourrón
(1986).
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In our theory, we distinguish between rules and norms for the following reasons:
~ Rules cannot be violated.
~ The defeasibility of rules is different from the defeasibility of norms (cf. definition
7.3.5 and definition 7.4.8), which is the most important difference.
The most important thing about the difference between rules and norms is not what differ-
ences there are, but simply that there are differences. This is why we discuss our theory on
different levels: first, on the level of rules (section 7.3), and second, on the level of norms
based on a given set of rules (section 7.4).
The set of rules is denoted by W and the set of conditional norms by 0. Furthermore,
we have a factual sentence F representing the factual situation, which consists of back-
ground knowledge and contingent facts. The background knowledge consists of necessary
conditions, for example, a human being is mortal. A set of conditional norms, a set of rules
and a factual sentence is called a deontic context.
Definition 7.2.1 A deontic context T-(0, W, F, ~) consists of a set ~ of conditional
norrns, a set W of rules, a factual propositional sentence F: the conjunction of background
knowledge Fb and contingent facts F~, and an ordering ~ over rules and conditional norms.
7.3 Rules
Facts (formalised by the sentence F) can contain material implications. Rules, however,
are represented by normal defaults written as a conditional statement of the type al n
a2 n... n a„ ~ B, with B the legal effect formalised by a literal. Our theory of defeasible
reasoning for rules is based on four notions:
~ the notion of argument ( definition 7.3.4);
~ the notion of defeating ( definition 7.3.5);
~ the notion of defeasibility chain (definition 7.3.7);
~ the notion of justified, defensible and overruled arguments (definition 7.3.9).
At the end of this section, we define maxirnal-coherent argument sets of rules that we use
for the notion of the applicability of norms and the violation of obligations in section 7.4.
Before we discuss the notion of argument, we give three definitions which we will use
in the sequel.
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Definition 7.3.1 Let F 6e the factual proposátional sentence, V be a set of rules and r a
literal, then V explains r(V U{F} ~ r~ iff
r E U~oG;,
with
Go -{r ~{F} ~ r} and G;~i - G; U{r ~ 3a,nasn...na„~rEV (c; U{F} ~ a;)},
for all i E {0,1,2,...}.
Intuitively, explaining is the same as logical consequence, except that now we deal with
defaults and not with implications.
Definition 7.3.2 Let V be a set of rules, then the consequences of V U{F} (Cons(V U
{F})) is defined as
Cons(V U{F}) :- {r ~ r is a literal and V U{F} ~ r}.
Thus, the Cons relation is a transitive closure of the explaining. It gives the set of all the
literals that can be consistently derived from V and {F}.
Definition 7.3.3 Get V be a set of rules. Then V U{F} is coherent iff
~~r is a literal(r E Cons(V U{F}) n~r E Cons(V U{F})).
The notion of argument can now be defined as follows:
Definition 7.3.4 Let M C W, ~ a literal and M U{F} coherent. Then M explains ~
minimally iff
~ {F} U M ~ ~ and
~ ~3~iEM({F} U M `{~1}) ~ ~.
We call M a minimally explaining set or an argument. The set of all arguments ás denoted
as Nt. The ~-relevant set of W, denoted by [~]J1~t, is the set of all arguments in .M that
explain ~ minimally.
Ml is a subargument of M iff Ml C M and Ml is an argument. If there is an argument
for ~, thus [~]Nl ~~, then ~ is called an outcome.
Our definition of `defeat' is based on the idea that, in order to defeat an argument, a
counterargument can point its attack at the argument itself, but also at one of its proper
subarguments, since an argument cannot be stronger than its weakest link (cf. Prakken
and Sartor, 1995).
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Definition 7.3.5 Let Ml E[~~JVf and Mz E[~')~1~1. Then Ml is defeated by Mz (M~ ~`
Mz) íff
3~i~ásEM,3~~~~4EMy{~3 ~ ~4 } ~1 ~ ~2} and {(py} U {(bq} U {F} is inconsistent.
Thus, an argument Mz defeats an argument M~ iff M~ and Mz have contradictory con-
clusions ~z and ~q with respect to the factual sentence F, and the rule ~~~q E Mz
(responsible for the conflict) does not have a lower priority than the rule ~1 ~~Z E MI.
Note that {~z} U{F} and {~q} U{F} are consistent, which directly follows from definition
7.3.4.
Relation ~" is not transitive and not asymmetric. It is possible that Ml ~' Mz and
Mz ~' Ml both hold. The following example illustrates this point:
Example 7.3.6
(1)a~b
(,~) c ~ ~a
(3)d~e
(.~) b ~ ~c
(5) e ~ c
F: f n(f -~d)ne
with (5) ~ (4) ~ (3) ~ (2) ~ (1).
Let Ml -{e ~ c, c~ ~a} and Mz -{d ~ a, a~ b, b~~c}. Then Ml ~" Mz, since
e~c~b~~c,andMz-~`Ml,sinced~a~c~~a.
Definition 7.3.7 A defeasibility chaín is a sequence of arguments in M:
Ml~'Mz~'...~'M„
with the following conditions:
~ t1k,l-i,z,...,nn~~~Mk ~ Mi;
' ~~Mnf1E~1{(MIi...,Mn ~ Mnfl) n (Mn ~' Mnfl)}.
We deftne Ch(~l~t) as the set of all defeasibility chains of arguments in Jl~l.
The first condition ensures that cycles in defeasibility chains are avoided. Suppose that
Ml ~' Mz and Mz ~' M3i with Ml C M3. We would thus end up with the endless chain
Ml ~' Mz ~' M3 ~" Mz ~' M3.... This would also be accomplished by `~' instead of
`~'. The reason why indeed we need `~' is to satisfy the weakest link principle, which will
become clear in example 7.3.17.
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The second condition provides that a chain stops if there is no `stronger' argument than
the last argument in the chain.
Take the example above, then
Ch(~l)-{{d~a,a~b} ~' {e~c,c~~a},
{d~a,a~b,b~~c} ~' {e~c,c~~a},
{e ~ c} ~` {d ~ a, a ~ b, b ~ ~c},
{d ~ a} ~` {e ~ c,c ~ ~a},
{e~c,c~~a} ~' {d~a,a~b,b~~c}}.
Definition 7.3.8 Ch(M) is the set of ald defeasibility chains in Ch(.M) starting with M.
The defeasibility chains in Ch(.M) take the set of all possible arguments and their mu-





A justified argument is a`winning' argument. Such an argument can be defeated by
another argument, but that argument will be overruled. An overruled argument is a`losing'
argument. A defensible argument is an argument that is neither justified nor overruled. In
other words, an `undeciding' argument.
Definition 7.3.9 Let M E N1. Then
~ M is a justified argument iff Ch(M) -{M} or for all chains M-~' Ml ~` ... ~'
M„ E Ch(Nt) it holds that
n is even n~3~y~E,~.~M„ ~' M'n
dk is even(Mk rs a justified argument assuming M is a justified
argument).
~ M is an overruled argument iff there is a chain M~" Ml ~' ... ~' M„ E Ch(~l~t)
with
n is odd n~~,y~E,~.~M„ ~' M'.
4The tetms justified, overruled and defensible arguments were introduced by Prakken and
Sartot (1995).
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~ M ís a defensible argument iff M is neither a justified argument nor an overruled
argument.
Note that M„ in the chains of definition 7.3.9 is a justified argument, since Ch(M„) -
{M„}, which is equivalent to ~3;y~E,~,~M„ ~` M'. The condition in the definition of a
justified argument M that all arguments M~ with k is even are justified assuming M is a
justified argument is necessary, since the justification of Mk can depend on M (see example
7.3.11). In other words, `if it cannot be proven whether Mk is justified or not, then M~
should be justified assuming that M is justified.'
Let M~` Ml ~' ... ~' M„ be a chain in Ch(~1~1), then we call the arguments M; with
i is odd odd arguments, and the arguments M and M; with i is even even arguments.
In a defeasibility chain M~' Ml ~' ... ~` M„ with n is even (odd) and Ch(M„) -
{M„}, we stipulate that the odd ( even) arguments are the attacked arguments and the
even (odd) arguments the non-attacked arguments. The chain ends with M,,, so Mi-1 is
an attacked argument, because it is defeated by a non-attacked argument. M„-2 is not
attacked, because it is defeated by an attacked argument ( Mn-1), and so on. For example,
M is overruled if Ml is a non-attacked argument and this follows if n is odd. The following










with (9) ~ (8) ~ ... ~ (1).
Let
M1-{a~b}





1. Ch(Ml) - {Ml}, thus Ml is a justified argument.
2. Ch(M2) -{MZ ~' Ml}, thus MZ is an overruled argument, since the chain contains
an even number of arguments and Ch(Ml) -{Ml}.
3. Ch(M3) -{M3 ~' MS ~' M4 ~` M2 ~' Ml}. M3 is not overruled, since otherwise
the chain contains an even number of arguments. It depends on argument M4 whether
M3 is justified or defensible.
4. Ch(M4) -{M4 ~' MZ -~' Ml, M4 ~' M3 ~' MS}. M4 is not a justified argument,
since Ch(MS) ~{MS}. M4 is not an overruled argument, since there is no chain
in Ch(M4) with an even number of arguments. Thus, M4 is a defensible argument.
Hence, from the chain in Ch(M3) it also follows that M3 is a defensible argument.
5. Ch(MS) -{M5 ~' M4 ~' MZ ~' M1iM5 ~' M4 ~' M3}. MS is an overruled
argument, since the chain MS ~' M9 ~ M2 ~` Ml contains an even number of
arguments and Ch(Ml) - {Ml}.
In definition 7.3.9 of a justified argument M, the even arguments have to be justified
assuming M is justified. The condition `assuming M is justified' is necessary since other-
wise we cannot determine whether an argument is justified or defensible in certain cases.
Consider the next example.
Example 7.3.11
(i) i ~ ~d
(2) b ~ ~ h
(~~
(4)
















M~c ~ d, d ~ ~b};
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Mz - {e ~ f, f ~ ~d};
M3-{g~h,h~~f};
M4-{a~6,b~~h};
MS - {i ~ ~d};
Ms-{j~~h}.
Suppose that we state that the
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cven arguments have to be justified instead of the even
in the definition 7.3.9 of a justifiedarguments have to be justified assuming M is justified
argument M. Then, we cannot determine whether Mz and M4 are justified or defensible
arguments. The set of defeasibility chains starting with M4 is
C h ( M4 ) - { M4 ~' Mi ~ ~ Mz ~' Ms ~ ` Ms, Ma ~' Mi ~' MS }.
M4 is not an overruled argument, since both chains contain an odd number of arguments.
Suppose M4 is a justified argument, then the following three conditions have to be satisfied:
1. Ch(MS) - {MS};
2. Ch(Ms) - {Ms};
3. Mz is a justified argument.
The first two conditions are satisfied. For the third condition, we have to analyse the set
of defeasibility chains starting with Mz:
Ch( Mz )-{ Mz ~' Ma ~' Ma ~' Mi ~' 11rs, Mz ~' M3 ~' Ms }.
Mz is not an overruled argument, since both chains contain an odd number of arguments.
Suppose Mz is a justified argument, then the following three conditions have to be satisfied:
1. Ch(MS) - {Ms};
2. Ch(Ms) - {Ms};
3. M4 is a justified argument.
Again, the first two conditions are satisfied. Thus, whether Mz is a justified argument or
not, depends on the `status' of argument M4i and vice versa. Hence, we cannot find out
whether Mz and M4 are justified or defensible arguments. To overcome this problem, we
have set the condition that the even arguments in the chains are justified assuming M is
justified:
According to definition 7.3.9, argument M4 is justified if
1. Ch(M5) - {Ms};
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2. Ch(M6) - {M6};
3. M2 is justified assuming that M9 is justified.
Argument M2 is justified assuming M4 is justified, since the three conditions mentioned
above, i.e., Ch(MS) -{M5}, Ch(Ms) - {M6} and M4 is a justified argument, are now
satisfied. Thus, M2 is a justified argument assuming that M4 is justified. Hence, M4 is a
justified argument.
Analogously, we can show that M2 is also a justified argument. Intuitively, this is
correct: argument M4 (Mz) is only defeated by argument Ml (M3), and, in turn, Ml (M3)
is defeated by argument MS (M6), which is not defeated. Thus, Ml (M3) is an overruled
argument, and cannot invalidate an argument.
Proposition 7.3.12
1. Let M be a justified argument. Then all odd arguments in the chains of Ch(M) are
overruled arguments.
2. Let M be an overruled argument. Then there is a chain in Ch(M) where all even
arguments are overruled or defensible.
Proof
1. Let M be a justified argument. Then for all chains M~' Ml ~" ... ~` M„ in
Ch(M), it holds that n is even and ~3~y~E,~,~M„ -~' M'. Let Mk with k is odd be an
argument of a chain M-~' Ml ~' ... ~' M„ in Ch(M). Then this chain without
the first k arguments, thus M~ ~' Mk}1 ~' ... ~' M,,, is a chain in Ch(Mk) which
satisfies the conditions of an overruled argument Mk, since the chain contains an even
number of arguments and Ch(M„) - M,,. Thus, all odd arguments are overruled
arguments.
2. Let M be an overruled argument. Then there is a chain M~" Ml ~' ... ~' M„
with n is odd and ~~~y~E,~,~M„ ~' M'. Suppose an even argument Mk is justified,
then the chain M~` Ml ~' ... ~' M„ without the first k arguments, i.e., Mk ~"
Mk~~ ~' ... ~' M„ is a chain in Ch(Mk) and does not satisfy the conditions for a
justified argument Mk, since the chain contains an even number of arguments. Thus,
the even arguments in such chains in Ch(M) are overruled or defensible.
The condition that all even arguments in the chains of Ch(M) with M being a justified
argument have to be justified arguments, is necessary, since otherwise we obtain some
undesirable results:
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Example 7.3.13
(1) a ~ ~6
(.2) c ~ a
(~) b ~ ~d
(4) e~b
(5) ~9 ~ ~f
(6) d ~ ~h
(7) f ~ d
(8) i ~ f
(9) h ~ ~j
(10) k~h
(11) 7 ~ ~9
(1~) r ~ j
F:cneninknl
with (12) ~ (11) ~ ... ~ (1).
LetM1-{a~~b,c~a};
M2-{b~~d,e~b};
Ms - {~9 ~ ~f~J ~ ~9~ t ~ 7};
M4-{d~~h,f ~d,i~ f};
M5-{h~~j,k~h}.
Ch ( M3) -{ M3 ~' MS ~' M4 -~' M2 ~' Mi} and Ch(Mi) - {Mi}, thus without the
condition that all even arguments have to be justified arguments, M3 would be a justified
argument instead of a defensible argument, since M4 is not a justified argument, but
defensible.s Suppose M3 is justified. The outcomes of argument M4 and its subarguments
are ~h, d and f, and the outcome of M3 is ~f. Thus, if we decide to use argument M4i
there is a conflict with the `winning' (justified) argument M3i we cannot use M4, since we
need the outcome f to derive ~h (the outcome of M4), which is in conflict with f, the
outcome of the justified argument M3. Thus, it is counter-intuitive to call M4 defensible
and M3 justified. However, M3 is a defensible argument. Now we have to decide which of
the two arguments will be used: both arguments are defensible.
SArgument M4 is defensible: the set of defeasibility chains starting with My is Ch(Mq) -{Mq ~'
MZ ~' MI,M4 ~' M3 ~ MS}. Since MS is an overruled argument ( the chain MS ~' M4 ~' MZ ~' Ml
satisfies the conditions for the overruled argument MS), the chain M4 ~' M3 ~' MS does not satisfy the
conditions for a justified argument M4. Thus, M4 is not a justified argument. M4 is not an overtuled argu-
ment either, since neither of the two chains in Ch(M4) satisfies the conditions for an overruled argument
M4. Thus, M4 is a defensible argument.
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Corollary 7.3.14
1. A justified argument can only be defeated 6y an overruled argument.
2. !f there is no justified argument, then there is no overruled argument.
~. There is no justified argument i„~j all arguments are defensible.
.~. There is a justified argument iff there is a defeasibility chain with one argument.
Proof
1. Let M be a justified argument, and defeated by Ml. We have to prove that Ml is
an overruled argument. For all chains M ~` M, ...~' M„ in Ch(M) it holds that
n is even and Ch(Mn) -{Mn}. For all these chains without the first argument M,
i.e., Ml ~' ... ~' M,,, it holds that they are elements of Ch(~1~t) and satisfy the
conditions of an overruled argument. Thus, Ml is an overruled argument.
2. Suppose that there is no justified argument. Then there is no chain M~" Ml -~"
... ~' M„ in Ch(Nt) with Ch(M„) - {M„}. Hence, there is no overruled argument.
The converse does not hold. For example, let W-{a ~ b} and a a fact. Then the
only argument is {a ~ b}, which is justified.
3. Suppose that there is no justified argument. Then there is no overruled argument,
thus all arguments are defensible.
Evidently, if all arguments are defensible, then there are no justified arguments.
4. Suppose that M is a justified argument. Then for all chains M~' Ml ~` ... ~' M~
in Ch(M) it holds that Ch(Mn) -{M„}. Thus, there is a defeasibility chain with
one argument.
If there is a chain with one argument, say M, then M is a justified argument. Hence,
there is a justified argument.
The converse of 7.3.14.1 does not hold: an overruled argument need not be defeated by a
justified argument.
Example 7.3.15
(1~ a ~ b








(6~ g ~ e
(7~
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F: ancn fngnh
with (7) ~ (6) ~ ... ~ (1).
LetM1-{a~b};
M2-{c~d};
M3 - {~b ~ ~e, f ~ ~b};
M9-{g~e,e~~d};
M5-{h~d}.
Then Ch(MS) -{MS ~' M4 ~` M3 ~' M1iM5 ~' M4 ~' M2}. MS is an overruled
argument, since chain MS ~` M4 ~` M3 -C' Ml contains an even number of arguments
and Ch(MI) -{Ml}. Further, MS is only defeated by argument M4, which is an overruled
argument, since MQ ~' M2 E Ch(M4) and Ch(MZ) -{MZ}. Thus, an overruled argument
can be defeated by an overruled argument.
The following proposition shows that definition 7.3.9 satisfies the weakest link principle.
Proposition 7.3.16 All subarguments of a justified argument are justified arguments.
Proof. Suppose that M is a justified argument and M' is a subargument of M. We have
to prove that M' is a justified argument, and without loss of generality we assume that
M' is a`largest' subargument of M, i.e., ~3~y~~E,~,~M' C M" C M. For if this argument
is justified, we can repeat this process for M' to prove that all subarguments of M' are
justified. Suppose that M' is not a justified argument, then M' is an overruled or a
defensible argument.
~ Suppose that M' is an overruled argument. Then there is a chain M' ~' Ml ~' ...~`
M„ with Ch(M„) -{M„}, and n is odd. However, then the chain M~" Ml ~'
... ~" M„ is a chain of Ch(M), which is in contradiction with the assumption that
M is a justified argument.
~ Suppose now that M' is a defensible argument. Then there is a chain M' ~' M~ ~'
... ~` M„ and Ch(M„) ~{M„}. Now, the chain M~' Ml ~" ... ~' M„ is not
an element of Ch(M), but part of a chain in Ch(M). M„ can only be followed by
M',thusM~'M~ ~`...~'M„~"M'~`M{~"...~"M~,withCh(Mi)-
{M~ }. However, now it follows that M' is an overruled argument (if it is an odd
argument in the chain (proposition 7.3.12.1)) or a justified argument (if it is an even
argument (definition 7.3.9)), which is in contradiction with the assumption that M'
is defensible.
Thus, M' is a justified argument.
In definition 7.3.7, we chose operator `~' instead of `~', otherwise the weakest link princíple
is not satisfied. The following example illustrates this point:
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Example 7.3.1?
(I) d ~ ~e
(2) e ~ ~b
(,~) a ~ b
(~) 6 ~ ~c
(5) c ~ e
(6) f ~ c
F: andn f
with (6) ~ (5) ~ ... ~ (1).




Then, Ch(M3) -{M3 ~' M2 ~' Ml} and Ch(Ml) - {Ml}, thus Ml and M3 are justified
arguments. M4 is a subset of the justified argument M3i thus also justified (proposition
7.3.16).
Suppose now that we use operator `~' instead of `~', then subargument M4 of M3
is not justified, since the chain M4 ~' M2 -~' M3 would be an element of Ch(M4) and
Ch(M3) ~{M3}. Thus, the weakest link principle is not satisfied if we use operator `~'.
The following three problems form the main problems in the literature on defeasible
arguments. We will show that these problems can be adequately dealt with in the theory
as it follows from definition 7.3.9.
Example 7.3.18 The inter~rreediate conclusion
(1) a ~ b
(,2) c ~ ~b
(3)d~a
F: cnd
with (3) -~ (2) ~ (1).
Here, a conflict arises between rules (1) and (2). By definition 7.3.5, the choice is made
between the rules which are certain to be in conflict with each other. Rule (3) with
intermediate conclusion a, necessary to derive outcome b, is irrelevant to the conflict.
The minimally explaining sets (arguments) are Ml -{d ~ a,a~ b}, M2 -{c ~~b}
and M3 - {d ~ a}. The sets of defeasibility chains are Ch(M~) -{Ml}, Ch(M2) -
{M2 -~` Mt} and Ch(M3) -{M3}. Ml and M3 are justified, since they are not defeated
by any argument. M2 is overruled, because it is defeated by justified argument Ml. Thus,
a and b are the outcomes.
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Example 7.3.19 lterated conflácts
(1)c~a
(2) d ~ ~a
(3) ~a ~ ~b
(~) a ~ b
F: cnd
with (4) ~ (3) ~ (2) ~ (1).
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Here, a conflict arises between rules (1) and (2) and between rules (3) and (4). Rules
(1) and (2) have intermediate conclusions a and ~a for their final conclusions ~b and b.
This type of problem is called iterated conflácts: conflicts on both intermediate and final
conclusions.
The minimally explaining sets are Ml -{c ~ a}, Mz -{d ~~a}, M3 -{d ~
~a, ~a ~~b} and M4 -{c ~ a,a~ b}. The sets of defeasibility chains are Ch(Ml) -
{Ml}, Ch(M2) - {M2 ~' Ml}, Ch(M3) - {M3 ~" Ml} and Ch(M4) - {M4 ~" M3 ~'
Ml}. Ml and M4 are justified arguments. M2 and M3 are overruled arguments, because
they are defeated by justified argument Ml: a and b are the outcomes. Note that M4 is
defeated by M3i though not overruled, since M3 is an overruled argument (defeated by
M, ).
Example 7.3.20 Circular corz,flácts
(1)a~b
(2) c ~ ~b




with (5) ~ (4) ~ (3) ~ (2) ~ (1).
Here, we have conflicts between rules (1) and (2), rules (3) and (4) and rules (2) and (5).
The applicability of rule (1) depends on rule (4) with intermediate conclusion a. Rule
(4) is in conflict with a higher rule, (3), (iterated conflict), and the applicability of (3)
depends on (5), which is in conflict with (2). Rule (2) is in conflict with rule (1), and the
applicability of (1) depends on rule (4), and so on. This will never stop, therefore we call
this the problem of circular confíicts.
The minimally explaining sets are M~ -{d ~ a,a~ b}, M2 -{c ~~b}, M3 -
{d ~ 6, 6~~a}, M4 -{d ~ a} and MS - {d ~ b}. The sets of defeasibility chains
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are Ch(Ml) - {M1 ~` M3 ~' MZ}, Ch(M2) - {MZ ~' Ml ~' M3}, Ch(M3) - {M3 ~`
M2~"Ml},Ch(M4)-{M4~'M3~'MZ}andCh(MS)-{M5~'M2~'Ml}. Allthe
arguments are defensible since there is no justified argument. Thus, b, ~b, ~a and a are
the outcomes.
Definition 7.3.21 Let J1it" be the set of ald defensible and justified arguments in .M. Then
w is a maximal-coherent argument set iff w is the set {Ml, M2, ..., M„} of arguments in
~1~1', such that
~ Cons(Ml U M2 U ... U M„ U{F}) is consistent and
~~3MEM'`w(Cons(Ml U M2 U... U Mn U {F} U M) is consistent).
W is deftned as the set of all maximal-coherent argument sets w C ,M. Out(w) is defined
as the set of all outcomes of the arguments M E w.
Consider example 7.3.20. Then W-{wl, w2, w3} with wl -{Ml, M4, MS}, wz -
{M2i M4} and w3 - {M3i MS}. It follows that Out(wl) -{a, b}, Out(w2) -{a, ~b}
and Out(w3) -{~a, b}. There is no w E W with Out(w) -{~a, ~b}, since M3 is the
argument for ~a and M3 U{F} ~ b. Thus, if ~a E Out(w), then b must also be an element
in Out(w), since otherwise we cannot derive ~a: the literal b is necessary to derive ~a. In
other words, if an argument M is a subset of a maximal-coherent argument set w, then all
outcomes of the subarguments of M are elements of the set Out(w).
Corollary 7.3.22 Let w E W. Then for all justified arguments M in ~1~t it holds that
M E w.
The following definition is needed for the definítion of arguments of norms in the next
section.
Definition 7.3.23 Let W be the set of rules, w E W and w -{Ml, M2i ..., M~}, then
W(w) is defined as the maximal-coherent set of rules in W with respect to w and F. Let
~ ~ ~1 E W, then
~~~1 E W(w) iff {~ ~ ~1} U Ml U M2 U ... U M„ U{F} is coherent.
Note that all rules in the arguments in w are in W(w).
Example 7.3.24
(1) c ~ a
(2) d ~ ~a
(,~) d ~ b
(4) ~c ~ ~b
F: cnd
with (4) ~ (3) ~ (2) ~ (1).
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Then w - {{c ~ a}, {d ~ b}} and W(w) - {c ~ a, ~c ~ ~6, d ~ b}. Rule d ~ ~a
is not an element of W(w), since the rule is incoherent with {c ~ a} U{d ~ b} U{F}.
Furthermore, note that ~c ~~b is an element of W(w), though not of an argument in w.
We will see in the following section that such a rule can be applicable for the derivation of
a certain norm.
7.4 Norms
Defeasible deontic reasoning is based on five notions: the notion of applicable norms based
on a set w E W(definition 7.4.1) and the same four notions of defeasible reasoning for
rules (definitions 7.4.3, 7.4.8, 7.4.10 and 7.4.12).
We also define maximal-coherent argument sets for norms that we will use for the
definition of violated obligations in subsection 7.4.2. At the end of this section, we give an
example of defeasible deontic reasoning with violated norms.
Definition 7.4.1 Let w E W, w-{Ml, Mz, ..., M„} and al n az n... n an ~~ be a
conditional norm in 0. Then .
~ E 0(w, F) iff `d;E{i,z,...,n}MI U Mz U ... U M„ U{F} ~ a;.
~ is called an applicable norm in 0 with respect to w and F. Thus, 0(w, F) is the set of
all applicable norms in 0 with respect to w and F.
Example 7.4.2
W: (1Ja~b 0: (1')b~0(~a) F: anenh
(,lJb~c (,2'Jdnh~O(ivl)
(~i) e ~ d (3'J g ~ O(b)
(4)f~g
(5J h ~ ~c






It is easy to see that Ml, Mz and M3 are justified arguments, since they are not defeated
by an argument. M4 is defeated by Mzi thus M4 is an overruled argument. There is one
maximal-coherent argument set w: {Ml, Mzi M3}. Now we can give the applicable norms:
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1. O(~a) E 0(w, F), since Ml U MZ U M3 U {F} ~ 6;
2. O(iVl)EO(w,F),sinceM1UM2UM3U{F} ~dandM1UM2UM3U{F} ~h;
3. O(b) ~ 0(w, F), since Ml U M2 U M3 U {F} ~ g.
Thus, 0(w, F) -{O(~a), O(i V l)}.
For 0(w, F), we use SDL with the axiom schemata and inference rule given in chapter 1.
Furthermore, we add the following inference rule to SDL:s
(ROM2)
0(Pt ) i ~(P2 ) i. .. v 0(Pn ) , P~ n PZ n... n pn ~ 9
O(q)
Analogous with the definition of arguments for rules, we define arguments for norms.
Definition 7.4.3 Let N C 0(w, F), ~ a norm and N U {F6} U W(w) consistent. Then N
explains zli minimally iff
.{F6} U W(w) U N~ z(i and
~~3~iEN{F6} U W(w) U N`{~(il} F- ~i.
We call N a minimally explainíng set or an argument. The set of all arguments will be
denoted as N(w, F). The z~i-relevant set of 0(w, F), denoted by [~]N(w, F) is the set of
all arguments ihat explain ~i minimally.
Let N C N(w, F). If there is an argument for ~i, thus [~].~V ~ 0, then ~i is called an
outcome.
We do not use F, but F6 in this definition, because otherwise we would derive ridiculous
conclusions. Consider the following example.
Example 7.4.4
(I) O(a): It is obligatory to go to school.
(2) O(b): !t is obligatory to behave.
F- F~: a n~b: You go to school and you do not óehave,
with (2) ~ (1).
Now we can derive 0(~b) from O(a) and F~, because {F~} ~ a-~ ~b and by (ROM)
O(a) --~ O(~b). Thus, if we use F instead of F6i then {O(a)} would be an argument for
the outcome O(~6), which is not a desirable result.
6For a brief discussion of this rule, see section 7.5.
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Definition ?.4.5 Let N C N(w, F) and Nl, N2 E N. Then Nl and N2 are in conflict iff
{Fb} U W(w) U NI F- ~(i and {Fb} U W(w) U N2 ~~~i.
Example 7.4.6
(1) O(a v b)
(2) O(~a)
(3) O(c V ~b)
(4) o(,e)
with (4) ~ (3) ~ (2) ~ (1).
Let Nl -{O(a V 6),O(c V ~b),O(~c)} and N2 - {O(~a)} be arguments in N. Then Nl
is an argument for O(a) and N2 an argument for ~O(a), since O(~a) -~ ~O(a) is deduced




(2) ~ (1) and W(w) - {a ~ b}.
Let N3 -{O(a}} and N4 - {O(~b)} be arguments in N. Then N3 is an argument for
O(b), since {a ~ b} U N3 f- O(b) and N4 is an argument for ~O(b). Thus, N3 and N9 are
in conflict.
7.4.1 Defeasibility
Because the arguments in N(w, F) can be in conflict, we resolve these deontic conflicts
by adopting defeasible reasoning. The defeasibility of norms in ~(w, F) determines the
validity of these norms. The validity depends on the rules in w. For instance, let 0(w, F) -
{O(a),O(b)}, O(b) ~ O(a) and w-{a ~~b}. Then {D(a)} is an argument for ~O(b),
since w U{O(a)} ~~O(b). Now we say that {O(a)} defeats {O(b)}, and that O(b) is not
valid. Suppose that w-~, then O(a) and 0(b) are both valid, because {O(a)} and {O(b)}
are not in conflict.
Definition 7.4.8 Let N~ and NZ be argurnents. Then Nl is defeated by NZ (Nl ~' N2)
iff Nl and N2 are in conflict and
~biEN~d~ENy Wl ~ 4'2.
The main difference between this definition and definition 7.3.5 is that here we look at
the statements of the two arguments with the lowest priority, and in definition 7.3.5 we
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looked at the statements of the two arguments with conflicting conclusions. Note that it
is possible that Nl ~' N2 and N2 ~' Nl both hold, but only if the statements with the
lowest priority of the two arguments have the same priority. ~` is not transitive and not
asymmetric.
Example 7.4.9 Consider example 7..~.6. Nl is defeated 6y N2, since O(~c) has a lower
priority than all the norms in N2: O(~c) ~ O(~a).
Now consider example 7.~.7. N4 is defeated by N3i since O(~b) ~ O(a). If (1) ~(2), then
N3 ~` N4 and N4 -~' N3.
The following three definitions for arguments in N concerning defeasibility chains, Ch(N)
and justified, defensible and overruled arguments are exactly the same as the definitions
for arguments in N(cf. definitions 7.3.7, 7.3.8 and 7.3.9).
Definition 7.4.10 Let N C N(w, F). A defeasibility chain is a sequence of arguments in
N: N, ~' N2 -C` ... ~' N„ with the following conditions:
~ dk,(-1,2,...,nnkGlNk ~ N!i
~ ~3NnfiEN{(N1i...,Nn ~ Nnti) ~ (Nn ~' Nnti)}.
We define Ch(N) as the set of all defeasibility chains in N.
Definition 7.4.11 Let N C N(w, F). Then Ch(N) is the set of all defeasibility chains
in Ch(N) startíng with N. -
Definition 7.4.12 Let N E N(w, F). Then
~ N is a justified argument iff Ch(N) -{N} or for all chains N -~` Nl ~' ... -~`
N„ E Ch(N) it holds that
n is even n ~3N~E,VN„ ~` N'~
dk is even(Nk is a justi,fied argument assuming N is a justifïed
argument).
~ N is an overruled argument iff there is a chain N~' Nl ~' ... ~' N„ E Ch(N)
n is odd n~~~nE,vNn ~` N'.
~ N is a defensible argument iff N is neither a justáfied argument nor an overruled
argument.
Note that ~~N~ENNn ~' N' is equivalent to Ch(N„) -{N„}.
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Example 7.4.13 Consider example 7. ~.6. Let N-{Nl, N2i ..., N6}, with
Ni - {O(aV b),O(cV ~b),O(~c)} E [O(a)]N
NZ - {O(~a)} E [~O(a)]N
N3 - {O(aV b),O(~a)} E [O(b)]N
N4 - {O(cV ~b),O(~c)} E [~O(b)]N
NS -{O(a V b), O(c V ~b), O(~a)} E[O(c)]N
Ns - {O(~c)} E [~O(c)]N
Argument Nl is defeated by justified argument N2i since O(~c) ~ O(~a) and Ch(NZ) -
{N2}, thus Nl is an overruled argument. N3 and NS are justified arguments, since
Ch(N3) -{N3} and Ch(NS) -{NS}. N4 and Ns are overruled arguments, since NQ ~`
N3 E Ch(N4) and Ns ~' NS E Ch(Ns).
If (4) ~(3) ~(2) ~(1), then NS and N6 are defensible arguments, since Ch(NS) -{NS ~'
N6} and Ch(N6) - {N6 ~' NS}.
Example 7.4.14 Consáder example 7. ~.7. N4 is defeated by justified argument N3 and
Ch(N3) -{N3}, thus N4 is an overruled argument.
Definition 7.4.15 Let N C N(w, F) and N' be the set of all defensible and justified argu-
ments in N. Then o is a maximal-consistent argument set iff o is the set {Nl, NZ, ..., Nn }
of arguments in N', such that
~ Nl U Nz U... U Nn U {F6} U W(w) is consistent and
~~3NEN~`o(Nl U N2 U... U Nn U {F6} U W(w) U N is consistent).
C7(N) is defined as the set of all maximal-consistent argument sets o. Out(o) is defined as
the set of all outcomes of the arguments N E o.
Corollary 7.4.16 Let o E C~(N). Then for all justified arguments N in N it holds that
N E o.
Example 7.4.17 Consider example 7.4.13 with the justífied arguments N2i N3 and N5.
There is one maximal-consistent argument set o: o-{N2, N3, NS}.
If (4) ~(3) ~(2) ~(1), then NS and Ns are defensible (see example 7.4.13~. Then
there are two maximal-consistent argument sets: ol -{NZ, N3i NS} and o2 -{N2, N3, N6},
thus O(N) - {ol, 02}.
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7.4.2 Violation
An obligation is violated if and only if the obligation is not fulfilled. In SDL, we can
represent the violated obligation by O(p) n~p. We define the violated obligation in our
theory analogously.
Definition 7.4.18 Let N C N(w, F), o E O(N), o-{Nl, ..., N„}, w-{MI, ..., M~}
and Nl U NZ U .. . U Nn U W(w) U{Fy} I- O(~). The norm O(~) is violated iff Ml U M2 U
... U M~ U {F} ~~~. The set of violated norms will be denoted as V(o).
Example 7.4.19 Let o-{{O(a)},{O(b)}}, W(w) -{a ~ c}, {F6} - w - 0 and F~:
~6 n~c. Then O(c) E V(o), since {O(a)} U{O(b)} U W(w) ~ O(c) and {F} F- ~c and
O(b) E V(o), since {O(a)} U{O(b)} U W(w) ~ O(b) and {F} ~~b.
Definition 7.4.20 Let N C N(w, F), o E D(N) and V (o) be the set of violated norms.
Then N E o is a violated argument iff
~~EylolN U W(w) U {F6} ~ ~.
N(V(o)) is the set of all the violated arguments with respect to V(o).
Example 7.4.21 Consider example 7.4.6:
(1) O(a V b)
(~~ C(~a)
(3) O(c V ~b)
(~) O(~c)
with (4) ~ (3) ~ (2) -~ (1), W(w) - {F6} - Ql and F~: ~c. Sv.ppose fvrther (see eaample
7. ~.13J that N-{Nl, N2i ..., N6}, with
Nl - {O(aV b),O(cV ~b), O(~c)} E [O(a)]N
NZ - {O(~a)} E [-~O(a)]N
N3 - {O(aV b),O(~a)} E [O(b)]N
N4 - {O(cv ~b),O(~c)} E [-~O(b)]N
NS -{O(a V b), O(c V~b), O(~a)} E [O(c)]N
Ns - {O(~c)} E [~O(c)]N.
From examples 7.4.13 and 7.4.17 it follows that o- {NZ, N3i NS}. O(c) E V(o), since
NS F O(c) and {F} ~~c. Therefore, NS is a violated argument. NZ and N3 are no violated
arguments, since NZ If 0(c) and N3 F~ O(c).
Definition 7.4.22 Let N C N(w, F) and ~il, ...,~„ E 0(w, F). Then
N`' {~,, ... ,~„} - U{N~N E N n d;-,,...,,,~; ~ N}.
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Thus JV ` ' {zGl, ...,~„} is the set of arguments in ~V without the arguments containing a
norm of the set {~~, . . . ~„ }.
Example 7.4.23 A programme commíttee requires that conference submissions (papers~
are sent in by mail. However, if your paper is not sent by maíl, then your paper should be
sent by fax. And if no faxmachine is available, one should try to send it by e-mail. The
facts are that the paper is sent by fax and if you send your paper by fax, then you do not
send the paper by e-mail. The formalisation is as follows:
W: (1J email ~~mail ~: (1'~ O(maid) F~: fax
(2~ f ax ~~mail (2'~ ~mail ~ O(f ax) F6 : f ax - ~ ~email
(~'~ ~fax ~ O(email)
with (2) -~ (1) and (3') ~ (2') ~ (1').
Let us consider this example. If the paper is sent by mail, then there is no violation; this
is the best situation. However, the norm O(mail) is violated, because the paper is not
sent by mail. Then the second-best situation is that your paper is sent by fax. We can
formalise this process as follows:
Out(w) - {~mail}, W(w) - { fax ~ ~mail,email ~ ~mail}
0(w,F) - {O(mail),O(fax)}
JV(w,F) -{N1iN2}, with Nl -{O(mail)} and NZ -{O(fax)}.
Note that 0(email) is not an element of ~(w, F), since it is not an applicable norm:
wU{F} ~~fax.
Nl is a justified argument, since Ch(Nl) -{Nl}, and NZ is an overruled argument,
since it is defeated by Nl. Nl and NZ are in conflict, since {Fb} U W(w) U Nl ~- O(mail)
and {F6} U W(w) U NZ f- ~O(rnail) and O(fax) ~ O(mail). Thus, o- {Nl}.
The norm O(mail) has a higher priority than the norm O(fax). However, the norm
O(mail) is violated:
V(o) - {O(mail)} and (N(w,F))(V(o)) - {NI}.
Now we consider the norms again without the violated norm, since they can become valid
because of the violation of the norm O(mail). Let N- N(w, F) `' {O(mail)}. Then
N-{Nz}. Argument N2 is a justified argument. Let o' E O(J1r), then it follows that
o' -{N2}. N2 (with O(fax) as an outcome) is a justified and non-violated argument with




In this chapter, we presented a theory of defeasible deontic reasoning dealing with some
very common problems of other approaches:
~ defeasibility between groups of conditional norms;
~ the combination of defeasibility of rules and norms;
~ the absence of the notion of permission.
However, we do not claim that our theory is completely free from the above-mentioned
problems. Adopting defeasible reasoning for non-deontic constraints (rules) is not trivial,
like the study of the validity of deducing O(b) from O(a) and a~ b. This corresponds
with the choice of rule (ROM2):
o(~~),o(~~),...,o(~n),p~ nn2 n... nP„ ~ 9
o(q) ~
However, it is also possible to add the default rule schema (RK)
(t'~ n í72 n... n n„ ~ 9) -~ (o(n~) n o(n~) n... o(t'n) ~ 0(9)),
which also allows defaults between norms.
The consequence of the use of rule (ROM2) is that norms are dependent on rules and
that rules are not dependent on norms. This means that rules have a higher priority than
norms. Thus, an argument of rules cannot be defeated by an argument of norms. If we
had not made this distinction between rules and conditional norms (i.e., if we had opted
for (RK) instead of (ROM2)), we would have got, for example, the following situation:
W U ~: (1) O(a) F: 0
(2) O(b)
(3) a ~ ~b
with (3) ~ (2) ~ (1).
From O(a) and a~~b we can deduce O(~b). Thus, {O(a), a~ ~6} would be an argument
for O(~b). Thus, the set {O(a), O(b), a~ ~6} is incoherent. We cannot deduce ~(a ~~6)
from O(a) and O(b) with the (ROM2) rule. However, with (RK) we can derive ~(a ~~6)
from O(a) and O(b):
- O(a) n O(b) --~ O(a) n,O(,b);
- O(a) n ~O(~b) -~ -~(~O(a) v O(~b));
- ~(~D(a) V O(-~b)) --~ ~(O(a) -i O(b));
- ~(Q(a) -' O(b)) -~ ~(a ~ ~b).
Therefore, {O(a),O(b)} is an argument for ~(a ~~b).'
7As a consequence, we allow negations of default rules. It is not trivial to decide on the meaning of
these formulas.
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The advantage of replacing rule (ROM2) by a stronger rule is that rules and condi-
tional norms do not have to be separated in the arguments, and that, by definition, rules
do not have a higher priority than conditional norms, which is a consequence from the
theory presented in this chapter. At first glance, this seems a good concept for solving
the problem of the separation of rules and norms. However, this concept gives rise to
some serious problems since the definition of defeating arguments for rules is different from
the definition of norms. In the definition of defeating arguments for rules, we only look
at single statements with conflicting final conclusions, whereas in the definition of norms
we not only look at final conclusions but also at groups of statements deriving conflicting
conclusions. Furthermore, the applicability of a conditional norm depends on the facts and
the rules. This means that we have to separate rules and conditional norms. We leave this
issue of the separation of arguments for rules and conditional norms in deontic reasoning
as a future research topic.
Most deontic defeasible reasoning approaches are based on specificity considering the
amount of relevant information or supporting evidence. Our approach is based on the more
general idea of priority (authority). Other defeasibility criteria can easily be converted to
some form of defeasibility on the basis of priority.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Assuming that logic, especially deontic logic, can provide foundations for the construction
of legal expert systems and knowledge based systems in law, the purpose of this thesis
was to give a logical analysis of representation of legal rules and legal reasoning. We
investigated three concepts with respect to deontic logic:
~ the addition of (groups) of actors;
~ the addition of authorities;
~ reasoning with conflicting rules.
These concepts are necessary to deal with the problems discussed on the basis of a case of
conflicting speed limits in chapter 1. Therefore, they are also necessary ingredients for any
formalism that functions as a foundation for legal expert systems and knowledge based
systems in law.
A first aim has been to clarify the addition of (groups of) actors and authorities in
deontic logic in order to represent legal rules. This showed that the extensions of deontic
logic have more expressive power and that formulas acquire new meanings, not expressible
in SDL and PDeL. A second aim has been to reason with conflicting legal rules. We
investigated two reasoning approaches of this: first, the priority of the norms with the
help of an authority hierarchy to determine which norm should be followed in cases of
conflict, and second, defeasible deontic reasoning, i.e., reasoning with legal rules which are
implicitly subject to exceptions, and reasoning with inconsistent information. Both aims
have been reached, as we will summarise in this chapter. We can safely conclude that we
can improve the representation of legal texts and of legal knowledge in general, and that we
can formalise adequately legal reasoning by investigating deontic defeasible reasoning
and
reasoning with normative inconsistent information. Therefore, such an improvement and
a formalisation form a basis for the improvement of legal expert systems and knowledge
based systems in law.
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This research was meant to be a contribution to developments initiated by others, partly
by applying these developments to the legal domain and partly by adding something new
to the developments themselves.
8.1 Summary
In chapter 2, we started with the presentation of PDeL (propositional deontic logic). We
saw that this system provides a very workable framework for reasoning with Ought-to-do
statements, in contrast to SDL (standard deontic logic), which enables us to reason with
Ought-to-be statements.
In chapters 3 and 4, we presented formalisations of relativised deontic modalities. The
result was that we distinguished several levels of the notions of obligation and permission.
The first level was the level of the personal notions, the second level was the level of the
general and unspecific notions, the third level was the level of the collective notions, and
the fourth level was the level of strong and weak notions. The relations between these four
levels were investigated and summarised in figures 3.7, 3.8, and 4.3.
The addition of (groups of) actors in SDL resulted in a description of relativised deontic
operators for Ought-to-be statements. Our approach avoided problems encountered in
other approaches, especially, in the approach taken by Herrestad and Krogh. We showed
that the problem in this approach could be smoothly solved by introducing the strong
and weak obligations, on the basis of collective obligations. Interpreting the collective
obligation as the strict collective obligation was essential, since the problem was not solved
when interpreting the collective obligation as the weak collective obligation.
In the extension of PDeL with groups of actors, we saw that the type of action is very
important to indicate when a group fulfils an obligation; e.g., if a group has to perform a
positive action, then some subset of that group has to perform that action, and if a group
has to `perform' a negative action, then every subset of that group has to perform that
action.
The difference between the extensions of the systems SDL and PDeL with groups of
actors is that in the extension of SDL we are able to express that a group of actors or
an actor has to accomplísh a certain situation, and that in the extension of PDeL we are
able to express that a group of actors or an actor has to perform a certain action. We
saw that in the case of the Penal Code, the formalisation of obligations as Ought-to-do
statements fitted better than Ought-to-be statements. Thus, with regard to the Penal
Code, the extension of PDeL is to be preferred.
In chapter 5, we extended the system discussed in the chapters 3 and 4 with sets of
authorities, which ~enabled us to express who enacted a certain norm. Furthermore, it
enabled us to treat several classical issues: hierarchical norms, completeness of a legal
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system and normative inconsistencies.
The theory we presented was a modification of Bailhache's theory. This theory was
developed to obtain a deontic coherent system. Inherent to this theory is that we cannot
express conflicts between enacted norms. However, we showed that this theory has some
serious drawbacks, e.g., that we cannot express that an authority enacted a permission.
To deal with these drawbacks, we chose for another approach: instead of the set A of
authorities modifying a norm, the set A is treated as a modal operator. With the help
of this change, the drawbacks disappeared from our theory. Furthermore, we saw that we
could consistently formalise normative inconsistencies, i.e., conflicting norms enacted by
sets of authorities.
In chapter 6, we saw that a normative system changes by promulgation (the introduction
of a norm into a legal system) and derogation (the removal of a norm from a legal system),
i.e., the dynamic character of law. These two legislative acts by authorities have two
features in common: the modification of the norms applicable and the restriction of the
competence of inferior authorities. Furthermore, we showed that not only derogation but
also promulgation can lead to logical indeterminacy, in contrast to Alchourrón's statement.
Since normative systems change by promulgation and derogation, normative inconsistencies
may exist. To deal with these normative inconsistencies, we developed a theory on the
basis of an ordering of the authorities with respect to their competence, in other words,
an authority hierarchy. A drawback of this approach is that we can only deal with norms
and, more precisely, with unconditional norms.
Finally, (postulated) universality was discussed in chapter 5, and the way in which uni-
versality can be reached by a closure rule, such as nulla poena sine lege. We argued that
postulated universality does not restrict individual freedom and responsibility: the indi-
vidual's norms awareness is restricted by the extension of the whole of legal prohibitions.
In chapter 7, we presented a theory of defeasible deontic reasoning dealing with some
very common problems of other approaches: defeasibility between groups of conditional
norms; the combination of defeasibility of rules and norms; the absence of the notion of
permission. In this approach, defeasibility occurs in two phases. The first phase concerns
the defeasibility of rules, and the second phase concerns the defeasibility of norms with
respect to the first phase. A consequence of this approach is that norms are dependent
on rules and that rules are not dependent on norms. This means that rules have a higher
priority than norms.
8.2 The Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990 revisited
In this section, we formalise some cases related to the case concerning speed limits discussed
in chapter 1. Before we present the cases, we will give the formal representation of arts.
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20, 21 and 22 of the Dutch Traf~ic Regulation 1990 concerning speed limit. We use the
following abbreviations:
Q1(i) : i is within built-up areas
Qz(i) : i is outside built-up areas
Q3(i) : i is on motorways
Q4(i) : i is on national routes
a~: to drive l km~h, for 1- 0, 1, 2, ..., 300
bi: aifi U attz U... U asoo
c(i): to give right of way to i.
M: the group of motor-vehicle drivers
Cl: the group of moped drivers
Cz: the group of motorised wheelchair drivers
El: the group of lorry drivers
Ez: the group of bus drivers
E3: the group of tractor drivers
E4: the group of construction vehicle drivers
E5: the group of motor vehicles with trailers drivers
The formalisation of the articles is as follows:
Article 20. Within built-up areas the following speed limits hold:
for motor vehicles 50 km~h;
for mopeds and motorised wheelchairs 30 km~h.
diEM(Qll2) ~ F(2 : b50))i
diEC~ucz(Qi(i) ~ F(i : ~o)).
Article 21. Outside built-up areas the following speed limits hold:
a. for motor vehicles on motorways 120 km~h, on national routes 100 km~h and on other
roads 80 km~h;
b. for mopeds and motorised wheelchairs 40 km~h.
diEMl(Q2(Z) n Q,3(2)) ~ F(1 : b120))i
diEM((Q2(2) n Q4(2)) ~ F(2 : b100))r
diEM((Q2(Z) n~(Q3(Z) v Q4(Z))) ~ F(2 : bgo))i
diEC,uc,(Qz(i) ~ F(i : bao)).
Article 22. Assuming that, in accordance with other sections, no lower speed limit holds,
the following speed limits hold for the following vehicles:
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a. for lorries, buses and motor vehicles with trailers 80 km~h;




The main case in chapter 1 was as follows. On a national route, a lorry driver drove at a
speed of 96 km~h. The lorry driver was imposed an administrative sanction on the ground
of `a lorry exceeding the speed limit by 15 to 20 km~h'. However, the lorry driver was of
the opinion that, on the road in question, traffic signs indicating a speed limit of 100 km~h
were in force, and that, therefore, no sanctionable act had been committed, for traf~ic signs
override traffic rules according to art. 63 of the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990.
In art. 22 of the Dutch Traf~ic Regulation 1990, it is laid down that for lorries the
special speed limit of 80 km~h holds, which can be formalised as follows:
diEE, F(i : bsp).
According to traffic sign A1(100), it is forbidden to drive faster than 100 km~h:
diE,yF(i : blpp).
Let il be the lorry driver. Then, the following statement holds
F(il : bgp) n F(il : blpp),
since il E El and il E M. Note that El C M. This formula is equivalent tol
F(il : bso)~
thus, the two prohibitions are not in conflict. Hence, art. 63 is not applicable in this case,
since traffic signs override traffic rules in as far as these rules are incompatible with the
signs.
However, as we have seen in chapter 1, the letter of the law with regard to the speed
limit is not in agreement with the spirit of the law in the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990.
In built-up areas, there are, for example, A1(70) traffic signs on circular roads, indicating
that it is prohibited to drive faster than 70 km~h:
diEMF(2 : b70)-
1F(íl : b~) n F(il : bloo) - F(il : as1 U.. . U asoo) n F(i~ : aiol U... U aaoo) - F(il : asl) n.. . n F(il :
asoo) n F(il : aioi) n... n F(il : asoo) - F(íl : aal) n... n F(íl : a~o) - F(íi - bao).
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Many drivers will, and justifiably, take this sign to mean that it is permitted to drive at
a speed of 70 km per hour. This is, however, in disagreement with the motivation by the
district court judge and the Advocate-General. According to art. 20 of the Dutch Trafiic
Regulation 1990, a speed limit of 50 km~h holds for motor vehicles inside built-up areas.
Thus, the following norm holds
t1;ea~F(i : bso).
In this case, the following combination of the two general prohibitions holds:
diEMF(Z . ~70~ndiEMF(2 : b50)i
which is equivalent to
t1;E,yF(i : b~).
In chapter 1, we solved this problem by replacing articles 20, 21 and 22 by the following
article
The following speed limits hold:
a. for motor vehicles on motorways 120 km~h, on national routes 100 km~h
and on other roads 80 km~h;
b. for lorries, buses and motor vehicles with trailers 80 km~h;
c. for mopeds and motorised wheelchairs inside built-up areas 30 km~h and
outside built-up areas 40 km~h;
d. for tractors and construction vehicles 25 km~h.
Thus, the speed limit of 50 km~h for motor vehicles inside built-up areas is removed, and
speed has to be regulated by means of A1 signs. Then, the above case can be formalised
as follows:
diEMF(2 : bgp) n d~EMF(2 : b~p)r
which is equivalent to
d;En~F(i : b~o)-
This alternative has two advantages: first, the rules can be applied consistently, and second,
the legislator's wish is expressed in a clearer way. The legislator's intention is stated
precisely in these rules. In the Dutch Traffic Regulation 1990, this is definitely not the
case.
Right of way
In chapter 1, we saw that traff'ic signs and traffic rules can be incompatible in cases con-
cerning `right of way'. We gave the following example. Car driver ir is on a major road
and approaches a junction, where car driver i2 approaches from the right.
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On the grounds of the rule in art. 15, i, has to give right of way to iz; on the grounds
of the right-of-way signs (A6 and A9) and the principle of trust, il does not have to give
right of way to i2. In this formulation, i, both has to give right of way and does not have
to give right of way, which is clearly a case of incompatibility, which can be expressed as
follows on the basis of the principle of trust:
o(i, : c(~2)) n ~o(il : c(i2))~
It is obvious, that here we have an inconsistency. We can express this consistently with
the addition of articles and signs, in the same way as the addition of authorities in chapter
5:
art.15 : O(i, : c(iZ)) n sign(A6~9) :-~O(i, : c(i2)),
meaning that according to art. 15, i, is obliged to give right of way to iZ, and according
to signs A6 and A9, i, is not obliged to give right of way to i2. In this formalisation, there
is clearly a case of incompatibility, thus art. 63 is applicable. Since signs A6 and A9 have
a higher priority than art. 15, the norm ~O(i, : c(i2)) is followed in this situation.
Just as we define an authority hierarchy, we can define an article~sign hierarchy, i.e.,
an ordering of articles and signs. This is not only a hierarchy concerning two sets, the
set of articles and the set of traffic signs; articles are also ordered among themselves. For
example, according to art. 15.1 a driver has to give right of way to another driver who
approaches the junction from the right, and according to art. 15.2 a driver on a dirt road
has to give right of way to another driver on a paver road. Art. 15.2 has a higher priority
than art. 15.1 in case of incompatibility.
Emergency service vehicles
As we saw in chapter 1, there is one case in which art. 63 has a nasty consequence. A
passenger car driving on a major road approaches a junction, and at the same time a police
car with flashing light and sirens approaches from the left. On the ground of art. 50, driver
i, of the passenger car has to give way to driver i2 of the police car, but on the ground of
art. 15 and right-of-way signs A6 and A9, i2 has to give way to i,. This can be formalised
as follows on the basis of the principle of trust:
o(i, : c(i2)) n -~o(i, : c(iz)).
It is obvious, that we have an inconsistency; however, this can be consistently expressed
with the addition of articles and signs:
art.50 : O(i, : c(i2)) n art.15 :~O(i, : c(i2)) n sign(A6~9) :~O(il : c(i2)).
Art. 50 has a higher priority than art. 15, and signs A6 and A9 have a higher priority than
art. 50. Hence, on the ground of art. 63, the norm ~O(i, : c(i2)) is chosen. We solved this
problem by replacing art. 50 by:
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Yielding right of way by road users to drivers of emergency service vehicles
overrides traflïc lights and traffiic signs and rules that regulate right of way.
Then, the above case can be formalised as follows:
e.s.v. : O(il : c(iz)) n art.15 :~O(il : c(i2)) n sign(A6~9) :~O(il : c(i2)).
Now, norm O(i~ : c(i2)) is chosen, since emergency service vehicles (e.s.v.) have a higher
priority than signs and articles.
The above cases show that we can smoothly represent articles in the Dutch Traf~ic
Regulation 1990 in our `extended' deontic logic. Using this representation, we can analyse
legal reasoning with conflicting norms or inconsistent information.
8.3 Further research
This thesis invites further research on several areas:
~ The incorporation and implementation of the theories discussed in this thesis, in
knowledge based systems.
~ The representation of ineta-statements, such as art. 63 of the Dutch Traffic Regu-
lation. These statements are not explicitly expressed in our representation of legal
rules.
~ The representation of open-textured concepts. Open texture is one of the ways in
which a judge deals with unforeseen change, and is essential to facilitate legal change.
However, this is one of the hardest problem of representation.
~ The role of the individuals in a group with respect to collective obligations are in-
determinate; every individual plays the same part in the group. In reality, there is
more structure in a group, like goalkeeper, defenders, midfield players and attackers
in a football team, but they all have the same goal, i.e., to win.
~ The combination of Ought-to-do and Ought-to-be statements. There are situations
in which we would like to relate the two Oughts with each other (see d'Altan, Meyer
and Wieringa, 1993).
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Samenvatting
Deontische logica is van groot belang voor het formaliseren van juridische regels. Deon-
tische logica is te omschrijven als de bestudering van de formele structuur van normatief
taalgebruik. Met andere woorden, deontische logica is de analyse van redeneerregels met
uitspraken waarin begrippen als `verplicht', `verboden' en `toegestaan' voorkomen. Er
bestaan veel verschillende systemen van deontische logica, omdat er geen overeenstemming
bestaat onder logici. Er bestaat bijvoorbeeld geen overeenstemming over de axiomatische
opbouw van een deontische logica en over de semantische status van de uitspraken waar
deontische operatoren in voorkomen.
In dit onderzoek zijn twee `standaard systemen van deontische logica' behandeld: stan-
daard deontische logica (SDL) voor `Ought-to-be' beweringen en propositionele deontische
logica (PDeL) voor `Ought-to-do' beweringen. Het verschil tussen beide systemen is, dat
een formule als O(p) in het eerste systeem gelezen wordt als `Het is verplicht zo te handelen
dat de propositie p waar wordt', bijvoorbeeld `Het is verplicht zo te handelen dat er niet
gerookt wordt', en in het tweede systeem als `Het is verplicht handeling p uit te voeren',
bijvoorbeeld `Het is verplicht niet te roken'.
Dit proefschrift, getiteld `Representation of Legal Rules in Deontic Logic', heeft als
uitgangspunt dat binnen juridische kennissystemen het gebruik van niet-standaardlogica's,
eventueel in combinatie met elkaar, een verbetering kan zijn ten opzichte van het gebruik
van de standaardlogica. Onder juridische kennissystemen worden met name computer-
programma's verstaan die tot doel hebben rechtsvragen op te lossen. In dit proefschrift
komt deontische logica, een niet-standaardlogica, aan de orde. Deze is onmisbaar voor de
formalisering van juridische regels. Een geschikte deontische logica is echter nog niet voor-
handen en zeker geen niet-monotone variant hiervan, waarmee we kunnen redeneren onder
voorbehoud van uitzonderingen. Dit komt veelvuldig voor in het recht. Dit onderzoek
levert een bijdrage aan een verdere ontwikkeling van een deontisch systeem voor het recht.
De deontische logica wordt uitgebreid door middel van
~ het toevoegen van (groepen) actoren;
~ het toevoegen van autoriteiten.
Actoren zijn individuen waarop de normen van toepassing zijn. Autoriteiten zijn individuen
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die de normen bepalen. Verder hebben we twee benaderingen gegeven om te redeneren met
inconsistente informatie: een benadering met behulp van een autoriteiten-hiërarchieen één
met behulp van niet-m,onotoon redeneren.
In hoofdstuk 1 worden de doelstelling en uitgangspunten van het onderzoek geschetst.
Een centraal uitgangspunt is dat deontische logica bruikbaar is voor de analyse van ju-
ridische kennissystemen. Een ander belangrijk uitgangspunt is dat de analyse niet in
direct programmeerbare theorieën behoeft uit te monden. Dit onderzoek gaat hier nood-
zakelijkerwijs aan vooraf: een analyse op formeel beschrijvingsniveau die geschikt is als
beoordelingsmaatstaf voor geïmplementeerde kennissystemen.
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt tevens uitvoerig ingegaan op een arrest betreffende de notie van
onverenigbaarheid in art. 63 van het RVV 1990. Deze casus dient als ondersteuning voor
het formaliseren en als voorbeeld van de manier waarop de betreffende problemen met
behulp van de deontische logica kunnen worden uitgedrukt en opgelost.
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt het systeem propositionele deontische logica (PDeL). Daarin
wordt de deontische logica gereduceerd tot een variant van de dynamische logica. Dynami-
sche logica is een systeem waarin we eigenschappen kunnen uitdrukken zoals: `Als men een
actie uitvoert in de huidige situatie, dan zal na de uitvoering van die actie een bepaalde
bewering mogelijk (of noodzakelijk) gelden'. Bijvoorbeeld, als het raam open staat en men
doet het raam dicht, dan zal na die actie de bewering `Het raam is dicht' gelden en niet
meer de bewering `Het raam staat open'. Dynamische logica kan beschouwd worden als
een zwakke modale logica met toegevoegde axioma's voor het gedrag van de verschillende
acties die strikt gescheiden worden van de beweringen in het systeem. Hier blijkt dat deze
laatste eigenschap van de syntax ons behoedt voor intuïtief tegenstrijdige beweringen, die
vaak in de literatuur over deontische logica's te vinden zijn.
In de hoofdstukken ~ en 4 worden formalisaties van relatieve deontische modaliteiten
gegeven. Relatieve deontische modaliteiten hebben betrekking op wat verplicht, verboden
of toegestaan is voor een individu of groep individuen. Hierdoor ontstaat de mogelijkheid
om weer te geven voor wie een bepaalde norm geldt, bijvoorbeeld `Het is verboden voor Jan
om te roken'. In tegenstelling tot wat `niet persoonlijk' verplicht, verboden of toegestaan
is, bijvoorbeeld `Het is verboden om te roken'. Het resultaat is dat we vier verschillende
noties kunnen onderscheiden van verplichtingen, verboden en permissies:
1. de individuele notie (`Het is verboden voor Jan om te roken');
2. de generale notie (`Voor iedereen is het verboden om te roken') en haar duale notie
de onbepaalde notie (`Er is iemand waarvoor het verboden is om te roken');
3. de collectieve notie (`Voor Jan en Piet is het verplicht om de tafel te verplaatsen');
4. de sterke notie (`Voor iedere groep individuen is het verboden om de tafel te ver-
plaatsen') en haar duale notie de zwakke notie (`Er is een groep individuen waarvoor
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het verboden is om de tafel te verplaatsen').
De relaties tussen deze vier noties zijn uitgebreid onderzocht in de twee hoofdstukken.
Met name, het idee van de collectieve notie is nieuw. Verplichtingen berusten niet altijd
op individuen, maar kunnen ook gericht zijn op groepen individuen. Bijvoorbeeld, `Jan en
Piet zijn verplicht de tafel te dekken'. Deze verplichting is niet gericht op elk individu in
de groep ( in dit geval de groep .Ian en Piet). Met andere woorden, het is geen verplichting
voor zowel Jan als Piet om de tafel te dekken. Als alleen Jan de tafel dekt is aan de
verplichting voldaan.
Bij de uitbreiding van PDeL met groepen individuen is het van belang welke type actie
(positief of negatief) aan de orde is om aan te geven wanneer een groep aan een verplichting
voldoet. Een positieve actie is een actie die enige vorm van lichamelijke activiteit met zich
meebrengt. Als een groep verplicht is om de tafel te verzetten ( een positieve actie), dan
voldoet de groep aan de verplichting als een subgroep die tafel verzet. Als een groep
verplicht is de tafel te laten staan ( een negatieve actie), dan voldoet de groep aan deze
verplichting als elke subgroep de tafel laat staan. De norm wordt al geschonden als een
individu uit de groep de tafel verzet.
Er bestaat een wezenlijk verschil tussen de uitbreiding van de systemen SDL en PD~L
met groepen individuen. In de uitbreiding van SDL zijn we in staat uit te drukken dat
een individu of groep individuen verplicht is om een bepaalde situatie te bewerkstelligen.
In de uitbreiding van PD~L kan worden uitgedrukt dat een individu of groep individuen
verplicht is een bepaalde actie uit te voeren. Wat betreft het strafrecht is de uitbreiding
van PDeL te prefereren, omdat het daar steeds om gedmgingen gaat. Wanneer in een
delictsomschrijving een onwettige toestand wordt genoemd, vraagt men zich af wie die
toestand in het leven heeft geroepen ( of laten ontstaan) en wie die toestand heeft laten
voortbestaan. De onwettige toestand wordt dus herleid tot een gedraging.
In hoofdstuk 5 breiden we de systemen, die behandeld zijn in de vorige twee hoofdstuk-
ken, uit met autoriteiten, zodat de mogelijkheid ontstaat om uit te drukken wie een be-
paalde norm heeft bepaald. Op basis hiervan worden verscheidene onderwerpen behandeld,
zoals hiërarchische normen, ( gepostuleerde) universaliteit en normatieve inconsistenties.
De theorie die besproken wordt, is een uitbreiding en wijziging van de theorie van
Bailhache. Deze theorie was ontwikkeld om een deontisch coherent systeem - dat wil zeggen
`Wat verplicht is, is toegestaan voor iedereen' - te krijgen. We zien echter dat deze theorie
enkele serieuze bezwaren met zich brengt: (1) alleen verplichtingen en geen permissies
kunnen bepaald worden door autoriteiten. Het is dus onmogelijk om uit te drukken dat
een autoriteit bepaalt dat het toegestaan is om te parkeren; ( 2) autoriteiten kunnen alleen
een atomaire collectieve verplichting bepalen en geen combinaties van verplichtingen. Het is
onmogelijk om uit te drukken dat een autoriteit bepaalt dat het verplicht is rechts te houden
en verplicht is om je snelheid aan te passen; en (3) normatieve inconsistenties kunnen niet
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worden uitgedrukt. Met normatieve inconsistentie wordt bedoeld dat in een bepaald geval
twee tegenstrijdige regels van toepassing zijn. Een oorzaak hiervan is bijvoorbeeld dat de
wetgever geen uniek orgaan is: de regelgevende bevoegdheid is verdeeld over een groot
aantal instanties, waardoor conflicten tussen regels kunnen ontstaan. Het laatste bezwaar
is inherent aan een deontisch coherent systeem. Deze drie bezwaren verdwijnen in onze
theorie.
In hoofdstuk 6 zien we dat een normatief systeem verandert door promulgatie (het intro-
duceren van normen) en derogatie (het verwijderen van normen): het dynamische karakter
van het recht. Deze twee wetgevende activiteiten, uitgaande van autoriteiten, hebben twee
gemeenschappelijke eigenschappen: de wijziging van daadwerkelijk geldende normen en de
beinvloeding van de competentie van `lagere' autoriteiten. Bovendien wordt getoond dat
niet alleen derogatie maar ook promulgatie kan leiden tot logische onbepaaldheid. Onder
logische onbepaaldheid verstaan we dat we logisch gezien niet kunnen bepalen welke norm
impliciet moet worden afgeschaft. Door het dynamische karakter van het recht kunnen
normatieve inconsistenties ontstaan. Om deze inconsistenties het hoofd te bieden, wordt
een theorie ontwikkeld op basis van een ordening van autoriteiten met betrekking tot hun
competentie, met andere woorden een autoriteiten-hiërarchie. Een nadeel van deze theorie
is dat alleen ongeconditioneerde normen worden behandeld.
Tot slot bespreken we (gepostuleerde) universaliteit van normen en hoe deze bereikt kan
worden. We zien dat de invoering van een universeel normensysteem op praktische moei-
lijkheden stuit. Deze moeilijkheden kunnen eenvoudig omzeild worden door de invoering
van algemene sluitingsregels, zoals nulla poena sine lege (`geen straf zonder voorafgaande
strafbepaling'). Hierdoor ontstaan echter geheel andere problemen, zoals het bevorderen
van het zogenaamde zwemmen door de mazen van de wet. Verder blijkt dat niet de ge-
postuleerde universaliteit de individuele vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid aantast, maar de
uitbreiding van verplichtingen en verboden.
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een theorie van een deontische variant van niet-monotoon rede-
neren ontworpen, die enkele problemen van bestaande theorieën omzeilt. Bijvoorbeeld, de
nieuwe theorie bevat de toevoeging van een Reiter default voor de negatie van de verplich-
ting (permissie) en kan niet alleen niet-monotoon redeneren met normen, maar ook met
interpretatie-regels.
Hoofdstuk 8 bevat de resultaten van het onderzoek. Het gaat te ver om te stellen
dat de resultaten van dit onderzoek onmiddelijk een optimale vorm bieden om juridische
teksten te representeren, ofschoon dat op onderdelen niet is uitgesloten. De omzetting
van theoretische kennis in praktische regels voor de ontwerper van een kennissysteem vergt
een grondige uiteenzetting en afweging van de waarden en doeleinden waarop die regels
berusten en dikwijls ook kennis van empirische verbanden. Het is evenwel onze overtuiging
dat dit onderzoek, als analytische studie, een bijdrage levert aan het inzicht in de wijze




Lambèr Royakkers werd op 4 september 1967 geboren te Heerlen. In 1986 behaalde hij
het VWO-diploma aan het Bisschoppelijk College in Echt. In september 1986 ging hij
Technische wiskunde en Techniek en maatschappij studeren aan de Technische Universi-
teit in Eindhoven (TUE) en behaalde in december 1991 het doctoraal-examen Techniek
en maatschappij en een jaar later het doctoraal-examen Technische wiskunde. Zijn af-
studeerverslagen waren getiteld Enkele formele problemen van de elementaire leer van de
maatschappelijke keuzetheorie, met als begeleiders prof. dr. A. Sarlemijn, prof. dr. H.C.M.
de Swart en dr. A. Storcken, en Predikatieve deontische logica, met als begeleiders dr. R.
Nederpelt en prof. dr. J.-J.Ch. Meyer. Tijdens zijn studie was hij verder twee jaar
student-assistent bij de vakgroep Techniek, Wetenschap, Innovatie en Maatschappij. Sinds
1 april 1992 is hij werkzaam als onderzoeker in opleiding bij de vakgroep Inleiding van de
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant in Tilburg, onder begeleiding van dr. F. Dignum. Dit pro-
motieonderzoek is gefinancierd door het Nederlands Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO).
De resultaten van het onderzoek zijn weergegeven in dit proefschrift. Verder is hij sinds
1993 als freelance-medewerker verbonden aan de TUE, waar hij de colleges Maatschappe-
lijke Keuzetheorie en Normenlogica geeft.
205
i u u ui u a ~ i i ui ua u u uuu m iuu u uu uil
